Hegel's Critique of the Concept of Consciousness: Its Relevance to Contemporary Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind Jay A. Gupta A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 0 Copyright by lay A. Gupta 200 1 Nationai Library Bibliothique nationale 1+1 of Cûnada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. me Wellington OnrxON KtAON4 dnawa ON KiA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aliowing the exclusive permettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seii reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la foxme de microfiche/fk, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be priated or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abstract Hegel's Critique of the Concept of Consciousness: Its Relevance to Contemporary Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind Jay A. Gupta Ph.D., 200 1 Department of Philosophy University of Toronto This study develops a particular interpretation of G.W.F.Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and extends it to contemporary philosophical concerns. 1 claim that the Phenomenology is a critique of an epistemic concept, 'consciousness', and that the Phenomenology should therefore be viewed generally as a critique of mentalism. 'Mentalism' refers to both a body of beliefs and certain habits of thought that presuppose the subjectivity of mind, and that picture mind and mental items as standing in a problematic relation to what is taken to be the objectivity of reality. 1 claim that the interpretation of Hegel as a critic of mentalism clarifies Hegel's overall systematic intentions, and therefore clarifies the relation of the Phenomenology to the Science of Logic. 1 argue that the reading of Hegel that is developed here is relevant to contemporary philosophy. I examine works by John McDowell, Robert Brandom, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 1 draw analogies between Hegel and the later Wittgenstein, who 1 claim was also a critic of mentalism. 1 argue that insofar as Hegel and Wittgenstein are critics of mentalism, it is a significant error to read either of them as espousing any form of idealism. Acknowledgments 1 would like to thank my supervison, Professon Sonia Sedivy and Amy Mullin, for dl of their help, encouragement, and excellent advice throughout the writing of this thesis. 1especially would like to say how much 1 appreciate their adventurous spirits in taking on a project of this scope. In addition, 1 believe that this thesis benefited enormously fiom Professor Sedivy's painstaking attention to detail. 1 would like to thank my family - parents, step-parents, brothers, sister, Jackie, and Sadie, for their warm emotional support, and their frank interest in something that had great persona1 significance for me. 1 would like to thank my friends, especially Gianpier Fakone, Bruno Blumenfeld, and Hiram Fowler, for reminding me that philosophy is said in many ways, and that it has great bearing in life outside the academy. Over the years 1 have benefited 6om uncomprornising, in-depth discussions with Noah Heringman and Daniel McCray, and have retained early inspiration from sharing ideas with Paul Lucre. And finally, 1 would like to strongly thank al1 of my undergraduate teachers, above al1 Professon Keniey Dove and Frank Farrell, for instilling in me the proper perspective and habits of thought that have allowed me to pursue philosophy productively. It is in retrospect that 1 have a clear view of how much 1 leamed from them. List of Abbreviations [BR]: Robert Brandom, "Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Noms." PI: Kenley Dove, "Hegel's Deduction of the Concept of Science." [PSP]: Kenley Dove, "Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy." [PG]: G.W.F.Hegel, Phünomenologie des Geistes. [PSI: G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. [SL]: G.W.F.Hegel, Science of Logic. [WL]: G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. [AIB]: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. pl: John McDowell, Mind and World. [McD]: John McDowell, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule." Cpl: Robert B. Pippin, Hegel S Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. [SI: Jason L. Saunders, Greek alid Roman Philosophy afrer Aristotle. [SVF] : Stoicorum Veterurn Fragmenta. [PI) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophicai Investigations. Table of Contents Introduction 1- Background II. Mentaiism and Determinacy: Explication of Some Main Ideas m. Argument-Structure of Each Chapter Chapter One: John McDowell's Prolegomenon to the Reading of Hegel 1. Naturalized Platonism A. What is 'Nature'? B. Problems with hvoking Aristotle iI. Wittgenstein's Quietism m. Towards a Critique of the Concept of Consciousness Addendum: More Clues to McDowell's Modest Aristotelianism Chapter Two: History of a Presupposition 1. Roots of a Sui Generis Concept of Mind iI. Descartes and Skepticism iI1. Kant, Hume, and the CulmiDation of the Stoic Dichotomy A. Brief Background Excursus B. Appearance and Things in Themselves Chapter Three: Hegel's Phenomenological Critique of the Concept of Consciousness 1. The Critique of the Concept of Consciousness A. The Detenninacy of Coasciousness B. An Equivocation in the Concept of Knowing C. Who are 'We'? II, Force and the Understanding: Hegel's Phenomenological Method Ap plied A. The Appearance of Force B. The Syilogism C. CoUapse of the Syliogism iü. "Who Are 'We'?'Revisited Cbapter Four: Science, Spirit, and Self-Consciousness 1. Absolute Knowing II. What 1s Required for Logic? A. Logic and Determinacy B. With What Must the Science Begin? 1. Two Senses of 'Beginning' 2. Why Shouldn't the Beginning Be Made fiom the Standpoint of 'Consciousness'? m. The Metaphysical Interpretation and Its Consequences A. Pippin's Genealogical Prism B. Force and the Understanding Revisited Chapter Five: In What Sense Is Wittgenstein a Neo-Hegelian? 1, Brandom's Ideaiism A. The Social Constitution of Selves B. Perception C. Empiricism, Idealism, and the Structure of Consciousness II. Subjectivity, Idiolects, and the Restomtion of Determinacy A, McDoweU on Rule-Following B. Skepticism, Antirealism, and Wittgensteinian Bedrock III. The Central Anaiogy (Conclusion) Conclusion Bibiiography Introduction Jay A. Gupta 1 Introduction 1. Background In the course of becoming acquainted with contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind, 1, like many others, noticed something like a continuous oscillation in claims conceming the nature of 'mind', and its relation to reality. Intemalist and extemalist, realist and antirealist, materialist and idealist - in some sense any side taken in these familiar pairings seemed arbitrary, since it was possible to mount arguments for and against these positions with the same relative degrees of success. 1 became interested in the various critical, yet non-skeptical, approaches that were aimed at analysing the background assumptions involved in these kinds of debates, believing that this constant oscillation of opinion shuuld not lead to a terminal "suspension of judgment". i also was intuitively disposed towards getting beyond mentalist conceptions of 'mind' - "mentalist" being a term that roughly refers to those doctrines that picture an autonomous, interior mental domain that stands in a problematic relation to the rest of reality. Gilbert Ryle was a great source of inspiration, specifically his thesis that much philosophical confusion about the concept of mind rests on a "category mistake". If, said Ryle, we could get clear on the correct use of the concept of mind, the apparent force behind certain familiar debates, new and old, would simply fizzle into oblivion. 1found particularly striking his comments concerning the "logicd geography of concepts" (Ryle 7). Since, as he says, many people can talk sense with concepts, but cannot talk sense about concepts, it is desirable to draw a Introduction Jay A. Gupta 2 "map" of certain conceptual "regions" in order to explode certain "myths" conceming their use. This map would be a chart of "logical types" or categories, each with concepts peculiar to it, and each forming a set of rules for the logically Iegitimate use of the concepts that fa11 within it. The main myth in question is, of course, "Cartesian"; even though people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, ordinarily use mental-conduct concepts (e.g. 'careful', 'stupid', 'witty', 'vain') in a perfectly adequate manner, if called upon to speciQ the logical regdations governing the use of these concepts, such specification typically betrays the operation of the Cartesian myth. This is the mentalist myth of a self-standing, "inner" menta1 region, with its own laws and processes, roughly parallel to the causes, episodes, laws, and processes of the "outer" world. Now, if only we could understand the logical geography of mental concepts, then we would understand the precise sense in which the Cartesian myth is indeed a myth,