Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1994, 1 (2), 239-249 Contextualism: Is the act in context the adequate metaphor for scientific psychology? E. J. CAPALDI and ROBERT W. PROCTOR Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana According to some, psychology as it has been practiced is based on a world view known as mech­ anism. Individuals from a number of different areas of psychology, most recently within the behavior-analytic community, have strongly argued that psychology should be based on a differ­ ent world view, contextualism. They emphasize a variety of characteristics that, in their view, differentiate a contextualistically based psychology from one based on mechanism. We examine these characteristics and find them to be of dubious value for differentiating a contextualistic approach to psychology from others. One proposal of some advocates of contextualism is that con­ textualistic approaches should develop independently from most ofthe remainder ofpsychology, which they regard as mechanistic. This proposal is said to be derived from the metaphilosophy ofPepper (1942). We evaluate this proposal and reject it. We go on to suggest that the mechanis­ tic/contextualistic dichotomy is too constraining to realistically describe various approaches to psychology. In 1942, Stephen C. Pepper published a book entitled sequently, by critically focusing on the case advanced by World Hypotheses , in which he presented a framework the behavior analysts, we should be able as well to sup­ for classifying philosophic systems. This framework has ply a general critique of the more salient arguments met with considerable acceptance among a variety of psy­ offered by various adherents of Pepper 's metaphilosophy. chologists from different fields over the past two decades. Pepper's classifications have been used by some ofthese PEPPER'S METAPHILOSOPHY psychologists to reject what may be regarded as the dom­ inant or conventional approaches to theory and research According to Pepper (1942), most philosophic positions in psychology in favor of certain newer alternatives. If can be subsumed under one or another of four relatively these alternative approaches should come to be widely ac­ adequate world views. He goes on to say that each ofthese cepted, the result would be a revolution in the way psy­ world views derives from a distinctive root metaphor that chological research is practiced and theory is generated. provides a different, coherent, and defensible way of in­ Any arguments advocating radical change obviously de­ terpreting the world. These four world views arejormism, mand close scrutiny. However, although a few of the ar­ organicism, mechanism, and contextualism. guments stemming from Pepper's metaphilosophy have The root metaphor of the world view known as formism encountered some opposition (e.g., from Kendler, 1986; is similarity. The members of any dass of objects or ideas Marr, 1993; Staddon, 1993), so far they have escaped are similar to one another either because these members the extensive examination they deserve. We intend to rec­ are the reflection of some independently existing norm tify this shortcoming here. (Plato) or because we can see in the particulars that all The most recent proponents of radical change in psy­ members of the dass manifest the norm (Aristotle). For chology based on Pepper's metaphilosophy are individu­ Plato, oak trees are oak trees because they participate in als within the behavior-analytic framework stemming the norm for oak trees, whereas for Aristotle, all oak trees from the work of B. F. Skinner. Because the behavior­ have a common essence. The truth criterion of formism analyticarguments, more than others that have been made, is correspondence of the individual to the characteristics are addressed specifically to how experimental psychol­ of the dass. For example, this particular bird is a bird ogy is practiced, they are most relevant to members of because it has the characteristics peculiar to the dass of the Psychonomic Society and deserve particular attention. birds. Although some of the arguments advanced by certain For organicism, the root metaphor is the growing or­ members of the behavior-analytic community are unique, ganism. Things are seen as developing toward certain in many cases they correspond to those advanced by other ends, according to predetermined stages. Piaget's stages psychologists, such as developmental psychologists. Con- of cognitive development make up one example of organi­ cism within developmental psychology. The criterion of Correspondence should be addressed to E. J. Capaldi, Psychology truth for organicism is coherence. Systems-as, for ex­ Department, Psychology Building 1364, Purdue University, West ample, scientific theories-progress over time (i.e., de­ Lafayette, IN 47967-1364. velop) toward greater and greater inclusion or coherence. 239 Copyright 1994 Psychonomic Society, Inc. 240 CAPALDI AND PROCTOR Thus, Newton's theory is superior to that of Anaximenes. (1991), a behavior analyst, has argued that "for psychol­ Why? "Because, answers the organicist, it includes vastly ogy, mechanism is the wrong world-view for its subject more data, because these data are much more determinant, matter, and always was" (p. 124). He goes on to say, and because these determinant data are so closely in­ "Contextualism, though, is the bold new alternative-an tegrated so that in very large measure they are all mutu­ alternative that is continuing to evolve" (p. 143). ally implicative" (Pepper, 1942, p. 3(0). Contextualism has had its initial and major impact on Of almost exclusive concern here are the remaining two developmental psychology (see, e.g., Ford & Lerner, world views, mechanism and contextualism. According 1992; Lerner & Kaufman, 1985; Reese, 1991). It also to Pepper (1942), the root metaphor ofmechanism is the has been influential in environmental psychology (e.g., machine. The parts of the machine are assumed to inter­ Altman & Rogoff, 1987), social psychology (e.g., Ger­ act in a lawful manner to produce the functioning of the gen, 1989), and clinical psychology (e.g., Terwee, 1990). entire machine. For example, the earth revolves around Arecent book by Gillespie (1992) argues that cognitive the sun in a fixed pattern determined by the mutual gravita­ psychology should become contextualistic, and contex­ tional attraction ofthe two bodies. Mechanism is regarded tualism has been strongly advocated as the proper ap­ by many as the metaphor of science and of most contem­ proach for behavior analysis in particular and for psychol­ porary psychology (e.g., Gillespie, 1992; Morris, 1988). ogy in general (e.g., Hayes, Hayes, & Reese, 1988). Mechanism would be identified with Newton's approach, Despite the numerous differences among the advocates for example. Newton attempted to explain a variety of of contextualism, a theme that runs through the various phenomena on the basis of a small set of laws. The truth contextualistic accounts is that stimulus-response (S-R) criterion of mechanism is correspondence between hy­ psychology and cognitive psychology are highly similar, pothesis and experimental findings. This version of the in that both are exemplars of mechanistic systems and have correspondence criterion of truth is so well known and serious shortcomings as approaches to psychology. widely accepted as to require no elaboration. One may judge the fervor with which some have come The root metaphor ofcontextualism is the ongoing act to embrace contextualism from remarks by Sarbin (1993), in context. Contextualism sterns from pragmatism and is a personality-social psychologist. He states that coming associated with the philosophic systems ofWilliam James, to accept contextualism in place of mechanism is a very C. S. Peirce, and John Dewey. In contextualism, things difficult experience, requiring "something akin to reli­ are always seen as changing, but the change is not neces­ gious conversion" (p. 53). To begin to appreciate how sarily progressive, as in organicism. According to Pep­ different his contextualistic approach is from the so-called per (1942), "The ineradicable contextualistic categories mechanistic approach, consider the following: may thus be said to be change and novelty" (p. 235). Pep­ We have crossed the threshold into a new era. We have per states, "To give instances of this root metaphor in joined ranks with scholars who make the case for social our language with the minimum risk of misunderstand­ constructivism, for hermeneutics, for ethnomethodology, ing, we should use only verbs. It is doing, and enduring, for psychobiography, for dramaturgy, for narrative psy­ and enjoying" (p. 232). Contextualism favors an opera­ chology, for ethogeny, all patently contextual, all ready tional theory of truth, which has three distinct specifica­ to advance knowledge through the study of exemplars or tions. One of these truth criteria is that of "successful specimens. Wehavelived through a conversion experience, working." In terms ofthis criterion, Pepper states, "Truth andcan nowseethe worldfromthe perspective of contex­ is utility or successful functioning, and that is the end of tualism, the root metaphor of which is the narrative. We it" (p. 270). According to Pepper, the successful work­ live in a story shaped world. Looking back, the dreamof a productive andcomplete science of psychology basedon ing criterion eschews hypothesis testing altogether. The mechanistic principles served as a powerful incentive to true is whatever works in a particular situation.