Ideas IRPP Analysis Debate Study Since 1972 No. 4, March 2010 www.irpp.org Accountability for National Defence Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight Philippe Lagassé While the existing regime to provide accountability for national defence works reasonably well, modest reforms that reinforce the convention of ministerial responsibility can improve parliamentary oversight and civilian control of the military. Le processus actuel de reddition de comptes en matière de défense nationale remplit son rôle ; toutefois, des réformes mineures renforçant la responsabilité ministérielle permettraient de consolider la surveillance parlementaire et la direction civile des forces militaires. Contents Summary 1 Résumé 2 Parliament and National Defence 5 The Government and National Defence 28 Notes and References 58 About This Study 61 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRPP or its Board of Directors. IRPP Study is a refereed monographic series that is published irregularly throughout the year. Each study is subject to rigorous internal and external peer review for academic soundness and policy relevance. IRPP Study replaces IRPP Choices and IRPP Policy Matters. All IRPP publications are available for download at irpp.org. If you have questions about our publications, please contact [email protected]. If you would like to subscribe to our newsletter, Thinking Ahead, please go to our Web site, at irpp.org. ISSN 1920-9436 (Online) ISSN 1920-9428 (Print) ISBN 978-0-88645-219-3 (Online) ISBN 978-0-88645-221-6 (Print) Summary Canadians’ renewed focus on military matters reflects a desire to strengthen accountability for matters of national defence. Two issues are at stake: the role of Parliament in overseeing and shaping national defence policy, and the administrative and policy-making processes of the Department of National Defence. Critics have argued that the House of Commons should have the right to decide on the deployment of the Canadian Forces, and that parliamentary commit- tees should play a larger role in shaping defence policy and reviewing the appointment of sen- ior officers and defence officials. With the controversy over the treatment of Afghan detainees in late 2009, these issues returned to the forefront of Canadian politics. Debate about account- ability for defence within the government was reignited by General Rick Hillier’s recently pub- lished autobiography alleging that civilian officials had allowed “process and procedures” to complicate and undermine his transformation of the armed forces and the military’s mission in Afghanistan. Many in the defence community hold that senior bureaucrats play an inappro- priately large role in helping to keep the military accountable to the minister of national defence, cabinet and the prime minister. In this study Philippe Lagassé assesses the state of accountability for matters of national defence in Canada, and evaluates calls to reform how the government is held to account for military and defence matters. In the first section he examines the national defence responsibilities of Canada’s Parliament, as well as proposals to strengthen the powers of the House of Commons and parliamentary committees in defence matters. The author argues that while certain changes are needed to improve the ability of parliamentarians to hold the government to account for Canada’s defence, reforms must respect the principles of responsible government. Reforms that dilute ministerial responsibility and the adversarial character of Parliament will weaken rather than strengthen defence accountability. Indeed, it could be argued that reinforc- ing ministerial responsibility and encouraging partisan competition could bolster Canadian defence accountability. In the second section, Lagassé examines the lines of responsibility and accountability for defence within government. He shows that the part played by senior officials in formulating defence policy and in helping to keep the military accountable to the civilian authority is both necessary and in line with statute law. Drawing on the history of Canadian civil-military rela- tions and contemporary civil-military relations theory, the study shows why the government’s existing structure of defence administration is advantageous and effective. Although the administration of national defence in Canada is not perfect, it ensures that the prime minister and the minister of national defence are well informed about their defence policy choices, and that the policy preferences of the government are respected by the military and the defence bureaucracy, regardless of whether senior officers and officials agree with these preferences. IRPP Study, No. 4, March 2010 1 Résumé Depuis quelques années, les Canadiens portent une attention accrue aux questions militaires souhaitant, entre autres, que l’on renforce la reddition de comptes en matière de défense nationale. Cet enjeu peut être cerné en considérant, d’une part, le rôle que joue le Parlement dans l’élaboration des politiques de défense nationale et, d’autre part, les processus administra- tifs et de développement des politiques au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale. Certains observateurs estiment que la Chambre des communes devrait avoir le droit de décider du déploiement des Forces armées et que les comités parlementaires devraient jouer un plus grand rôle dans l’élaboration des politiques de défense et dans le processus de nomination des officiers supérieurs et des hauts fonctionnaires de la Défense. La polémique récente concernant les prisonniers afghans a d’ailleurs ravivé l’intérêt pour ces questions. Le débat sur le devoir de rendre des comptes au gouvernement en matière de défense, de son côté, a été alimenté par la publication de l’autobiographie du général Rick Hillier. Celui-ci considère que les fonctionnaires civils ont, au moyen « de processus et de procédures », compliqué et entravé la transformation des Forces armées canadiennes qu’il voulait accomplir ainsi que la poursuite de la mission mili- taire en Afghanistan. En effet, nombreux sont ceux à l’intérieur du Ministère qui pensent que des hauts fonctionnaires jouent un rôle trop important en s’assurant que les militaires rendent des comptes au ministre de la Défense nationale, au cabinet et au premier ministre. Dans cette étude, Philippe Lagassé analyse l’obligation de rendre compte en matière de défense nationale canadienne et évalue les propositions de réforme à ce sujet. La première partie se penche sur les responsabilités du Parlement canadien ainsi que sur les propositions visant à ren- forcer les pouvoirs de la Chambre des communes et des comités parlementaires. Dans son analyse, l’auteur note que, quoique certains changements soient nécessaires afin d’améliorer la capacité des parlementaires d’obliger le gouvernement à rendre des comptes, les réformes doivent respecter les principes de gouvernement responsable et de divergence partisane. Les réformes qui diluent la compétence des ministres ainsi que le caractère antagoniste du système parlementaire affaibliront plutôt que renforceront la reddition de comptes. Dans la deuxième partie, l’auteur examine les lignes de responsabilité en matière de défense au sein du gouvernement. Il démontre que le rôle que jouent les hauts fonctionnaires dans l’éla- boration des politiques de défense et dans l’obligation des militaires de répondre de l’exécution de leurs tâches devant les autorités civiles est nécessaire et conforme à la législation. S’appuyant sur l’histoire des relations civilo-militaires au Canada, ainsi que sur les théories contemporaines à ce sujet, l’auteur explique pourquoi les structures actuelles d’administration de la défense, quoiqu’imparfaites, sont avantageuses et efficaces. Elles garantissent que le premier ministre et le ministre de la Défense nationale sont bien informés de leurs choix de politiques de défense et que les préférences du cabinet en la matière sont respectées par les militaires et les fonction- naires concernés, peu importe que ceux-ci les appuient ou non. 2 IRPP Study, No. 4, March 2010 Accountability for National Defence: Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command and Parliamentary Oversight Philippe Lagassé anadians have grown increasingly interested in national defence matters in recent years. C A result of the 2001 attacks against the United States and of Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, this renewed interest in military issues has been expressed in several ways. Public opinion polls indicate that Canadians have grown more appreciative of the military; according to one survey, the Canadian Forces are seen as the country’s most respected public institution (Strategic Counsel 2007, 7). Events and paraphernalia showing support for members of the forces have proliferated. Media outlets have devoted far more attention to the military over the past eight years, particularly since the Canadian Forces were deployed on a strenuous counterinsurgency mission in 2005. Political leaders have also paid greater attention to the mil- itary. Prime Minister Paul Martin declared that he would rebuild the Canadian Forces, and his government inaugurated a substantial, multiyear increase in the defence budget. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has vowed to further improve the state of the military. His Conservative government has outlined a long-term funding formula to recapitalize the armed forces. Members of Parliament have debated defence questions with greater