2021 Thomas Reilly ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WORKING WITH WHAT THEY HAVE: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF DIVERSIONARY ACTION By THOMAS REILLY A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Political Science written under the direction of Jack S. Levy and approved by ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ New Brunswick, New Jersey January 2021 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION WORKING WITH WHAT THEY HAVE: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF DIVERSIONARY ACTION By THOMAS REILLY Dissertation Director: Jack S. Levy This dissertation broadens the diversionary theory of war to account for both lower-levels of foreign conflict and the breadth of possible diversionary actions for authoritarian regimes. First, I present a theory of diversionary choice that argues a particular regime-types available institutions and necessary centers of political power are going to be the main determinant in choosing a potential diversionary action. I posit that the more institutionalized a regime is, the severity of a chosen diversion will be inversely correlated with said institutional strength and complexity. As authoritarian regimes are not automatically prone to pursue the archetypical “rally-round-the-flag” effect due to the lessened influence of the broader population on governing stability and continuity, chosen diversions will make most use of extant institutions in order to enhance or preserve the critical segments of political power. Greater institutionalization allows for the exploitation and manipulation of smaller diversions to derive political benefits, while weaker institutions require a direct-effects approach or more grand and engaging spectacles. I then produce a framework of commonly accepted nondemocratic regime-types classified along institutional lines. Single-party regimes with their compartmentalized and bureaucratic nature are considered the most institutionally complex. Military Juntas represent a moderately institutionalized regime with robust institutions supporting the armed forces, but weak ii institutions in the civilian sector. Personalist regimes represent the least-institutionalized regimes, with the centralization of power around a single individual causing the decay and weakening of autonomous institutions. I then test my theory qualitatively with three rigorous case studies, two of which are historical, one of which is ongoing at the time of this dissertation. I analyze the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the tenure of Mao Zedong for personalist regimes, whereupon repeated failures of social engineering and widespread discreditation of Stalinism served to weaken Mao personal prestige, necessitating a violent diversion to compensate for the institutional malaise resulting from Mao’s weakness. I then look at the invasion of the Falklands by Leopoldo Galtieri as an attempt to reaffirm the status and continued relevance of the military even in light of worsening economic conditions and a potential return to civilian rule. My final case study focuses on the ongoing ownership dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands. The current institutional complexity and strength of China allows for the aggrandizement of even small-scale diplomatic disputes and the extraction of political benefits. iii Acknowledgement and Dedication Rutgers was good to me. Being from New York, it will always pain me that I spent so much time living in New Jersey, but my friends, colleagues and professors made the experience much more tolerable. I will always be indebted to my teachers and their valuable classes, and my various office-mates, whom served as a necessary source of both comic relief and advice. I am particularly indebted to my committee members, Jack Levy, Andrey Tomashevskiy, Eric Davis and Avery Goldstein. Generally, I thank them all for tolerating my various idiosyncrasies and work patterns, alternating between complete silence for many months, to constant email barrages. Avery served as an extremely valuable (and much-needed) source of China-centric knowledge and an insightful check on what I thought I knew. Andrey always made sure I was on the cutting-edge of research methods, data collection and stylistic prose. It also helped that his office was right next to mine. I have to thank Eric for sticking with this dissertation, even after I cut out the case for which I specifically asked him to be on it, but his presence firmly established the value of a pair of outside eyes. I have to thank Jack most of all, and for several reasons. First off, for accepting that I was never fully domesticated in, or comfortable with the various political machinations of academia as a distinct “world.” I’m rough around the edges, and he took it in stride. Secondly, for consistently pushing me towards building a better theory, exploring alternate literatures and serving as a constant (and timely!) source of constructivism criticism. Given my academic focus, I couldn’t have asked for a better dissertation advisor. iv I also want to thank my family and friends for a number of reasons. First of all, I truly appreciate that none of you are involved in academia. As bad it sounds, I preferred never being asked about my work, and being able to decompress and talk about other things when I wasn’t in the office. I greatly prefer having two separate worlds. I fully believe this is a reason I retained my sanity. Thank you all for listening to me when I would repeatedly state “I don’t discuss politics outside of work,” and thank you for giving me opportunities to kill the brain cells I worked so hard to enrich in school. Maintaining balance is a key to success. Finally, to Anna. You’ve been with me since the beginning, from letting me drink coffee and play pinball in the morning instead of applying to grad school, to us fighting due to lack of time spent together thanks to my studying for the GRE, to living on a horse farm in the middle of nowhere, to getting engaged, legally married and rescheduling our real wedding several times. You’ve been a pillar of support even as I refused to discuss school and work with you. Thank you for accepting that you wouldn’t always understand why I was working the way I was towards finishing my dissertation and thank you for dragging me out of my books, letting me vent and slack off for my mental health. Above all, thank you for continuing to “put up with my shit.” Even though this dissertation doesn’t do you justice, I dedicate it to you. It wouldn’t have been possible without you in my life. v Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………… ii Acknowledgements and Dedication…………………………………………………… iv Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………… vi List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….. vii Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 2: Review of the Literature: Borrowing Instead of Bridging……………… 8 Chapter 3: Proposed Theory and Framework……………………………………… 36 Chapter 4: Case Selection and Method……………………………………………… 68 Chapter 5: Personalist Regimes: Violent Tools…………………………………… 85 Chapter 6: Military Juntas: Galtieri’s Gambit……………………………………… 144 Chapter 7: Single-Party Regimes: The Magnification Effect…………………… 208 Chapter 8: Conclusions………………………………………………………… 265 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………… 278 vi List of Tables Table 3.1 Institutionalization by Regime-Type……………………………….. 48 Table 3.2 Institutionalized Diversionary Inputs………………………………. 67 vii 1 Chapter 1: Introduction Overview My study focuses on the diversionary behavior of authoritarian regimes due to the lack of attention that has traditionally been paid to nondemocratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes exhibit high variance in their governance, priorities and audience size. Similarly, variations in external strife are also myriad. Democratic regimes have dominated the diversionary field due to the ease of access in terms of polling data (facilitating and encouraging the growth of statistical analysis), transparency of their regimes and the outdated idea that diversions (most often understood as war) are the property of rich and powerful states – frequently democracies. The black box of authoritarian regimes is opening slowly, but not at a rate that would help us decipher puzzling international moves due to the misunderstood nature of their governance in a manner similar to democracies. The question of why different authoritarian regimes may pursue differing international strategies to potentially increase political security and utility draws attention to a simple global trend; interstate war is becoming increasingly rare in this day and age, and hallowed datasets count only several dozen instances of such within their ranks. In order to provide for an adequate sample size, actions short of war (ASW) are included within statistical analysis to ensure tested models work properly. This misspecification 2 of the dependent variable, and the continued focus on a narrow definition of “diversion” contributes to a gap between theory and empirical support as diversionary theory remains largely a theory of war, and not a theory of conflict or foreign policy. War and violent conflict may be best suited for certain regimes, but not all authoritarian states can be expected to pursue violent conflict and expect to walk away from it better off, or at the very least, relatively intact. For the purposes of this