MERCHANTS OF DEATH OR DEFENDERS OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER : INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN THE POST-KHASHOGGI AFFAIR ERA Major Thomas Hammond JCSP 44 PCEMI 44 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2019. ministre de la Défense nationale, 2019. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 44 – PCEMI 44 2017 – 2019 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT MERCHANTS OF DEATH OR DEFENDERS OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN THE POST-KHASHOGGI AFFAIR ERA By Major Thomas Hammond “This paper was written by a candidate « La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes fulfilment of one of the requirements of the pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au document, and thus contains facts and cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions opinions, which the author alone considered que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et appropriate and correct for the subject. It convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas does not necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un opinion of any agency, including the organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the Canadian gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Department of National Defence. This paper Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de may not be released, quoted or copied, except diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude with the express permission of the Canadian sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Department of National Defence.” Défense nationale. » 1 MERCHANTS OF DEATH OR DEFENDERS OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA IN THE POST-KHASHOGGI AFFAIR ERA There are moments when you have a stark decision. And the stark decision before us is whether we stand up for the rule of law or succumb to the law of the jungle and we need to make that decision. - Roland Paris, former foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Trudeau The post-1945 liberal international order guaranteed by Pax Americana is in decline. President Donald Trump, the great disruptor, is quickly collapsing the global governance model in favour of striking deals with bilateral partners that are narrow and short-term in focus.1 Logically, this ‘America First’ foreign policy diminishes U.S. influence in the world and it also negatively impacts Canada.2 As a middle-power, Canada substantially benefits from a global international system that promotes cooperation, rule of law and basic human rights. In essence, this liberal order amplifies Canada’s global position, as it can leverage its soft power and moral high ground on international issues. The shocking torture and murder of the Washington Post’s distinguished journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, by Saudi state officials with possible links to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is a contemporary test to the liberal international order. Near-universal condemnation of Saudi Arabia and cries for justice immediately following the Khashoggi Affair have subsided somewhat since the Saudi dissident’s death in October 2018. For America, “the Art of the Deal”3 trumps defence of liberal values and 1 Lucas, Russell E. “Arms and influence in the Khashoggi Affair,” In The Conversation, 16 October 2018. 2 Ahmad, Aisha, “A twenty-first century foreign policy for Canada in the Middle East and North Africa,” In International Journal. 2017, Vol. 72(3) 423. 3 A nod to Donald Trump’s memoire/business advice book: Trump Donald J. with Tony Schwartz, Trump: The Art of the Deal. Random House: Washington, 1987. 2 business relationships remain unchanged. Europe’s association with the Kingdom has cooled, but no significant sanctions were imposed. For Canada, the Khashoggi Affair is a political conundrum that is largely unsettled. How does the prime minister take affirmative action against the Kingdom without sacrificing Canadian values, Canadian interests or both?4 Notwithstanding global expectations that Canada defends its words with actions, the Trudeau government must also be mindful of the lucrative contract for weaponized light armoured vehicles (LAVs) valued at $15B that support stable jobs and economic growth.5 This essay will argue that it is both possible and necessary to take a principled and pragmatic response to Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Jamal Khashoggi’s murder that safeguards the defence industry without sacrificing liberal values. Utilizing the United States, the European Union (EU) and Canada as case studies, this paper will examine international relations with Saudi Arabia before and after the Khashoggi Affair with a specific focus on the defence industry. Next, a novel Canadian response to the Khashoggi Affair will be offered that balances both Canada’s interests and values. In part, this retort will involve the cancellation of the Saudi contract, continued vehicle manufacturing at General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and wholesale replacement of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)’s family of armoured combat support vehicles (ACSV). President Trump’s Oval Office press conference with Crown Prince MBS in March of 2018 embodies the historic and modern relationship between the two countries. 4 Holloway, Steven Kendall. “Defining the National Interest.” In Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006. 17; Bulles, Anni-Claudine, and Shannon Kindornay. Beyond Aid: A Plan for Canada’s International Cooperation. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, May 2013. 20; 5 Chase, Steven, “Trudeau says arms deal freeze would press Riyadh on Khashoggi,” In The Globe and Mail, 25 October 2018. 3 The president holds up a bulletin board, analogous to a grade school project, with the caption “12.5 Billion in Finalized Sales to Saudi Arabia” and boasts about U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Not expecting to be a PR prop and concerned about counter-images to the ‘Saudi Arabia is open for business’ campaign, MBS awkwardly and quietly endures the media spotlight.6 After all, America is Saudi Arabia’s most important strategic ally and the Kingdom is America’s key security partner in the Middle East.7 The pragmatic partnership was first forged in 1938 with ARAMCO, a Saudi and American conglomerate, being awarded the “steal of the century” with a 60-year lease to 360,000 square miles of the Kingdom’s oil fields.8 Maintaining relations with Saudi Arabia is in America’s self-interest, as the Kingdom possesses 25% of the world’s known oil resources and a disproportionate influence over global oil prices and the world economy. In effect, privileged access to Saudi Arabia’s spare oil capacity enables America’s foreign policy, as hostile oil producing states, such as Iran, can be isolated through sanctions.9 Oil may be the original lubricant for the U.S.-Saudi relationship, but religion, ideology and location also shape America’s interests in Saudi Arabia, according to Rachel Bronson, an esteemed author.10 As the de facto leader of the Muslim world, with claims to both Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia was a reliable partner against Communism and Soviet expansion during the Cold War. Today, the two countries share common interests 6 “Saudi Crown Prince ‘Humiliated’ by Trump’s Oval Office Boast of Arms Sales,” In Haaretz. 26 March 2018. 7 Cordesman, Anthony, “Saudi Arabia is a critical American security partner in the Middle East,” The Hill, 21 March 2018. 8 Feinstein, Andrew. The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade. Hamish Hamilton Penguin Books: New York, 2011. 13. 9 Bronson, Rachel, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford University Press: New York, 2006. 21-25; “Donald Trump restores Iran sanctions, hitting oil exports over its support for militant groups,” Associated Press, 2 November 2018. 10 Thicker than Oil …, 22-25. 4 in containing Iran, stabilizing Iraq, Turkey and Syria and countering non-state actors. With strategic access to Africa, Asia and Europe through the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s geography is also a launch pad for U.S. power projection and regional stability. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is further wedded through the defence industry. The unwritten social contract that the Kingdom will market seemingly limitless amounts of oil at low prices in exchange for American protection and lucrative arms deals has persisted for decades.11 The First Gulf War is an obvious historical example of this contract. Despite significant investment in modernizing Saudi Arabia’s military and having nearly 40,000 foreign advisors, as well as 10,000 Pakistanis serving in the 10th Armoured Brigade, the Kingdom was defenceless against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Republican Guard.12 Saudi Arabia was forced to appeal to the United States for protection, accept the political implications for having foreign troops on the Kingdom’s soil and paying over $16B in remittances.13 This decade, Saudi Arabia’s defence budget reached a high of 8% of GDP (four times the NATO pledge) and is projected to exceed $58B in real terms by 2020.14 Still, the calculus for the unwritten contract has not fundamentally changed. Stephanie Cronin, a lecturer at the University of Oxford, argues that Saudi Arabia has permanently surrendered responsibility of national defence to the Americans, content with its role as the peninsula policeman: “The massive expenditure on defence show[s] no signs of 11 Feinstein, Andrew.