H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond “Maximum Pressure:” The Trump Administration and Iran Essay by Gregory Brew, Southern Methodist University Published on 22 January 2019 | issforum.org Editor: Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Shortlink: http://tiny.cc/PR-1-5BM Permalink: http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5BM-Iran PDF URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5BM.pdf hile campaigning for President in 2015 and 2016, Donald Trump never missed an opportunity to attack the major foreign policy achievement of President Barack Obama: the Joint Comprehensive W Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, European Union, China, and Russia in June 2015 that halted Iran’s development of nuclear weapons in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. Criticizing the deal had been popular among Obama’s detractors, but Trump’s denunciations were particularly vociferous. “My number one priority,” he declared, “is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”1 He called it a “terrible” deal, one negotiated “in desperation,” which he vowed to rip up as soon as he took office.2 Iran came up, again and again, as yet another area where the Obama Administration had surrendered U.S. interests and initiative. During its first two years in office, the Trump Administration pursued a policy towards Iran defined by pain and pressure. From abandoning the JCPOA, to adopting a hard-line against Iran through sanctions and rhetoric, the Trump Administration pivoted away from the diplomatic gestures of the Obama Administration, in a determined effort to apply “maximum pressure” and even, some believe, to bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic itself.3 It is undeniable that this new U.S. campaign has made life more difficult for the Iranian government. But there is little evidence that sanctions alone will compel Iran to negotiate, or that such pressure will bring about the collapse of the regime. The campaign, led by ardent “Iran hawks” like John Bolton and Michael Pompeo, represents a fixation with Iran as the root of all evil plaguing the Middle East, and yet it lacks coherence or purpose, beyond the naked desire to inflict pain on Iran 1 Sarah Begley, “Read Donald Trump’s Speech to AIPAC,” Time, 21 March 2016. 2 Katy Tur, “Donald Trump Weighs in on Iran Deal,” NBC News, 14 July 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-weighs-iran-deal-n391926. 3 Vali Nasr, “The Iran Regime-Change Crew is Back,” The Atlantic, 25 April 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/iran-nuclear-deal-bolton-trump-regime-change/558785/. ISSF Policy Series whenever and however possible. Within the embattled, chaotic Trump Administration, Iran competes with other, arguably more pressing foreign and domestic issues. The ultimate outcome of the U.S. turn towards “maximum pressure” will be hard to assess, apart from the pain it has inflicted, and will continue to inflict, on Iran’s population. The United States and Iran: Let’s Make a Deal Why the United States should be so concerned with Iran is not, on the face of it, a confusing notion. Iran is resource-rich, possessing the world’s fourth largest oil reserves and second largest gas reserves, though its domestic economy is diverse compared to those of other oil-producing Middle Eastern states. Straddling the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Caucasus, in geographic terms it is one of the most strategically important countries on earth. The Iranian population is well-educated, and while it is ethnically diverse it is held together by a strong sense of national identity forged by thousands of years of history, literary tradition, and common culture. Unlike other Middle Eastern states, including Syria, Egypt and Iraq, Iran was never formerly colonized, and its borders are the result of centuries of geopolitical shifts rather than the casual whims of European imperialists. Before the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979, Iran was the most important American ally in the Middle East. Iran’s ruler, the Shah, owed his position to U.S. support. In August 1953, a CIA-assisted coup d’état removed the democratic constitutionalist Mohammed Mossadegh from power and replaced him with a military regime led by the Shah, who harnessed U.S. aid and oil revenues to build up Iran economically while utilizing his secret police to crush dissent. The monarchy lost its credibility as the Shah’s modernization alienated large swathes of the population, rewarding a small urban elite with disproportionate wealth while most Iranians lived in abject poverty.4 Opposition to the Shah grew as income inequality and inflation ate away at Iran’s economy. Amidst a national crisis in the late 1970s, the Shah, who was dying of cancer, fled the country, paving the way for a new government led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Denunciations of the U.S. as the “Great Satan” responsible for the Shah’s tyranny, as well as the November 1979 storming of the American embassy and the ensuing hostage crisis, led to a rapid deterioration in U.S.-Iranian relations. The United States acted to contain Iran, first by backing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and later by supporting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which view Iran as a major threat. Although there have been repeated efforts to establish a modus vivendi between Washington and Tehran, most notably in the late 1990s during the administration of reformist President Mohammed Khatami, the 4 The best survey of the U.S.-Iranian relationships remains James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); see also Richard Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989); Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); James F. Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51: the Diplomacy of Neglect (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), and The United States and Iran: in the Shadow of Mosaddeq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 2 | Page ISSF Policy Series relationship between the U.S. and Iran has been characterized by suspicion and antagonism.5 Iran’s government is repressive and authoritarian, controlled by a small clique of clerics and politicians who enforce a restrictive social order while jailing or silencing dissidents. In the twenty-first century the Islamic Republic has widened its involvement in regional struggles, taking advantage of the mayhem which ensued from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011 to expand its profile through proxy groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq. The regime’s pursuit of nuclear technology reached an advanced stage in the early 2000s, drawing condemnation from the international community and a fresh round of international sanctions. Such adventurism has little popular basis for support within Iran, where power is held primarily by the clerical establishment. Though difficult to measure accurately, it appears that most Iranians hold positive views of the United States and of Americans in general, particularly among the younger generation who grew up in the shadow of the Islamic Revolution.6 Frustrated from years of mismanagement and repression, Iran’s educated middle-class came out in their thousands during the 2009 Green Revolution, demanding greater freedoms and economic opportunities. The regime retained control of the country, but its legitimacy was shaken, and the need to deliver greater opportunities to average Iranians grew more immediate.7 The Obama Administration, wary of further entangling the United States in Middle East conflicts, adopted a policy that prioritized economic pressure as a way to force Iran to the negotiating table. The policy did not represent a major departure from previous approaches to Iran under President Bill Clinton or George W. Bush.8 Rather, it was notable for its transactional character, as well as the apparent friendly rapport struck at the negotiating table by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. After prolonged talks, the relatively moderate Iranian administration of President Hasan Rouhani agreed to limit Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and open nuclear facilities to international inspection. In exchange, Rouhani won relief from economic sanctions, which he used to justify the agreement to the Iranian people and conservatives within the Iranian government. The news was rapturously received by young Iranians, who paraded through the streets flashing peace signs, celebrating what many felt to be the dawn of a new age, the moment when Iran would be allowed to rejoin the international community after decades of isolation.9 5 Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path of Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007): 103-120, 175-192. 6 “How Young Iranians View America,” New York Times, 13 December 2013, https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/how-young-iranians-view-america/. 7 Abbas Milani, “The Green Movement,” The Iran Primer, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green- movement. 8 Suzanne Maloney, “Progress of the Obama Administration’s Policy Toward Iran,” Brookings Institute, 15 November 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/progress-of-the-obama-administrations-policy-toward-iran/. 9 Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Ian Black, “Thousands Take to Iran Streets to Celebrate the Historic Nuclear Deal,” The Guardian, 14 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/joy-in-tehran-at-end-to-isolation- but-hardliner-reaction-to-nuclear-deal-feared.