United States Department of Transponation Volpe !l.auonalTransportation System Center VNTSC Case Study: "Non-Technical Impediments to Maglev Development: A Lessons Learned Study of the Florida Maglev Demonstration Project" Robert Scott Cox April 1994 VNTSC Order No. DTRS57-93-P-81021 Requisition No. 42-5895 Non-technical Impediments to Maglev Development: A Lessons Learned Study of the Florida Maglev Demonstration Project Table of Contents I. Introduction l II. Involved Federal, State, Local and Private Entities 3 A. Federal 3 B. State 3 C. Local 3 D. Private 4 III. Timeline of Maglev Project 5 IV. Narrative History of the Maglev Project in Florida 7 A. Pre-legislation 7 B. 1984 Florida High Speed Rail Transportation Act 7 C 1988 Magnetic Levitation Demonstration Act 8 D. MTI's efforts to obtain Project certification 9 l. WDW withdraws 10 2. Post-WDW 10 a. western terminus on I-Drive 10 b. GOAA is unhappy 11 E. Other considerations 12 F. The state certifies the Maglev Project 12 .. G. The Maglev Project receives federal funds 12 H. Adverse developments 13 1. GOAA again 13 2. Transrapid's costs increase and cause delay 13 3. Deerfield Homeowners complain about noise 14 4. HSST technology; the demonstration project slows 14 V. Issues Resulting in Lessons Learned 15 A. Pre-Maglev Act (1985-1988) 15 1. Project mission 15 a. mission and participants 15 b. revised mission 16 2. Alternatives analysis and route selection 16 a. terminals 16 b. route criteria 17 3. Economic analysis 18 a. original intent of self-funding 18 b. WDW's philosophy 18 4. Federal, state and local regulation of magnetic levitation technology 19 a. federal railroad regulation 19 1) FRA jurisdiction? 19 2) rule-making? 19 3) labor costs 20 11 b. state regulation; environmental 20 c. local regulation; building and planning codes 20 d. regulatory preemption by FHSRTA? 21 e. establishment of certification under to the Maglev Act 21 B. Maglev Project to Loss of WDW Station Location ( 1988-1989) 22 1. Maglev project certification issues 22 a. in general 22 b. environmental issues 22 1) wetlands 22 2) noise 22 c. safety 23 d. rail competition issues 23 2. Station location issues; condemnation power 23 a. MTI is powerless to condemn station sites; WDW withdraws 23 1) OIA's use of its "veto" 24 2) WDW's use of its "veto" 24 b. resulting issues 25 1) no public funds 25 2) "private" vs. "public" status 26 C. Amendment through Project Certification ( 1989-1990) 27 l. In general 27 2. High speed rail; parallel tracks and different goals 28 a. conflicting objectives; FHSRTA and Maglev Act 28 lll b. OIA dissents 28 C. MTI coordinates with ABB 29 3. OIA station site negotiations 29 a. sources of animosity 29 1) parallel track 29 2) lost revenues 29 b. station location at OIA 30 1) MTI' s position; through-ticketing 30 2) OIA' s position; reliability 31 3) DOT intervenes 32 4. Negotiations with local government and state agencies 33 a. safety 33 b. financial capability 33 C. community impact 34 d. specific environmental impact 34 e. station design; public access 34 5. Conditions of certification 34 a. specific conditions 35 b. rejected condition; Expressway Authority's request for 37 "mitigation" D. Certification through Final Financing Commitment (1990-1992) 38 1. In general 38 iv 2. Private parties' negotiations to implement the project; assigning risks 39 a. cost overrun risks 40 b. technology risks 40 c. ridership shortfall and operating risks 41 3. ISTEA funds 42 a. the effect of federal entry into the process 42 b. funddispersal 42 1) reimbursement procedures 43 2) National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) 43 3) federal contracting guidelines 43 4) match credit - 44 5) repayment and assurances against project failure 44 VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 45 A. Conclusions 45 B. Recommendations 48 1 . One-stop permitting 48 2. Power to condemn station sites 49 3. Environmental impact balancing test 49 4. Public agencies govern condemnation, permitting and 49 corridor coordination 5. Public resource strategy 50 6. Alternative technologies 50 7. Attracting private sector support 50 V I. Introduction Since 1985, private and public interests have been developing the Florida Magnetic Levitation Demonstration Project in Orlando. The 14.5 mile, for-profit, demonstration of maglev technology will connect the Orlando International Airport with the International Drive tourist area, which includes Walt Disney World, Sea World and other attractions and hotels serving the burgeoning tourism market in central Florida. The project is likely to become the world's first commercial demonstration of high speed magnetic levitation transportation technology; in 1991, Florida's Governor and Cabinet issued a certificate to Maglev Transit, Inc. to exclusively construct and operate such a project. The cornerstone of planning and development for the project is legislation adopted by the Florida legislature in 1988 which provides, in part, for a novel one-stop environmental, land use and technology assessment. The Act codified a strategy to overcome hurdles identified in the project team's assessment of anticipated governmental barriers; all affected entities are bound to present jurisdictional concerns during a single certification process before a single forum. One critical development in project planning has been consensus building to bring together diverse modal constituencies with the project. The OIA and local transit authorities and business interests, for instance, have joined with the project in a collaborative planning process to create an intermodal demonstration at the maglev terminal. By way of contrast, during this same period, a competing proposal to construct a statewide network of high speed trains in Florida failed. Recent proposals by the Florida Department of Transportation note the success of the Maglev project and express a desire to render Florida's future high speed rail effort more like that of the Maglev project's. ISTEA proposes a Maglev Prototype Development Program to construct a demonstration project of at least 19 miles. After successful testing and technical evaluation is completed, the prototype is to be converted to commercial operation. ISTEA imposes an ambitious timeframe to complete the project. In addition, Congress had asked USDOT to prepare a feasibility study for both high speed rail and Maglev technology. Impediments similar to those both anticipated and unanticipated by the Maglev project team would undoubtedly surface to contravene such a timeframe. Such impediments relate to issues involving impacts on competing transit modes, public agencies and businesses, zoning and land use restrictions, corridor and right-of-way acquisition, noise, wetlands and electromagnetic fields. Those implementing the federal program hope to expedite deployment by incorporating means to overcome such impediments. Those implementing the ISTEA program may expedite planning by adopting a consensus building process similar to the one that evolved at the Orlando project. As noted, despite initial intense opposition from a variety of groups, this process led to unanimous support for the project by all state, local and private interests groups, including the state environmental and land use regulatory agencies, affected local government and OIA. The objective of this paper is to study lessons learned, to date, from the Orlando experience. Particular attention will be given to the economics of competing modes in the private and public section. That objective will entail identifying the groups who rafsed issues or opposed the project, an examination of the issues raised, the context in which they were raised and the means by which the Orlando project achieved consensus and overcame or failed to overcome the impediments. 2 II. Involved Federal, State, Local and Private Entities The roles of the following federal, state, local and private entities in the implementation of the Maglev project will be discussed: A. Federal 1. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 2. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 3. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) B. State 1. Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) 2. Florida High Speed Rail Transportation Commission (FHSRTC) 3. Florida Department of Natural Resources (DNR) C. Local 1. Central Florida Commuter Rail Authority 2. City of Orlando 3. East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (ECFRPC) 4. Economic Development Council of Mid-Florida (EDC) 5. Greater Orlando Aviation Authority (GOAA) 6. Orlando International Airport (OIA) 7. Kissimmee/St. Cloud Convention and Visitors Bureau 8. Meadow Woods Elementary School 9. Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) 10. Orange County 11. Orange County Public Schools 12. Orange County Public Utilities 13. Orlando Orange County Expressway Authority (OOCEA) 14. Orlando Orange County Convention & Visitors Bureau (OOCVB) 15. Osceola County 16. Port Canaveral Port Authority 17. Tri-County Transit (Lynx) 3 D. Private 1. Efficient Transportation for the Community (ETC) 2. Florida Power Corporation (FPC) 3. Japanese National Railways (JNR) 4. Japanese Railways Technical Services (JARTS) 5. Maglev Transit, Inc. (MTI) 6. Orlando Utilities Corporation (OUC) 7. Sea World/ Anheuser Busch 8. Transrapid International (TRI) 9. United Arts of Central Florida 10. Universal Studios 11. Walt Disney World Company (WDW) 4 III. Timeline of Maglev Project June 1986 JNR-JARTS team dispatched to Florida June 1987 Conceptual agreements with Disney MTI purchases ROW and ROW options Preparation of legislation June 1988 Magnetic