Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002) 257-272 POST-ANALYTIC METAPHILOSOPHY AND THE CASE OF COMPATIBILISM Danilo ŠUSTER University of Maribor Summary Terry Horgan (with D. Henderson and G. Graham) defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy (PAM). I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and aus- tere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intu- itions. 1. Terry Horgan and his co-authors propose a new direction in the anal- ysis and clarification of philosophically important concepts [HH, HG]. Horgan and Graham develop a metaphilosophical position they call Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy (PAM), which asserts that inquiry into the nature and workings of human concepts is both a centrally important component of philosophy and a broadly empiri- cal enterprise. New approaches in conceptual analysis are illustrated by the classical problem of compatibility of freedom of choice and action with causal determinism. Horgan and his co-authors argue that compatibilism is the best broadly empirical hypothesis which accords with the data the philosophers should take into consider- ation. 258 In many aspects PAM is a promising program but in this critical notice I will emphasize some points of disagreement. They are all connected with the claim that compatibilism is the best hypothesis that accords with the data the philosophers should take into consid- eration. First, I will briefly outline conceptual analysis as defended by Horgan and his co-authors. I will criticize the thesis that the ideol- ogy of freedom is austere. Next, I will question the claim that infer- ence to the best explanation yields compatibilism as the hypothesis which best explains the initial data. Finally, I will critically address contextualistic explanation of the fact that our intuitions can be pulled in the direction of incompatibilism. It seems to me that contextualism is rather the name of the problem and not its solution. At the end of this introducition let me mention that when I speak about freedom I have in mind a cluster of inter-connected concepts: free will, free action, free choice. The points I raise about the con- cept of freedom are general and no confusion should arise from this simplification. 2. In [HG] ideology is somehow provocatively used to name the tradi- tional job of philosophers – clarification and analysis of philosophi- cally important ideas or concepts. But the burial of a priori concep- tual analysis, seeking precise necessary and sufficient conditions, is at hand. So the authors offer a postanalytic metaphilosophical inter- pretation of the nature and role of ideological inquiry in philosophy. Ideology is conceived of as a multi-discipline enterprise, whose philosophical dimension is continuous with relevant work in disci- plines like cognitive science, linguistics, and sociolinguistics. Ac- cording to this optimistic view philosophy is a broadly empirical, in- terdisciplinary enquiry, continuous with science, advancing theoret- ical hypotheses about the workings of philosophically interesting concepts and making real progress. A species of PAM – Southern Fundamentalism (SF) – adds two substantive empirical ideological assertions: (i) the principle of ideological austerity of philosophi- cally interesting concepts; (ii) the principle of the respectful explainability of ideological-opulence tendencies..