Theory and practice in royal finance: England 1449–50 BILL SMITH Westhoughton High School,Bolton Financial affairs have loomed large in considerations of the failings of Henry VI and his government. Both contemporaries and modern commentators alike have seen fundamental problems in the management of the royal finances as major contributory factors in the draining of confidence in the Lancastrian regime and, ultimately, in the succession of the House of York. The tide of opinion as to whether financial crisis should be seen as cause or effect of political failure continues to ebb and flow.1 Close consideration of an extensive programme of financial reform which was instituted in 1449–50 will shed much light on this central issue, and on a number of significant related topics. Such analysis will also highlight the extent to which established political principles both informed and dictated the direction of government policy.2 It will also illustrate the importance of historic precedent and exemplars in the formulation of financial policy, and the important links between theory and practice in the works of Sir John Fortescue. Furthermore it will suggest that there existed within the administration a capacity for efficient and thorough management of the royal finances which has often been disregarded by historians. The government of Henry VI was faced with severe financial difficulties in the autumn of 1450, and these had been a major factor in the crisis which had threatened the realm in the 1 Compare, for example the recent opinion of C. Carpenter that ‘it was not that financial weakness caused political failure but the other way round’, with the famous dictum of R.L. Storey that ‘the bankruptcy of Lancaster drove York to rebellion’; C. Carpenter,The Wars of the Roses: politics and the constitution in England, c.1437–1509 (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1997), 31; R.L. Storey, The end of the House of Lancaster (London: Barrie & Rockliffe, 1966), 75. 2 There has been much stimulating comment in recent years on the significance of principle in politics in this period. See especially J.L. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1996), and A. Gross, The dissolution of the Lancastrian kingship: Sir John Fortescue and the crisis of monarchy in fifteenth-century England (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1996). 221 222 BULLETIN JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY preceding months.3 The dramatic collapse of the English position in France following on from Charles VII’s renewal of war in the summer of 1449 could be attributed, at least in part, to the chronic shortage of money which had characterized the last months of English control in Normandy. The widespread domestic disorder which had simmered through the early months of 1450 and erupted in the summer in the rebellion of Jack Cade was also coloured by complaints about inept and indeed corrupt management of the king’s revenues. In broad terms the crisis in the royal finances can be attributed to two causes. Firstly, there was the general economic recession of the middle years of the fifteenth century, occasioned by continuing demographic stagnation and a series of disruptions and dis- locations in international trade. These elements were largely beyond the control of government, although the general contraction in European trade was certainly made worse by periodic crises in England’s relations with some of her major trading partners such as Burgundy and the Hanseatic League, to say nothing of the renewal of war with the French.4 There was accordingly a considerable downturn in the customs revenues, largely as a result of a decline in wool exports, arising from both the economic recession and the continuing trend in English trade away from raw wool and towards woollen cloth, which bore a much smaller customs charge. Income from the customs revenues declined from more than £40,600 in 1421 to only £28,100 in 1448. In the period 1440–70 as a whole, the number of sacks of wool exported was more than 40% below the levels which had been shipped in the first thirty years of the century. Regardless of reductions to the royal income from any other areas, this decline in the customs revenues reduced the king’s total income by almost 20% from the levels which had been achieved under Henry V.5 The decline in royal revenues cannot be attributed entirely to the general economic climate. A good deal of the responsibility must lie with the policies pursued by the king and his government. As has been noted above, government action can in part be blamed for the declining yield from the customs. Rather more obvious is the impact of royal policy in the 1440s on both sides of the exchequer account. Whilst the king’s income from all sources continued to decline, expenditure was allowed to increase. Henry VI granted out royal lands and revenues on an unprecedented scale, mainly to members or associates of the royal household. It has been calculated that by 1450 a total of 169 persons held 192 3 For the best narrative account, see R.A. Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI:the exercise of royal authority (London: Ernest Benn, 1981). 4 R.H. Britnell, ‘The economic context’, in The Wars of the Roses (London: MacMillan 1995), ed. A.J. Pollard, 43–7. 5 Ibid., 59..