0c-i National Security and International Aff’ah Division B-239362 April 8,lQQl The Honorable Beverly B. Byron Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Dear Madam Chairwoman: This report responds to your request that we examine personnel retention in the Selected Reserve. As you requested, we focused our work on the causes and extent of personnel turnover in the units of the Selected Reserve. We will send copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, Air Force, and Navy; and other interested parties on request. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 276-3990. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VI. Sincerely yours, Paul L. Jones ” Director, Defense Force Management Issues Executive SUmmary The Selected Reserve, as part of the Ready Reserve, must be able to pro- Purpose vide the combat and combat support units and personnel to augment the active forces during a national emergency. Because of the importance of the Selected Reserve, the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Com- pensation, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to examine enlisted personnel retention in the Selected Reserve to determine the extent, causes, and effects of personnel attrition. GAO also identified mil- itary, economic, and environmental factors affecting personnel turnover and evaluated the effectiveness of current management procedures related to attrition in the Selected Reserve. There are three reserve component categories: the Ready Reserve, the Background Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. Under the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Total Force policy, reservists will be the primary source of personnel to augment the active forces in military emergencies such as the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf. The majority of these reservists will come from the 1.6 million members of the Ready Reserve, which consists of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard. The Selected Reserve is comprised primarily of part-time drilling reserv- ists in the Army, Air Force, Naval, and Marine Corps Reserves and the Army and Air National Guard. It also has some full-time personnel. The Selected Reserve includes individuals assigned to units and active ser- vice organizations and individuals who have not completed initial training. Most members of the Selected Reserve are assigned to mobiliza- tion units and must participate in 48 drills (inactive duty training periods of at least 4 hours) and at least 2 weeks of active duty annually. It is not yet clear what role the reserves will play given the reduction of tensions in Europe and the aftermath of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, it is clear that attrition will need to be managed. The reserves need to be able to retain who they need, not just those who stay. The Selected Reserve lost a total of 220,909 enlisted personnel in fiscal Results in Brief year 1988. Reported attrition rates (for all types of losses, including retirements, discharges, transfers, and deaths) ranged from 11 percent x in the Air National Guard to 30 percent in the Army Reserve. Much of the turnover in National Guard and Reserve units is due to the unpro- grammed loss of reservists who stop participating in training before Page 2 GAO/N&ID-91-135 Reserve Component Attrition Executive summary their enlistment terms are completed. In fact, four out of five enlistees without previous military service failed to complete their 6-year enlist- ments. They constitute the majority of overall losses in the Selected Reserve. Because personnel losses are unevenly distributed across grade groups, overall loss rates mask the extent of losses in particular groups. Also, the geographical dispersion of units prevents the transfer of reservists to fill shortages in other units. However, with the existing reserve per- sonnel data base, a large number of losses cannot be identified by unit or state and some losses are incorrectly categorized. Job conflicts, dissatisfaction with training and enlistment terms, and delayed receipt of reserve pay contribute to attrition. GAO'S analysis showed that reservists who were not trained for their current duty posi- tion were the most likely to leave the Selected Reserve. Dealing with reservists who fail to participate in inactive duty training is difficult because of limited enforcement options. DODand individual reserve components have programs designed to reduce attrition and improve reserve retention. These programs include efforts to reduce grade stagnation, improve the effectiveness of recruiting and retention bonuses, and help reservists who must relocate to find new units. However, other innovative approaches appear to war- rant some consideration and/or testing. Principal Findings Nonprior Service The reserve components depend on recruits with and without prior mili- Personnel Are Higher tar-y service to meet their manpower requirements. Although nonprior service recruits made up 42 percent of the enlistments in fiscal year Attrition Risks 1988, they constituted 61 percent of overall losses in the Selected Reserve. The loss of nonprior service personnel also represents a direct cost to the reserve components for recruitment and training. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD91-135 Reserve Component Attrition ‘Executive Sununaxy More Comprehensive DOD’S attempts to resolve the attrition problem have been hampered by Attrition Information inadequate attrition information. Aggregated attrition data can mask the effects of attrition when losses are concentrated in certain grade Needed groups or certain units. For example, although the overall Marine Corps Reserve loss rate was 28 percent, attrition for those in grades E4-ES was 46 percent. Also, while the Army Reserve’s overall attrition rate in Cali- fornia was 36 percent, 71 percent of the units had high loss rates (i.e., attrition rates above 42 percent). Unlike the active components, individual reservists cannot be readily transferred between units to make up personnel shortages. For this reason, unit loss data should be more important to decisionmakers than aggregate loss data. The Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System, the official source of manpower information, (1) could not identify approximately 28 percent of enlisted losses in fiscal year 1988 by unit or state, (2) understated transfers from the Selected Reserve to the Individual Ready Reserve, and (3) could not identify 11 percent of losses by type. Some of this was due to the lack of common, consistent definitions of attrition which results in losses being incorrectly categorized. Reserve Environment Is a Many of the attrition problems in the reserve components are an Factor in Attrition inherent aspect of the reserve environment. The effects of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm call-up could exacerbate the attrition problem. Because reserve service is, in essence, a second job for most of the reservists, competing demands of their regular jobs and leisure time are important factors in attrition. Policy for Dealing With DOD has no uniform policy for dealing with reservists who fail to honor Nonparticipating their obligation to participate in inactive duty training. Realistic enforcement options are limited by the voluntary aspect of reserve duty Reservists Needed and the primarily part-time nature of reserve participation. Since the demise of the draft, imposing involuntary active duty for nonparticipa- tion does not appear to be a viable option. Initiatives to Reduce DOD and the various reserve components have a variety of programs Attrition ” aimed at reducing attrition. However, GAO identified a number of other Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-91-136 Reserve Component Attrition Exeeutlve Summary potential opportunities to improve existing retention programs. For example: l modifying existing bonus programs to emphasize retention, . establishing age and service-in-grade limitations for reservists to improve promotion opportunities and encourage younger reservists to remain in the Selected Reserve, and . assisting reservists who relocate to find new units. Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense . consider actions (such as more timely receipt of reserve pay) which could alleviate attrition factors inherent to the reserve environment; l develop a uniform policy for dealing with nonparticipating reservists consistent with their status as part-time volunteers; . develop more accurate measures of attrition, establish common defini- tions for attrition, and improve the accuracy of the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System as a source of attrition information; and 9 direct the services to examine the nature and extent of potential ramifi- cations associated with their reliance on nonprior service recruits to meet manpower requirements. GAO is also recommending a number of different approaches for improving the retention program. DOD either concurred or partially concurred with all of GAO'S findings Agency Comments and all but one recommendation and plans to implement action in response to most of the recommendations. DOD did not concur with the recommendation to test the feasibility of paying reservists at the end of their weekend drill period because it believes that it would involve too many administrative problems. GAO continues to believe that a feasi- bility test would determine whether potential benefits outweigh imple- mentation