MARKOV'S PRINCIPLE, MARKOV'S RULE AND THE NOTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF JOAN RAND MOSCHOVAKIS (6/19/2018 FINAL DRAFT, CORRECTED 8/2/2018) 1. Introduction In [34] Georg Kreisel reflected at length on Church's Thesis CT, the principle proposed in 1936 by Alonzo Church ([9]) as a definition: \We now define the notion . of an effectively calculable function of positive integers by identifying it with the notion of a recursive function of positive integers." An equivalent version with \recursive function" replaced by \function computable by a Turing machine" was proposed the same year by Alan Turing. Yiannis Moschovakis ([49]) observes that CT \refers essentially to the natural numbers, and so its truth or falsity depends on what they are." Of course its truth or falsity also depends on what it means for a calculation to be effective, and this question forces a distinction between the constructive and classical meanings of CT. This distinction in turn leads to Markov's Principle MP, which asserts (in its original version) that if a recursive algorithm cannot fail to converge then it converges. In its capacity as a principle of unbounded search, MP refers essentially to the natural numbers so its truth or falsity depends on what they are, and in particular on the fact that ! is the order type of the standard natural numbers. Markov's Principle is not generally accepted by constructive mathematicians. Beeson ([2], p. 47) notes that \. even [Markov and the Russian constructivists] keep careful track of which theorems depend on it and which are proved with- out it." Bishop constructivists accept neither CT nor MP, although their work is consistent with both. Kreisel [32] proved that MP is not a theorem of intuition- istic arithmetic. Brouwer and traditional intuitionists reject an analytical version of MP, but their reasoning has more to do with the nature of the intuitionistic continuum than with what the natural numbers are. Markov's Rule MR, in contrast, is admissible for most formal systems T based on intuitionistic logic.1 In its simplest form the rule states that if T proves that a particular recursive algorithm cannot fail to converge, then T proves that it converges. Whether or not appropriate versions of the rule are always admissible for constructive theories evidently depends on what a constructive proof is. Constructive mathematics is often described simply as \mathematics done with intuitionistic logic." While this oversimplification ignores the difference between constructive and classical answers to the question of what constitutes a legitimate mathematical object, it does express a fundamental aspect of constructive proof. In [19] Arend Heyting quotes Kreisel ([31]) as saying \. the notion of construc- tive proof is vague." Heyting objects that In addition to M. A. Marfori and M. Petrolo, I am grateful to George Dyson for a copy of [13]. 1H. Friedman [14] and Dragalin [12] independently discovered a simple method for proving the admissibility of Markov's Rule which applies uniformly to pure and applied intuitionistic systems. 1 2 JOAN RAND MOSCHOVAKIS (6/19/2018 FINAL DRAFT, CORRECTED 8/2/2018) . the notion of vagueness is vague in itself, what we need, is a precise notion of precision. As far as I know, the only notion of this sort is based on a formal system. But even for a formal system with a recursive proof predicate, \. the difficulty reappears if we ask what it means that a given formula A is provable," for instance if ::9p(p ` A) rather than 9p(p ` A), leading back to Markov's Principle, which Heyting did not accept. More than twenty years after Brouwer rejected the law of excluded middle, Heyting formalized intuitionistic propositional logic and intuitionistic arithmetic. Pure intuitionistic predicate logic was isolated as a proper subsystem of classical predicate logic; cf. Kleene [25] where several equivalent formalizations are studied. Here we follow Kreisel [33] in adopting the acronym HPC (for \Heyting predicate calculus") for a formal system of intuitionistic predicate logic.2 The question of what constitutes a constructive proof depends essentially on whether HPC is sound and complete for its intended intuitionistic interpretation, and this question leads again to Markov's Principle, as G¨odeland Kreisel observed. Markov's Principle, Markov's Rule and the common notion of constructive proof appear to be legitimate candidates for investigation in the spirit of Kreisel's ideal of informal rigour (cf. [34]). Following Heyting's implicit advice, we consider MP and principles weaker than MP in the context of formal systems for intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis. In the process we hope to gather evidence for an inter- mediate principle GDK which is equivalent to the weak completeness of HPC for Beth semantics, as analyzed in detail by Dyson and Kreisel ([13]). In [33] Kreisel suggests that this principle \may be provable on the basis of as yet undiscovered axioms which hold for the intended interpretation (but not for the realizability interpretations). So the problem whether HPC is weakly complete is still open." That was the situation in June of 1962. During the following academic year Kleene succeeded in proving the independence of Markov's Principle from his for- mal system I of intuitionistic analysis, using his new, typed \special realizability" interpretation.3 The complete proof appeared in 1965 in Kleene and Vesley's [27], along with the untyped function realizability interpretation which established the consistency of I, with or without Markov's principle, relative to a classically correct subtheory. While GDK is function-realizable and special-realizable (and therefore consis- tent with I but weaker than Markov's Principle), it is not Grealizable in the sense of the author's [43] so does not follow from weak Church's Thesis. It is easily seen to be equivalent (assuming a classically and intuitionistically correct version of the binary fan theorem) to the double negation of weak K¨onig'sLemma. In other words, HPC is weakly complete for Beth semantics if and only if weak K¨onig'sLemma is persistently consistent with the fan theorem in the sense that any counterexample to either would generate a counterexample to the other.4 We conjecture that GDK is correct on the intended interpretation of intuition- istic analysis as a theory of numbers and (arbitrary) free choice sequences, and that HPC is weakly complete for Beth semantics. 2Troelstra and van Dalen [56] prefer IQC, abbreviating \intuitionistic quantificational calcu- lus," and reserve IPC for its propositional subsystem. 3In 1962-63 I was a graduate student working with Kleene at the University of Wisconsin, and I still vividly remember his enthusiasm as he presented this very fresh result to the seminar. 4Kleene's counterexample for recursive sequences (cf. [27]) applies equally to both. MARKOV'S PRINCIPLE, MARKOV'S RULE AND THE NOTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF3 2. MP and MR in the context of formal systems In 1958 Kreisel ([32]) developed a modification of Kleene's number-realizability interpretation to show that the primitive recursive form of Markov's Principle, which is (classically) consistent with Heyting arithmetic HA by Kleene's number- realizability, is independent of HA. Since then logicians have analyzed versions of MP and MR over intuitionistic predicate calculus and over constructive and intu- itionistic theories of natural numbers, real numbers, infinite sequences of natural numbers, and primitive recursive functions of all finite types. While a complete annotated bibliography of these investigations is beyond the scope of this article, in this and following sections we survey the folklore and contributions by many researchers over the past sixty years. Much more information is contained in the references and their bibliographies. 2.1. Formal versions of MP. Over intuitionistic arithmetic HA Markov's Prin- ciple can be rendered by a formula: MP0 : 8e8x[:8y:T(e; x; y) ! 9yT(e; x; y)] where T(e; x; y) is a prime formula expressing Kleene's T-predicate (\y is a g¨odel number of a successful computation of feg(x)"). Alternatively, it can be expressed by a schema: MPQF : :8x:A(x) ! 9xA(x); where A(x) may contain additional free variables but must be \quantifier-free” (bounded quantifiers are allowed), or MPPR : :8n:A(n) ! 9nA(n) where A(n) must express a primitive recursive relation of n and its other free variables. Over HA all three of MP0, MPQF and MPPR are equivalent. The most general schematic version of Markov's Principle is MPD : 8x(A(x) _:A(x)) & :8x:A(x) ! 9xA(x); (cf. [2], p. 47). Evidently HA + MPD ` MPQF since if A(x) has only bounded quantifiers then HA ` 8x(A(x) _:A(x)). However, Smorynski ([53], p. 365) 5 proved that HA + MPQF 6` MPD. A fortiori MPD is not provable in HPC from instances of (:8x:P(x) ! 9xP(x)) with P(x) prime. We leave the proof 6 that HPC + MPD 6` (:8x:P(x) ! 9xP(x)) as an exercise for the reader. As principles of pure predicate logic, MPD and variants can have no convincing constructive justification because the connection with the natural numbers is lost. Closed instances are persistently consistent with HPC in the sense that their double negations are provable, but the schemas are not persistently consistent because HPC 6` ::8y[8x(P(x; y) _:P(x; y)) & :8x:P(x; y) ! 9xP(x; y)].7 Over a two-sorted theory such as Kleene's I ([27]) and subsystems, Troelstra's EL ([54]) or Veldman's BIM ([60]), Markov's Principle can be strengthened to MP1 : 8α(:8x:α(x) = 0 ! 9xα(x) = 0): 5 In the presence of Church's Thesis, MPQF and MPD are arithmetically equivalent. If CT! is the recursive comprehension principle 8x9!yA(x; y) ! 9e8x9y[T(e; x; y) & A(x; U(y))] (where 9!yB(y) abbreviates 9yB(y) & 8z(B(y) & B(z) ! y = z)), then HA + CT! + MPQF ` MPD.