THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editor ROBERTS. COHEN, Boston University Editorial Advisory Board THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University ADOLF GRUNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh SAHOTRA SARKAR, McGill University SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University MARX W. W ARTOFSKY, Baruch College of the City University of New York VOLUME 170 THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE The Ankara Seminar Edited by IOANNA KUCURADI Hacettepe University, Ankara and ROBERT S. COHEN Boston University SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The concept of knowledge : the Ankara seminar I edited by toanna Ku9uradi and Robert S. Cohen. p. em. --<Boston studies in the philosophy of science ; v. 170l Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-481-4495-2 ISBN 978-94-017-3263-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-3263-5 1. Knowledge, Theory of--Congresses. I. Ku~uradi, toanna. II. Cohen, R. s. <Robert Sonnel III. Series. Q174.B67 vel. 170 [BD161.C643l 121--dc20 94-41544 ISBN 978-90-481-4495-2 Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved © 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. PREFACE A sense of place and time, of the historically specific, cannot be total­ ly transcended in philosophical work, although a philosophical desire for the universal seems always at hand too. All the more do these sensibilities motivate our human species when comparative encoun­ ters occur, across cultural, generational, ethnic, religious, gender, tribal, class boundaries. Can we talk across borders, are the borders permeable with respect to sharing experiences and reports of experiences? Can we, in Ioanna Kuc;uradi's words, engage in philosophical reflection on global problems? Indeed can we reason together, about agreements or differences or about problems and opportunities, but in any case can we understand how others from another place think? To the puzzles of self-criticism concerning our own doubts, unclarities, confusions about what is really known, about where do we begin, and what must we assume, we confront others who seem to begin otherwise, accept other arguments, trust other evidence. Are there different understandings of what it is to know, and if this is so, how may we communicate? The Ankara seminar on the concept of knowledge was held August 28-29, 1989, at the Hacettepe University, with the friendly sponsorship of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Philosophical Society of Turkey, and the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), and with the humane and rigorous scholarly leadership of Pro­ fessor Kuc;uradi. The seventeen speakers were themselves reaching out, communicating to each other across boundaries within a core of Euro­ pean philosophical commonalities but explicitly addressing a number of non-European challenges and even alternatives. The admirable Pro­ logue sets before the reader the issues confronted by each contributor and also integrates the seminar as a whole. Will there be other FISP seminars, seeking mutual understanding, dealing with meta-philosophy, identifying species-wide abilities and disabilities, hopefully coming to identify what it is to know, what it is that may be known? So many historical and cultural alternative civilizations were not at Ankara but this was a vigorous and stimulating seminar for those who were there to speak. The contributions in this book deserve reflection from those who were not there, too. R.S. Cohen v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE I ROBERT S. COHEN v INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMINAR I IOANNA Kuc;URADI ix PROLOGUE I IOANNA Kuc;URADI xvii PROBLEMSOFKNO~NG 1. GUIDO KUNG I 1\vo Concepts of Knowing 3 2. L. JONATHAN COHEN I Belief, Acceptance and Knowledge 11 3. ERNEST SOSA I Back to Basics 21 4. ARDA DENKEL I Experience, Order and Cause 31 5. VENANT CAUCHY I Some Thoughts on the Nature of Koow~ ~ 6. J. DAVID G. EVANS I Meno's Puzzle 67 KINDS AND CRITERIA OF KNOWLEDGE 7. GDROL IRziK I Popper's Epistemology and World Three 83 8. IOANNA Kuc;URADI I Knowledge and Its Object 97 9. EVANDRO AGAZZI I Are there Different Kinds of Knowledge? 103 10. RICHARDT. DE GEORGE I Ethical Knowledge and Social Facts 119 11. KWASI WIREDU I Knowledge, Truth and Fallibility 127 12. TEO GRUNBERG I Long Run Consistency of Beliefs as Criterion of Empirical Know ledge 149 APPROACHES TO KNOWLEGE 13. H. ODERA ORUKA I Cultural Fundamentals in Philosophy. Obstacles in Philosophical Dialogues 167 14. JINDRICH ZELENY I Analytical and/or Dialectical Thinking 183 vii viii TABLE OF CONTENTS 15. VLADISLAV A. LEKTORSKY I Knowledge and Cultural Objects 191 16. ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA I Knowledge and Cognition in the Self-Individualizing Progress of Life 197 17. FRANCISCO MIRO QUESADA I Knowledge and Destiny 219 NOTES ON THE AUTHORS 231 NAMEINDEX 239 IOANNA KU~URADI INTRODUCTION TO THE SEMINAR A few years ago, in this same hall, a small group of philosophers from different parts of the world, met with one part of their Turkish col­ leagues, in the Seminar on Philosophy Facing World Problems1 which the Philosophical Society of Turkey had organized with the aim to open a discussion, from a philosophical view-point, of global problems, selected by the participants themselves, and thus to give an example of "incorporating the dimension of philosophical reflection in an appraisal of world problems"- a need expressed 'officially' in Unesco's Medium­ Term Plan for the years 1984-1989, though felt for a long time by those who are well aware of the vocation of philosophy. The tendency to promote philosophical reflection on global problems and to involve philosophy in the endeavour to look for sound and humane solutions to these problems, at a global level, has gained ground also in the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP) during the past few years. The question we have to face now is "how could philosophical reflec­ tion be incorporated in dealing with such problems?", in other words "how could philosophy contribute her part to the treatment of such prob­ lems?''. This 'how' still does not seem to be clear enough in the minds of most of the philosophers who really possess the will to make such a contribution. The epistemological 'theories' prevailing in our days, prove inappropriate in the approach to many of such problems. An attempt to answer the question concerning this 'how', presupposes - among others- being well aware of the theoretical difficulties, which the world community comes across in the endeavour to tackle these problems. Among such theoretical difficulties we see the difficulties concerning the right diagnosis and explanation of such problems, e.g. the naming or labelling of a social or political fact, let alone the difficulties of its 'objective evaluation'. Different practical or theoretical starting points­ different assumptions or approaches- lead, naturally, to different diag­ noses and explanations, still of the same - objectively same - situation or fact. The world community is now sufficiently aware of this impasse. I. Ku(:uradi arui R. S. Cohen (eds.), The Concept of Knowledge, ix-xv. © 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. X IOANNA KU<;URADI Still, I am afraid, we are not sufficiently aware of the epistemological problems behind this impasse. Another theoretical difficulty the world community comes across, arises in connection with the selection of practical principles. The variety of the principles proposed for a same case, leaves at a loss those who care for an ethical approach to individual cases. The moral theories prevailing in our days, are far from being helpful in the selection of such principles. Also the adoption of pluralism does not help much in action when one has to decide, in a given situation, what it is right to do. Still, the question of the justification of norms - of their 'scientific justification' -, is a question that has kept the philosophical community busy as a permanent item of its agenda for at least the past twenty years. Nevertheless, due attention is not paid to the epistemological problems underlying the question of the justification of principles, probably because such problems lie outside the scope of the prevailing epistemological theories. These are some of the considerations, which have led us to diagnose also the need to dwell on epistemological questions underlying the difficulties which the world community comes across in the endeavour to tackle world problems. Among these epistemological questions, perhaps the most fundamental one is the question of 'what is knowledge?'. Prevailing epistemological theories paid, up to now, too little attention to the diversity of epistemological questions arising in different areas of human activity, besides the sciences- and even besides the natural sciences. Thus, either they assume a too broad conception of knowledge, understanding by 'knowledge' all kinds of products of the human mind, as for example in the case of pragmatism, whose conception of truth keeps constituting, though unnoticed, a main approach to knowledge; or, as in the case oflogical empiricism, for example, they take as model what they call 'scientific knowledge', i.e. this time a too narrow conception of knowledge, and keep out of their scope all assertions that do not stand well with the criterion of meaningfulness they have formulated. Thus, strangely enough, though perhaps the philosophical discipline most cultivated in our century appears to be epistemology in a sense- or more precisely Philosophy of Science and Logic -, the epistemological tools it secures help us too little in facing the difficulties we come across with respect to world problems.