1 CERS Working Paper 2015 Racist discourse in Japan Clio Tsivanidis In 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur, Diène (p.18), noted that the internet was littered with messages referring to the Buraku as ‘non-humans’ and calling for their death. In 2013, in Tsuruhashia, home to a large Korean population, a 14 year old girl ran into the streets with a loudspeaker, calling for the massacre of Koreans (The Economist, 2014) and, in July 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed ‘concern at the widespread racist discourse’ and hostility towards Japan’s minority populations, following a number of extremist demonstrations and the open display of ‘Japanese only’ signs in private establishments (Japan Times, 2014). Yet despite Japan’s agreement in 1995 to a UN-designated anti-racism convention, the central government has yet to pass any specific legislation prohibiting racial discrimination or hate speech, suggesting a reluctance to tackle the issue head-on. Indeed, it seems that this reluctance, and the fact that Japan’s minorities such as the Buraku, Ainu and Koreans, continue to suffer from racial discrimination, have much to do with the historical construction of a racialised homogeneous Japanese identity which has resulted in the exclusion of certain groups on the basis of assumed biological characteristics. While in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars often used the prism of race to analyse the problems faced by minority groups, today most social scientists acknowledge that race is a social construct lacking any biological significance (Brown, 2012 p.3). Therefore, scholars use the term ‘racialisation’ to demonstrate that the classification of peoples into measurable categories is a human activity which takes place within certain types of society at specific stages of economic, political and social development (Weiner, 2009, xv). However, despite this progression, there remains the tendency to assume that racism is a product of plantation slavery or Western colonialism, or that racism can be understood simply in terms of ‘the Colour Line’ as advocated by Du Bois (1961, cited in Weiner, 2009, xiii). As Weiner (2009) correctly argues, such views are highly problematic. Indeed, a colonial model of racism allows non-Western countries to deny that racial discrimination exists within their borders, as racism is considered to be a Western phenomenon. This was certainly the case in 1985, when David Y.F. Ho asserted that racism, however defined, could not be found in Asian culture because it was a ‘Western concept’ and therefore could only occur in the West (Dikotter, 1997, p.2). This essay will demonstrate the existence of nativist discourses in Japan prior to her modernisation and contact with European imperial powers and show that, although the influence of Western racial ‘science’ had a strong impact on racism in Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it transformed ideas that already existed; Japanese ideologues did not simply borrow racism from the West. As Dikotter (2008, p.1482) argues, there is no one form of racism ‘universal in its origins, causes and effects’; rather, as race is an adaptable and fluid social construct, its meanings are determined by specific historical contexts and local historical agents. Thus, an analysis of the political, social and ideological conditions in which the category of race was first conceptualised and mobilised in a specific country or region is key to understanding the enduring strength of racist ideologies today. This essay will therefore show the resilience of the narrative of a mono-ethnic homogeneous Japanese nation and the historical processes by which this identity was constructed. It appears that it was the construction of this homogeneous ‘Self’ that led to the development of racial theories and discourses, as it involved the construction of excluded ‘Others’ against whom notions of Japanese homogeneity and superiority could be measured (Armstrong, 1989, p.340). That 2 Japan’s minorities today are still considered by some to be ‘uncivilised’ or ‘backwards’ reflects the resilience of these decades-old racial theories and discourses. The Pure and Homogeneous Self: The Resilience of a Myth In 1986, the then Prime Minister Yashuri Nakasone sparked outrage among Japan’s Ainu community when he dismissed their request for recognition as an indigenous people, arguing that all Ainu were already assimilated (Siddle, 2003, p.448). Almost two decades later, another political row was provoked among the Ainu when two politicians on the same day declared that Japan was a ‘homogeneous nation’ (Siddle, 2003, p.448). This reflects the resilience of the discourse on national identity, first developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, known today as Nihonjinron. Nihonjiron is a highly problematic set of beliefs in the uniqueness of the Japanese people and culture. As Siddle (2003, p.460) argues, it as an inherently ‘racialised’ concept that prevents those who do not possess ‘unique’ Japanese culture and ‘blood’ from enjoying full citizenship rights. Comments such as Nakasone’s reflect the fact that despite the 1946 constitution which established democracy and guaranteed political, civil and social rights to all Japanese nationals, these civic notions seem to be undermined by deep-rooted primordial sentiments contained in Nihonjiron (Siddle, 2003, p.448). Thus, although today the Japanese government concedes the existence of ethnic minorities, it appears that myths concerning a homogeneous Japanese race still serve to exclude and marginalize Japan’s minorities, such as the Ainu. Indeed, there remains a gap in the standards of living and levels of education between the Ainu and the rest of the population. For example, only 16.1 percent of the Ainu in the Hokkaido prefectural government who finish high school continue into higher education, as opposed to the local average of 34.5 percent (Diène, 2006, p.9). Moreover, the discrimination faced by Ainu children at school can be so intolerable that many are forced to drop out, sometimes causing the entire family to move to another region (Diène, 2006, p.9). Worryingly, Ainu children reported that, far from their schools assisting them to alleviate such taunts, many teachers continued to perpetuate the belief that the Ainu were unintelligent, by telling a class that Ainu children could only count up to ten (Diène, 2006, p.13). Finally Diène (2006) noted that the Ainu were likely to receive marriage refusals from other Japanese owing to beliefs in their inherent ‘barbarism’, first propagated by the Imperial government when the colonial order in Hokkaido was established. Significantly, the long struggle of the Ainu to be recognized as an indigenous people reflects a reluctance on the part of some to forego the myth of homogeneity. Siddle (2003, p.447), for example, highlights the importance of the ability of internally colonised ‘native’ populations to redefine themselves as ‘indigenous peoples’ in an effort to reassert their identity after a legacy of oppression and domination. Indeed, following the wave of worldwide decolonisation after the Second World War, the Native Americans, Inuit and Maori did exactly this. Yet, despite the numerous parallels between the treatment of such groups and the assimilationist policies forced upon the Ainu from 1869 by Japan’s ‘Development Commission’, and ‘justified’ by the innate inferiority of the ‘natives’, until 2008 the Japanese government repeatedly refused to recognise the Ainu as an ‘indigenous people’, reflecting the Nihonjinron master-narrative of national homogeneity, which regarded them as either completely assimilated or biologically extinct (Siddle, 2003, p.447). 3 It is true that in 1997, the 1899 law labeling the Ainu as ‘former Aborigines’ and which marginalised them as part of a ‘dying race’ in need of ‘protection’ was revoked (Siddle, 2002). Yet, the law that replaced it was not as epoch-making in terms of alleviating racial discrimination as the Japanese government made it out to be. Rather, the Ainu Cultural Protection Act (CPA) was drafted by non-Ainu Japanese bureaucrats within the very governmental structures of power which had oppressed the Ainu since 1899, illustrating the continuing influence of the state in Ainu lives (Siddle, 2002, p.407). Certainly, it was a step in the right direction as it represented official recognition of Ainu existence. However, the special state protection conceded by the CPA was extended only to ‘Ainu cultural properties such as music, dance crafts’ rather than to the Ainu people themselves as a distinct indigenous group (Siddle, 2003, p.457). Finally, although the government finally recognized the Ainu as an indigenous people in 2008, as noted by Hidekai Uemara (Japan Times, 2008), a specialist in indigenous peoples’ rights, the resolution was still weak ‘in the sense of recognising historical facts’, as it did not acknowledge that the Ainu had been forced to become ‘Japanese’ in the first place. Most significant, however, is the fact that despite such legislation, those in positions of authority in Japan still seem reluctant to abandon the myth of a homogeneous nation. For example, in November 2014, a full six years after the resolution was passed, Masaru Onodera, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) stated that it is ‘highly questionable’ that the Ainu are an indigenous people of Northern Japan (Japan Times, 2014b). Alarmingly, this statement came only three months after Yasuyuku Kaneko (2014, cited in Japan Times, 2014b), another member