Clemson University TigerPrints All Theses Theses 5-2007 Here There Be Dragons: The Korean War and American Military Response in the Cold War Amanda Sweeney Clemson University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Sweeney, Amanda, "Here There Be Dragons: The Korean War and American Military Response in the Cold War" (2007). All Theses. 129. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/129 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HERE THERE BE DRAGONS: THE KOREAN WAR AND AMERICAN MILITARY RESPONSE IN THE COLD WAR A Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts History by Amanda Kaye Sweeney May 2007 Accepted by: Dr. Edwin Moïse, Committee Chair Dr. Alan Grubb Dr. Donald McKale ABSTRACT Starting in June 1950, the Korean War marked the beginning of a new era of warfare. The first limited war to take place in the nuclear age amid increasing Cold War tensions, Korea raised numerous questions of how the U.S. would interact with the Soviet Union in the new international climate. In this climate, both sides strove to maintain the world’s balance of power. Small shifts in that balance, such as in Korea, assumed great importance, forcing the U.S. to act in areas not previously considered vital. Despite the need for a firm response, U.S. actions in Korea were tempered by influences such as atomic weapons, diminished military force, communist expansion, and containment. All of these factors were amplified by the pervasive Cold War mentality of mutual fear and distrust. The course of the Korean War further intensified these suspicions, setting a precedent for U.S. actions throughout the Cold War. iii iv DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my fiancé Phillip. His unfailing love and encouragement are such a blessing. I also dedicate it to my parents, Marla and John, and my church family. Their support has been invaluable. This is for them. v vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS “But he said to me, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness.’ Therefore I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, so that the power of Christ may rest upon me.” (2 Corinthians 12:9) I could never have accomplished this on my own, and am deeply indebted to the many people who have helped me reach this point. I would like to thank my committee at Clemson University, Dr. Edwin Moïse, Dr. Alan Grubb, and Dr. Donald McKale. I greatly enjoyed the time in their classes, and appreciate all their guidance on this thesis. I am also very grateful for their flexibility in working with me this semester. I would also like to thank my undergraduate history professors at Erskine College, particularly Dr. Jim Gettys, Dr. Sandra Chaney, and Dr. David Grier. They helped me realize the joy of both the discovery and the recounting of history, and for that I am forever grateful. Most of all I would like to thank my Savior Jesus Christ. It is only through His grace and mercy that I am here. To Him be all the glory. vii viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TITLE PAGE..........................................................................................................i ABSTRACT......................................................................................................... iii DEDICATION.......................................................................................................v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................vii LIST OF MAPS ....................................................................................................xi INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD ..................................................................................1 CHAPTER I: FORMULA FOR A CRISIS ........................................................................7 II: FIRE ON THE SNOW..............................................................................39 III: THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE.................................................77 The Atomic Question...............................................................................77 Communist Influence on the Korean Conflict.....................................................................................94 IV: THE UNOFFICIAL LIMITED WAR...................................................121 CONCLUSION: ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT ..............................................................................................165 BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................169 ix x LIST OF MAPS Maps Page 1. Balance of Power in East Central Asia, 1950...............................................16 2. MacArthur’s Areas of Defense .....................................................................20 3a. Pusan Perimeter, August 1950....................................................................140 3b. Pusan Perimeter, September 1950 ..............................................................141 4. U.N. Advance to the Yalu, 24 November 1950..........................................147 5. Chinese Communist Advance, 26 November to 15 December 1950 ................................................................................148 xi xii INTRODUCTION LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD We didn't have any [advance] information on this at all. It was a complete surprise to me as it was to nearly everybody else even all over the world. Nobody thought any such thing would take place. I didn't think so. [The Commander in the Far East General Douglas] MacArthur didn't think so. I didn't know of anybody else who did. Then we had to meet the situation when it came up… Keep your minds open and be ready for whatever comes to meet it in the proper manner at that time and don't try to live in the past. Look to the future but use the past as a basis on which to figure out what you want to do in the future. -- Harry S Truman, December 19611 It has been called the forgotten war. In the late twentieth century, it was overshadowed by such events as the Vietnam War, the space and arms races, and the continuing threat of nuclear war. However, the war that began in 1950 would have long lasting implications on warfare in general, and particularly on interactions during the early years of the Cold War. The Korean War highlighted many of the changes in the international picture and mentality that had taken place since the end of World War II five years earlier. These changes were, on the whole, indicative of the mounting tensions between the Soviet Union and the non- communist world, tensions which would establish a manner of interaction that would be seen for the next forty years. One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Korean War was the way the mentalities of those involved with its execution differed from World War II. Part of the difference in mindset stemmed from the new issues in question. One 1 Harry S Truman, Talent Associates Fort Leavenworth Interview (15 December 1961), Papers of Merle Miller, available online <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/korea62550.htm#hst1.1>. Brackets in original text. 1 of the most obvious concerned atomic weapons. It was not until the last months of World War II that policymakers had such weapons to incorporate into battle plans. By the time the Korean War began, on the other hand, the U.S. had embarked upon a program of developing a hydrogen bomb, and the Soviet Union had successfully exploded its first atomic weapon. Each side was also clearly continuing development. Another difference concerned the extent to which the U.S. would intervene in Korea. In World War II, the U.S. joined other Allies whose goal was to force the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. With Korea, however, unconditional surrender ceased to be an option. Much of the mounting tensions centered on the question of the balance of power between the communist and non- communist worlds. This balance extended into peripheral areas of influence, such as Korea. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were determined at least to maintain, if not increase, their areas of influence. The common belief at the time was that the Soviet Union had this goal as part of its fundamental makeup. The U.S. therefore was acting to defend non-communist areas of the world from that inherent threat.2 In addition to the concern over the balance of power, another issue restricting U.S. action in Korea was that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union wanted to embark upon another war similar to the one that had just ended. Along with the magnified threat that came with mutual development of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, there was considerable belief that they would be 2 See George F. Kennan’s writings for this perspective, among many others. Also see Chapter II for more information on this perspective, as connected to the policy of containment. 2 used in any large-scale conflict. Even though policymakers in the late 1940s did not attribute to the weapons the same kind of destructive power as was seen a decade later,3 it was still clear that using these weapons would represent a fundamental—and dangerous—shift in international diplomacy. These and