University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Legacy Theses 2000 Blitzkrieg under fire: German rearmament, total economic mobilization, and the myth of the "Blitzkrieg strategy:, 1933-1942 Gore, Brett Thomas Gore, B. T. (2000). Blitzkrieg under fire: German rearmament, total economic mobilization, and the myth of the "Blitzkrieg strategy:, 1933-1942 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/21701 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/40717 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Blitzkrieg under Fire: Gennan Rearmament, Total Economic Mobilization, and the Myth of the "Blitzkrieg Strategy", 1933-1942 by Brett Thomas Gore A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTMI, FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER 2000 O Brett Thomas Gore 2000 National Library Biblioth&que nationale 1+1 of,,, du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 WMinStreet 395. rue WeDingtm Ottawa ON KIA ON4 OttawaON KlAW Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclisive pennettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distri'bute or sell reproduire, pr;ter, distri'buer ou copies ofthis thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la fome de microfiche/^ de reproduction sur papier ou sur format electmnique . The author retains ownership of the L' auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts &om it Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent itre imprim8s reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT The "Blitzkrieg Strategy" as an historid theory has bedthe debate for the last five decades concerning the nature, extent, and purpose of German rearmament during the 1930s, and the performance of the Third Reich's military forces and war economy between 1939 and 1941. It argues that Germany dehityplanned for a series of short, predatory wars requiring only Limited military and economic rnob~tion;conversion to MI-war production came only after the fim Germaa defeats in late-1941. Documentary evidence and the work of revisionist historians, however, demonstrates that pre-war rearmament and economic mobhtion in wartime were as extensive as possible given the Reich's economic and financial Iimitations. Furthennore, Germany planned to fight a large war in the mid-1940s once its major rearmament programs and heavy industrial and raw material projects had been completed ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It is with pleasure that I undertake to thank those who conm%uted to the completion of this work. To begin with, I would like to thank Dr. A. Chanady, Dr. B. Zagorin, and Dr. B. PIoufCe of the University of Regina for their letters of reference which enabled me to enter the MA. program. To my supervisor, Dr. Holger Herwig, I say thank you for the suggestion of this fascinating topic, and for the many hours spent editing the working drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Dr. John Ferris, not ouly for senring as my interim supervisor during the first year of the program, but also for his unhesitating willingness to sit on the examination committee. His good-natured humour and support over these past years is greatly appreciated. Special thanks are due, as weU, to Dr. Rob Huebert for piously agreeing to help a relative stranger, and sit as third examiner at the oral defence. Let me also take this opportlrnity to thank Jennifer Feldman of the University of Alberta Library for her assistance with archival materials, and Diana Hossfeld for her help with some of the more complex Gennan documents. I am also forever grateful to a fellow Reginan and Graduate Secretary of the Department, Olga Leskiw, for her tremendous . moral support and admmstmtive mastery! I would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Department of History and Faculty of Graduate Studies, as well as the support of those at the University of Calgary Parking Services who took my academic schedule into consideration I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my fmand fiends, and thank you for your unwavering support and encouragement And a final thank you to Wendel who kept me company and remained stead€&@ at my side throughout this entire undertaking. TABLE OF CONTENTS .. Approval Page ....................................................................................................................... u Abstract.............................................................................................................................. .--u--. Acknowledgements...................................................... .. Table of Contents................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction: An Historiographical Discussion of the Blitzkrieg Topic ........................................................................... I CHAPTER TWO: German MiIitary Rearmament, 1 933-1 939 ........................................ 29 CHAPTER THREE: Large-scale Economic Mobilization as an Indicator of To& War Preparations............................................................... 66 CHAPTER FOUR: "BliaIcrieg Strategy" as an Historicd Anachronism: Economic Crisis, Diplomatic Blunder, and Total Mobilization....... 89 CONCLUSION.... ................... ............................................................................................ 141 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................ 144 LIST OF TABUS 1. Some Estimates of Rearmament l2xpenditure 1933- 1939. by Calender Year. ............. 118 2. Investment in German Industry 1928- 193 8 ................................................................... 122 3 . German Wage and Consumption Statistics 1928-1938 ............................................... 122 4. indices of Production of Certain Armaments in Germany. 1939- 194 1........................ 133 5 . Expenditure on Selected Weapons in Gennany. 1939-1941 ........................................ 134 6 . The Mobilization of Net National Product for War .Germany. 1938-1945 ..................136 7 . Statistics on Investment in German Industry 1938-1944 in Billion RM ....................... 137 8 . Military Expenditure. State Expenditure and National Income in Germany 1938.1944 .................................................................................................. 138 CWERONE Introduction: An Historiographical Discussion of the Blitzkrieg Topic Much research and discussion has occurred since the end of the Second Wodd War concerning the military and economic motivations of Nazi Germany's Blitzkrieg or lightening-war campaigns between 1939 and 1941. The lively and vigorous historical debate which has resulted has focussed mainly on such key areas as the extent and composition of Germany's rearmament programmes throughout the 1930s; the evolution of the German economy and the nature of German economic policy under National Socialist control: the regime's diplomatic and strategic gods, or lack thereof; the type of war planned for by the political and military leadership; the adequacy of military and economic preparations given the type of war which resulted after 1939: and the performance of the German military and economy during the first two years of war. All these factors must be taken into account when considering the nature and existence of a "Blitzkriegstrate&*. The !%-st attempts to analyse the German economy and German rearmament under National Socialist direction were spearheaded primarily by economists. some of whom were Marxist-Leninists. Economic and political studies of pre-war Germany were conducted by the American economists Maxine Sweezy, Otto Nathan. and Milton Fried, as well as by East German Marxists like Jiirgen Kuczynski.' These studies nearly all agreed that, beginning in 1933. the National Socialist regime tailored its large public works projects to I See Maxine Sweezy. "Gennanicus," Gerrnanv. the Last Four Years (Boston: Eyre and Spomswoode. 1937); idem. The Structure of the Nazi E- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); Otto Nathan, Nazi War Finance adBanking (New York: Financial Research Program, National Bureau of Economic Research. 1944); Otto Nathan and Milton Fried. The Nazi Economic Svstem: Germanv's Mobilization for War (Durham.N. C.: Duke University Press, 1944); Jiirgen Kuczynski, Germany: Economk and Labur Condhons*. under Fascism (New York: International Publishers, 1945); Jiirgen Kuczynski and M. Witt, _Te Economics of Rarbarisrn :Hitler's New EcollpmiE Order in Euroue (Toronto: Progress Books, 1942). Other