9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page i Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 This page intentionally left blank Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 JON THARES DAVIDANN 9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page iv CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1919–1941 Copyright © Jon Thares Davidann, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7532–4 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7532–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Davidann, Jon Thares, 1961– Cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese relations, 1919–1941 / by Jon Thares Davidann. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7532–9 (alk. paper) 1. United States—Relations—Japan. 2. Japan—Relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign public opinion, Japanese. 4. Japan— Foreign public opinion, American. 5. United States—Foreign relations— 20th century. 6. Japan—Foreign relations—1912–1945. 7.World War, 1939–1945—Causes. I. Title. II. Title: Cultural diplomacy in United States- Japanese relations, 1919–1941. E183.8.J3D27 2007 303.48Ј2730520904—dc22 2007010304 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2007 10987654321 Printed in the United States of America. 9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page v To Mom and Dad who nurtured my love of learning. This page intentionally left blank 9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page vii Contents Acknowledgments ix Note on Chinese and Japanese Names xi Introduction: The Seeds of War 1 1. American Perceptions of Japan: Liberal Modernity or Feudal Militarism 11 2. Japanese Response to Orientalism 27 3. War Talk and John Dewey: Tensions concerning China 41 4. The Washington Conference, the Kanto Earthquake and Japanese Public Opinion: Victories for Liberals? 59 5. Immigration Exclusion 81 6. The Liberal Challenge: Responses to Immigration Exclusion 103 7. New Emperor, New Tensions in Manchuria 119 8. “Oriental” Duplicity or Progress and Order: The Manchurian Incident 133 9. “America Is Very Difficult to Get Along with”: Anti-Americanism, Japanese Militarism, and Spying, 1934–1937 159 10. “A Certain Presentiment of Fatal Danger”: The Sino-Japanese War and U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1937–1939 179 11. The March to War 205 Epilogue: Impact on the Postwar World 221 Notes 225 Bibliography 253 Index 257 This page intentionally left blank 9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page ix Acknowledgments This project has taken longer than I would have imagined when I started it. Nine years ago I began research. Given the length of time that has elapsed, inevitably I have incurred many debts to institutions, col- leagues, friends, and my family. My wife Beth and son Eli have borne the greatest burden. The project took time away from them and at times turned me into a crabby, tired professor when I was with them. I appreciate their lov- ing patience. Hawai’i Pacific University made this book possible by support- ing my work with many Trustees Scholarly Endeavors awards. I would like to thank in particular President Chatt C. Wright and Senior Vice President for Academic Administration John Fleckles for their support and understanding. It is not often when the leadership of an institution so readily embraces and supports the study of history. Writing a historical account can be lonely work. It is mostly individual work. Thus, the listening ear and timely words of encouragement can mean the difference between continuing and abandoning a project. This project was strengthened immensely by the insight and support of many colleagues. I would like to thank professors David Noble, Jerry Bentley, Pat Manning, Emily Rosenberg, Prasenjit Duara, and James Matray for their continuing support of my scholarship and of this particular project. Other scholars read all or parts of the manuscript and improved it through suggestions and comments. Professors Akira Iriye, Dan Headrick, George Oshiro and Associate Professor Paul Barclay took time out of their busy schedules to read the manuscript and suggest improvements. I had excellent support from archivists at the Kautz Family YMCA archives in Minneapolis, the Yale Divinity School Library Archives, the Japanese YMCA Archives, the National Diet Library in Tokyo, the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, and Houghton Library at Harvard University. Student assistants contributed in innumerable ways to the completion of this book. Very simply, I would not have finished without their support. Thanks to Marc Gallows, Trevor Tresselle, Stephanie Orr, James Uregen, and Arian Whitley for their hard work and persistence. This page intentionally left blank 9781403975324ts01.qxd 7-9-07 06:35 PM Page xi Note on Chinese and Japanese Names Chinese names are given in Wade-Giles form as they appear most often in the sources for the interwar period. Pinyin versions appear in parentheses following the first appearance. Japanese names are given in Japanese name order last name first, except in the notes where they are given as they appear in the sources. This page intentionally left blank 9781403975324ts02.qxd 1-9-07 11:54 AM Page 1 Introduction The Seeds of War When famous American philosopher John Dewey visited China in 1919, more than twenty years before the Pacific War, he saw the seeds of war in the Pacific being sown. But in the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident of China, Chinese or American, with whom I have talked in the last four weeks has vol- unteered the belief that all the seeds of a future great war are now deeply implanted in China.1 China and Japan were increasingly antagonistic toward each other. The Chinese protested against Japanese intrusion in North China, while the Japanese believed their presence was justified by the roiling instability there. These Sino-Japanese tensions damaged U.S.-Japanese relations, according to Dewey. He thought the China issue more central to the threat of a U.S.-Japan conflict than tensions over Japanese immigration into the United States. “It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction between the United States and Japan is not in California but in China...”2 Dewey avowed that an unofficial “diplomacy of peoples” and properly educated public opinion could provide a better solution to the conflict than could official diplomacy. But he also acknowledged that public opinion informed by cultural bias or manipulated by “apologetics” or propaganda could be turned into a powerful and dangerous tool if not informed by “goodwill and wisdom.”3 Dewey’s “great war” came to pass when Japan invaded China in the summer of 1937. Dewey’s assertion that conflict between China and Japan imperiled U.S.-Japanese relations also foreshadowed an even greater war, the Pacific War in 1941. Finally, his hope mixed with caution about unofficial diplomacy and public opinion mirrors the initial success, struggles, and 9781403975324ts02.qxd 1-9-07 11:54 AM Page 2 2 Cultural Diplomacy, 1919–1941 ultimate failure of cultural diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese relations in the interwar period. *** What caused the Pacific War? This deceptively simple question has tantalized historians ever since the war ended. Many historians emphasize the diplo- matic and military developments of 1939–1941 such as the Japanese Axis Pact with Germany and Italy, the course of war in Europe, the role of the Soviet Union in Japanese strategic thinking, and the American oil embargo. The American oil embargo against Japan was crucial in the march to war, because without oil, the Japanese war machine would grind to a halt. The Japanese bought over 80 percent of their oil from the United States. So the embargo became a provocative act in 1941. Closer study of the embargo reveals that it was a response not only to Japanese aggression in Asia, but also to American public opinion heavily in favor of an embargo. Calls for a strate- gic embargo by influential private citizens began much earlier in the decade. The decision lay in not just in the hands of official diplomats and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt but also with the U.S. populace. However, historians have traditionally undervalued the role of public opinion and unofficial diplomacy in explaining the Pacific War. Without denying the importance of formal diplomacy and geopolitics, this book studies these neglected areas to see how they contributed to the cause of war. First, the interwar period witnessed disturbing trends in the American public’s views of Japan, views that contributed to alienation between the United States and Japan. In addition to shifting from generally positive to quite negative by the 1930s, the popular debate also shifted in its content. Some Americans thought the Japanese were moving ever closer to the American model of a modern democratic nation, while other Americans saw the Japanese as having only a façade of modernity underneath which they were prisoners of a past dictated by feudal militarism. Although neither argument accurately represented the Japanese situation, the latter came to dominate American public opinion by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.