Chapter IV Dutch policy and self-determination in the West New Guinea case As was explained in Chapter I, the Netherlands and Indonesia failed to reach an agreement about the future of West New Guinea. Initially the problem seemed not insurmountable, but when the Netherlands refused to relinquish its sovereignty and embarked on a policy that was likely to result in a permanent separation of the territory from Indonesia, the conflict deepened. This chapter will further describe and explain the policy pursued by the Netherlands in this conflict. 1. West New Guinea becomes an issue In October 1946 during a conference in Pangkalpinang, a town on Bangka island off Sumatra, Netherlands negotiators launched the idea of a special status for West New Guinea. In November 1946 at Linggadjati, a town on Java, representatives of the Indonesian Republic, although opposed to the idea, agreed to an ambiguous compromise, that would be a source of much contention in the years to follow. Article 3 of the Linggadjati Treaty, asseverated that “the future United States of Indonesia will comprise the whole territory of the Netherlands Indies,”1 but “the population of any territory, which so wishes, 1 Article 3 of the Linggadjati agreement, quoted from B.V.A Röling, Nieuw-Guinea: Wereldprobleem [New Guinea: World Problem], Assen, Van Gorcum B.V., 1958, p.17. 109 can choose a special relationship with The United States of Indonesia or the Netherlands.”2 In the Netherlands, in a climate of frustration over the impending loss of the Indies, determination to save at least part of the colony was growing, and politicians used the opportunity which Article 3 offered to fulfil this desire. A statement of 10 December 1946 showed how the government capitalised on the confusing Linggadjati formulation, using it to justify a policy that would give West New Guinea a special status: The Netherlands Indies will become a sovereign democratic state on a federative basis...but the population of any territory, which so wishes, can choose a special relationship to the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands...[T]he government declares that it desires that in the spirit of the Articles 3 and 4 [of the Linggadjati agreement] New Guinea must be able to obtain its own status with respect to the Kingdom and the United States of Indonesia.3 With the decolonisation of Indonesia degenerating into a colonial war and the Netherlands suffering major diplomatic defeats in the United Nations which had forced it to accept a distasteful treaty of independence, the feeling that compensation for a blemished reputation and loss of political status was required united ever stronger social and political forces in the Netherlands. The colonial ship was lost but West New Guinea became a life boat to salvage Dutch pride. The ugly duckling of the former Dutch East Indies, with its uncivilised population and negligible economic value, became the ransom Indonesia had to pay for its independence. 2 Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, quoted in A. Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and New Guinea, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, p.112. 3 Handelingen der Staaten-Generaal, 1946-1947, p.707, quoted from Lijphart, op.cit., p.112. The Renville Agreement of January 1948 confirmed the principles of the Linggadjati 110 A major debate on the question of Indonesia’s independence in the Second Chamber of Dutch parliament on 17 August 1949 showed a high level of political support for excluding West New Guinea from a direct transfer of sovereignty. The main Christian coalition parties -- Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP -- Anti Revolutionary Party), Christelijk Historische Unie (CHU -- Christian Historical Union), and Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP -- Catholic People's Party) as well as fellow coalition party, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD -- People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) were united in their opposition to include West New Guinea in a treaty of independence and in favour of continuing Dutch sovereignty. Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA -- Labor Party) was the only member of the government coalition willing to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia. Since approval of Indonesia’s independence required a two-thirds majority PvdA gave in reluctantly. The opposition of Christian parties to a transfer of sovereignty should be understood in terms of emotional and psychological motivations, as well as a desire to preserve some colonial and strategic presence in Southeast Asia. VVD was the first party to use self- determination as an argument to substantiate the claim to preservation of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea.4 Given the amount of political opposition to relinquishing West New Guinea it came as no surprise that deliberations during the Round Table Conference (RTC) were difficult, and the compromise formulated in the RTC agreement only increased the obscurity. Article 1 stated: Agreement, and declared that sovereignty over the whole of the Dutch East Indies would reside with the Netherlands until the actual transfer. Röling, op. cit., p.28. 4 Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1949-1950, p.807. 111 “The Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia unconditionally and irrevocably to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.”5 Since the two parties had not been able to reconcile their views regarding West New Guinea, Article 2F excluded that territory from the transfer: The status quo of the residency of [West] New Guinea will be maintained with the stipulation that, within one year after the date of the transfer of sovereignty...the question of its political future will be decided through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.6 In 1950, however, a firm majority in the Dutch parliament and cabinet remained vehemently opposed to relinquishing the territory. The difference with 1949 was that in 1950 preparation for ultimate self-determination became a more prominent argument to justify a recalcitrant position. Thus moralistic-altruistic rhetoric dominated the debate in the Second Chamber on 26 May 1950. VVD floor leader in the Second Chamber, Oud, stressed that the Netherlands had a duty to lead the Papuans to self-determination. KVP leader Romme, although using more moderate phrasing, also asserted a Dutch responsibility towards the Papuans. PvdA, which supported direct transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, could not but give in.7 In cabinet, Prime Minister Drees (PvdA) and Minister for Overseas Territories, Van Maarseveen (VVD), were implacably opposed to a transfer of sovereignty as such, but 5 Quoted from Justus M. van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, p.2. 6 Quoted from Röling, op. cit., p32. 7 Lijphart, op. cit., p.169; Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1950-1951, p.1183. 112 Drees’ consideration was also based on his anticipation of a united opposition against transfer of sovereignty in the Second Chamber.8 In a bid to win the support of the US State Department, a Foreign Affairs aide memoire sent in 1950 emphasised concerns over the well being of West New Guinea’s indigenous population to justify a continuation of Dutch sovereignty. It was argued that the Papuans of West New Guinea had a distinct ethnological identity, and that a transfer to Indonesia would deny the Netherlands the opportunity to develop the Papuans to the stage of self- government. Thus a continuation of Dutch administration was in the best interest of the population. A transfer of sovereignty was claimed to violate Article 73 of the UN Charter and would be unacceptable to Australia. Finally the memo emphasised the strategic value of the territory.9 Given the feelings expressed in parliament and cabinet for holding on to sovereignty over West New Guinea, the aide memoire was largely propagandist. However, these ostensibly noble intentions failed to woo the US Administration, which remained neutral. This was quite an achievement, however, since interference by the United States in Indonesia’s decolonisation had resulted in an accelerating of the Netherlands’ departure. With the US remaining neutral, the Netherlands could hang on to its administration in West New Guinea. 8 Hans Meijer, Den Haag-Djakarta: De Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1950- 1962 [The Hague-Jakarta: Dutch-Indonesian Relations 1950-1962], Utrecht, Het Spectrum, 1994. 9 J.G. de Beus, Morgen bij het aanbreken van de dag; Nederland driemaal aan de vooravond van oorlog [Tomorrow at Daybreak: the Netherlands Three Times on the Eve of War], Rotterdam, Ad Donker, 1977, p.261. 113 A secret debate in the Second Chamber on 28 September 1950 finally decided the fate of West New Guinea. The debate proved that in reality a variety of grounds were in use for excluding West New Guinea from a transfer of sovereignty. Behind closed doors, the altruistic veil of Papuan self-determination was not so fashionable. Some politicians and political parties used self-determination as a facade to hide disgruntled and hurt feelings over the loss of the colonial empire, and as a means to get even with the reviled Indonesian President Sukarno. To the ARP Netherlands’ sovereignty was unquestionable, like CHU who regarded sovereignty as a means to protect the interests of Dutch citizens. Fear that communism would benefit from a transfer of sovereignty motivated VVD. PvdA spokesman Schermerhorn took a neutral stand, but KVP floor leader Romme remained opposed to a transfer of sovereignty under all circumstances.10 Romme’s opinion had been strongly influenced by his secret personal correspondence with Joseph Luns, a little known diplomat, but soon the man at the helm of Dutch foreign policy. Luns was against making any concessions to Indonesia regarding transfer of sovereignty.11 His knowledge of international politics and diplomacy would have strongly influenced Romme, who was far from an expert in international affairs.