1 A Fairly Comprehensive Reading List Braun D., [91] ‘Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs’, Philosophical Studies 62, 289-305. Braun D., [98] ‘Understanding Belief Reports’, Philosophical Review 107, 555-95. Braun D., [00] ‘Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations’, Nous 34, 203-36. Braun D., [01] ‘Russellianism and Explanation’, Philosophical Perspectives 15, 253-89. Brown C., [91] Believing the Impossible’, Synthese 89, 353-64. Burge T., [77] ‘Belief De Re’, Journal of Philosophy 74, 338-62. Burge T., [77] ‘Kaplan, Quine and Suspended Belief’, Philosophical Studies 31, 197-203. Burge T., [78] ‘Belief and Synonymy’, Journal of Philosophy 75, 119-38. Carnap R., [56] ‘Meaning and Necessity’ (enlarged edition), Chicago: University of Chicago. Cartwright R. [71] ‘Identity and Substitutivity’, in M. K. Munitz (ed), ‘Identity and Individuation’, 119- 133, New York: New York University Press. Chien A. J. [85] ‘Demonstratives and Belief States’, Philosophical Studies 47, 271-89. Church A., [46] ‘Review of 4 Articles on the paradox of analysis’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11, 132- 3. Church A., [50] ‘On Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief’, Analysis 10, no. 5, 97- 9. Reprinted in Linsky [71] Church A., [51] ‘A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation’, in ‘Structure, Method and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer’ (eds. Henle P., Kallen H. M., Langer S. K.), New York: Liberal Arts Press, pp. 3-24. Church A., [56] ‘Introduction to Mathematical Logic’, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Church [82] ‘A Remark Concerning Quine’s Paradox About Modality’, Analisis Filosofico 2, reprinted in translation in Salmon & Soames [88]. Crimmins M., [92] ‘Talk About Beliefs’, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.Crimmins M., [98] ‘Hesperus 2 and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference’, Philosophical Review 107, 1-47. Crimmins M., Perry J., [89] ‘The Prince and the Phone Booth’, Journal of Philosophy 86, 685-711. Devitt M., [81] ‘Designation’, New York: Columbia University Press. Donnellan K., [90] ‘Belief and the Identity of Reference’, in ‘Propositional Attitudes’ (eds. Anderson C. A., and Owens J.,), Stanford: CSLI Press. Dummett M., [73] ‘Frege: Philosophy of Language’, London: Duckworth. [chap. 2 & 516-7]. Dummett M., ‘Frege’s Distinction between Sense and Reference’, article 9 of ‘Truth and Other Enigmas’, Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press, from ‘Frege’ in Teorema, vol v., (1975), 149-88. Dummett M., [76] ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (II), in ‘Truth and Meaning’ (ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell), Oxford: Clarendon Press reprinted in ‘The Seas of Language’, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1993). Fine K., [84] ‘A Defence of Arbitrary Objects’, Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 57 (1983), 55-77. Reprinted in ‘Varieties of Formal Semantics’, (ed. F. Landman and F. Veldman), Dordrecht-Cinnaminson: Foris Publications (1984). Fine K., [85] ‘Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects’, Oxford: Blackwell. Fine K., [98] ‘A Defense of Cantorian Abstraction’, Journal of Philosophy, 98/12, 599-634. Fine K., [89] ‘The Problem of De Re Modality’, in Almog et al. [89], 197- 272. Fine K., [00] ‘Neutral Relations’, Philosophical Review, vol. 109, no. 1, January 2000, pp. 1-33. Fine K., [02] ‘The Limits of Abstraction’, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fine K., [03] ‘The Method of Postulation’, to appear. Forbes G., [89] ‘Cognitive Architecture and the Semantics of Belief’ in ‘Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II’ (ed. P. A. French et al), Notre Dame. Forbes G., [90] ‘The Indispensability of Sinn’, Philosophical Review 99, 535-63. [dual role view] Forbes G., [93] ‘Solving the Iteration Problem’, Linguistics and Philosophy 16, 311-30. Frances B., [98] ‘Defending Millian Theories’, Mind 107, 703-27. 3 Frege G., [52] ‘On Sense and Reference’, translation of ‘Uber Sinn und Bedeutung’, in ‘Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (eds. P. T. Geach and M. Black), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grandy R., [86] ‘Some Misconceptions about Belief’ in ‘Philosophical Grounds of Rationality’ (eds. Grandy and Warner), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hale B., Wright C., [2000] ‘The Reason’s Proper Study’, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Higgenbotham J., [91] ‘Belief and Logical Form’, Mind and Language 6, 244-69. Hornsby J., [77] ‘Singular Terms in Contexts of Propositional Attitudes’, Mind 86, 31-48 Jacob P., ‘Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions’, Mind and Language 2, 301-5. Kamp H., [85] ‘Context, Thought and Communication’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85, 239-61. Kaplan D., [89a] ‘Demonstratives’, in ‘Themes from Kaplan’ (ed. Almog J., et al). Kaplan D., [89] ‘Afterthoughts’, in ‘Themes from Kaplan’ (ed. Almog J., et al). Kaplan [90] ‘Words’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volume 64, 93-119. Kripke S., [80] ‘Naming and Necessity’, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Kripke S., [79] ‘A Puzzle about Belief’, in ‘Meaning and Use’ (ed. A. Margalit), Dordrecht: Reidel. Larson [93] R. and Ludlow P., ‘Interpreted Logical Forms’, Synthese 95, 305-56, reprinted in ‘Readings in the Philosophy of Language’ (ed. P. Ludlow), Cambridge: MIT Press. Levin H., [82] ‘Categorial Grammar and the Logical Form of Quantification’, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Lewis D. K., [81] ‘What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe’, Australian Journal of Philosophy 59, 283- 89. Linsky L., (ed.) [71] ‘Reference and Modality’, New York: Oxford University Press. Loar B., [80] ‘Names and Descriptions: A Reply to M. Devitt’, Philosophical Studies 38, 85-9. Loar B., [72] ‘Reference and Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophical Review 81, 43-62. Loar B., [76] ‘The Semantics of Singular Terms’, Philosophical Studies 30, 353-77. McDowell J., [77] ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name’, Mind 86, 159-85, reprinted in 4 ‘Reference, Truth and Reality’ (ed. Platts M.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. McGinn C., [82] ‘The Structure of Content’, in ‘Thought and Object’ (ed. A. Woodfield), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 207-58. McKay T., [81] ‘On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions’, Philosophical Studies 39, 287-301. McKay T., [81] ‘On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions’, Philosophical Studies 39, 287-303 McKay T., [91] ‘Representing De Re Beliefs’, Linguistics and Philosophy 14, 711-39. Marcus R. B., [81] ‘A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle about Belief’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI, (ed. French P. et al), Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. Marcus R. B., [83] ‘Rationality and Believing the Impossible’, Journal of Philosophy 80, 321-38. Mates B., [72] ‘Synonymity’ in ‘Semantics and the Philosophy of Language’ (ed. L. Linsky), Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 111-38. Montague R., [74]‘Formal Philosophy’ (ed. Thomason R.), New Haven: Yale University Press. Moore G. E., [] ‘Facts and Propositions’ in ‘Philosophical Papers, New York: Collier Books. Over D. E., [93] ‘On Kripke’s Puzzle’, Mind 92, 253-56. Owens J. I. [90] ‘Cognitive Access and Semantic Puzzles’, in Anderson and Owens, 147-73. Owens J. I., [95] ‘Pierre and the Fundamental Assumption’, Mind and Language 10, 250-73. Parsons T., [81] ‘Frege’s Hiearachies of Indirect Senses and the Paradox of Analysis’, in ‘Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI’ (ed. French P.), Minneapolis, Univ. Of Minnesota Press. Partee B., [73] ‘The Semantics of Belief Sentences’ in ‘Approaches to Natural Language’ (ed. J. J. Hintikka, J. M. E. Moravcsik, & P. Suppes), Dordrecht: Reidel, 309-36. Peacocke C., [75] ‘Proper Names, Reference and Rigid Designation’, in ‘Meaning, Reference and Necessity’ (ed. S. Blackburn), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 109-32. Perry J., [80] ‘A Problem about Continued Belief’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61, 317-32. Perry J., [80] ‘Belief and Acceptance’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, 533-42. Perry J., [?] ‘Circumstantial Attitudes and Benevolent Cognition’, in ‘Language, Mind and Logic’ (ed. Butterfield J.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 123-34. Perry J., [86] ‘Perception, Action, and the Structure of Believing’ in R. Grandy & R. Warner (eds) 5 ‘Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends’, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Perry J., [86] Thought without Representation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 60, 137-51. Perry J., [88] ‘Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference’, Nous 22, 1-18. Perry J., [90] ‘Individuals in Informational and Intentional Content’, in ‘Information, Semantics and Epistemology’ (ed. Villanueva E.), Oxford: Blackwell, 172-89. Perry J., [93] ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays’, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Putnam H., [54] ‘Synonymy and The Analysis of Belief Sentences’, Analysis 14, 114-22, reprinted in ‘Propositions and Attitudes’ (ed. N. Salmon and S. Soames), 149-158. Putnam H., [75] ‘Comments [on Kripke 79]’ in ‘Meaning and Use’ (ed. A. Margalit), Dordrecht: Holland. Quine W. V., [60] ‘Word and Object’, Cambridge: MIT Press. Recanati F., [97] ‘Can we Believe what we do not Understand’, Mind and Language 12, 84-100. Recanati F., [00] ‘Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta’, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Reiber S., [92] ‘Understanding Synonyms Without Knowing That They Are Synonyms’, Analysis 52, 224-8. Richard M., [83] ‘Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, 425- 452. Richard M., [87] Attitude Ascriptions, Semantic Theory, and Pragmatic Evidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87, 243-62. Richard M., [87] ‘Quantification and Leibniz’s Law’, Philosophical Review 96, 555-78. Richard