YEMEN: COPING WITH TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN A FRAGILE STATE 8 January 2003 ICG Middle East Report N°8 Amman/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..............................................................i I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND ....................................................2 A. COLONIAL AND COLD WAR DIVISIONS .................................................................................2 B. CIVIL WAR AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................4 C. THE ECONOMY ................................................................................................................6 D. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS............................8 1. The Presidency and Political Institutions ..................................................................8 2. Political Parties..........................................................................................................8 3. Militant Islamism in Yemen....................................................................................10 III. THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF CONFLICT..............................................................13 A. TRIBAL CLASHES ................................................................................................................13 B. KIDNAPPING AND TERRORISM.............................................................................................16 1. Abyan 1998..............................................................................................................17 2. Sirwah 2000-2002....................................................................................................17 3. Operations Against the Abida Tribe 2001-2002......................................................19 C. STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ........................................................................................20 IV. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES........................................................................................22 A. SAUDI ARABIA’S LONG SHADOW........................................................................................22 B. AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT ........................................23 C. THE U.S. WAR ON TERRORISM...........................................................................................23 V. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF YEMEN ..................................................................................................................28 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................29 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................30 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................35 ICG Middle East Report N°8 8 January 2003 YEMEN: COPING WITH TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE IN A FRAGILE STATE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS On 3 November 2002, an unmanned U.S. “Predator” developing the instruments of a modern state and has aircraft hovering in the skies of Yemen fired a cooperated with international efforts to uproot the al- Hellfire missile at a car carrying a suspected al- Qaeda network. Qaeda leader, four Yemenis said to be members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and a Yemeni- Concerns that areas of rural Yemen increasingly will American who, according to U.S. authorities, had become a magnet for members of al-Qaeda fleeing recruited volunteers to attend al-Qaeda training Afghanistan are legitimate but appear exaggerated camps. All six occupants were killed. Almost two and, more importantly, can lead to wrong-headed months later, three American missionaries were shot policy conclusions. In contrast to Afghanistan under and killed in the Yemeni city of Jibla. These the Taliban, Yemen’s central government has not incidents, only the latest in a series involving Yemen, offered direct support to that international terrorist reinforced its image as a weak and lawless state with organisation. Al-Qaeda has used Yemen as a staging porous borders, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda operatives, and recruitment area on account of the presence of a country with tenuous government control over vast thousands of veterans who fought the Soviets in parts of its territory and dominated by a culture of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but has not been able to kidnappings and endemic violence. The October establish large bases. A variety of politically 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the arrest earlier in motivated attacks on foreign and Yemeni targets 2002 of several Yemenis in the United States and have taken place in recent years but these have been Pakistan suspected of membership in the al-Qaeda conducted by diverse actors driven by diverse network, the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibah, a political goals. Detailed, reliable information about Yemeni citizen accused of being a key plotter of the such attacks is scarce, and in most cases it is 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., and the attack impossible to discern whether they are personally, on the French oil tanker Limburg in October 2002 financially or politically motivated. Organisational have all contributed to this perception. Indeed, during and financial relations between al-Qaeda and two the past year, the U.S. has sent special forces to home-grown Islamist militant groups, the Islamic Yemen and neighbouring countries, with the purpose Jihad Movement (IJM) and the Aden-Abyan Islamic of pursuing presumed members of the al-Qaeda Army, remain murky, although it is known that there network and associated organisations in Yemen. have been personal links between Osama bin Laden and members of the IJM in the past. The Yemeni reality is, of course, vastly more complex than the headlines it generates and presents An exclusive focus on terrorism – and on combating a conundrum for international policymakers. Signs it almost exclusively through military means – of potential instability are offset by significant would present two sets of risks. First, it could positive political developments. Yemen has made obscure, and therefore leave unaddressed, the substantial progress since its unification in 1990 and domestic roots of the many problems that confront civil war in 1994. A nascent democracy with the Yemen. Endemic urban and rural violence there most open political system in the Arabian Peninsula, reflect a host of interlinked factors. These include its government has shown a general commitment to widespread poverty, rapid population growth, an Yemen: Coping With Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State ICG Middle East Report N°8, 8 January 2003 Page ii uneven distribution of scarce natural and other potential to improve relations, Riyadh continues to resources, a heavily armed civilian population that is provide direct subsidies to a number of tribal leaders dispersed throughout remote and often inaccessible – making the task of building an effective central regions, a state often unable to extend its authority to government all the more challenging. rural areas, porous borders and smuggling, weak political institutions, popular disenchantment with Yemen is not a failed or failing state but it is a the slow pace of democratisation and lingering fragile one. The varied and, at times, contradictory social, economic and religious cleavages. pressures it faces – from the U.S. to take stronger action against suspected al-Qaeda followers; and The central government has yet to exert full control from the very militant groups the U.S. seeks to root over tribes in remote areas and faces difficulties in out and that seem to thrive on the expanding U.S. exerting control over religious education in both presence in the Middle East – could put it at risk. public and private schools. Parts of the population Add to this the tensions created by a possible war on continue to resist stronger government authority, and Iraq and the continued confrontation between Israel many discontented young men and women have and the Palestinians, and the carefully constructed been attracted to a variety of home-grown Islamist edifice of the Yemeni state – a work still in progress movements. That Yemen continues to be marred by – may yet come apart. The disintegration of the violent clashes and hostage taking – including by the Yemeni state would present its citizens, their region authorities – is a function of all these complex and the international community alike with a set of factors, not one alone. challenges far graver and more complex than any confronted during the recent past. A second risk, is that the Yemeni government may, like other states, use the cover of anti-terrorism efforts to pursue its own, unrelated political RECOMMENDATIONS objectives and that it might bend the rule of law in ways that risk generating broader anti-government To the International Community, especially the feeling, thus creating new recruitment opportunities U.S.: for militant Islamist groups. Branding government disputes with tribes as counter-terrorist operations is On Fighting Terrorism one example, as is direct government intervention in tribal disputes motivated by the affiliation of senior 1. Respect