REUNIFYING CYPRUS: THE BEST CHANCE YET Europe Report N°194 – 23 June 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. NEW POLITICAL WILL.................................................................................................1 A. A NEW GREEK CYPRIOT PRESIDENCY.........................................................................................1 B. TURNABOUT IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT APPROACH........................................................................3 C. TURKISH CYPRIOTS STILL OFFER COMPROMISE..........................................................................4 II. THE NEGOTIATIONS IN 2008.......................................................................................6 A. THE 21 MARCH PROCESS............................................................................................................6 B. IMPROVING NEGOTIATION PRACTICE..........................................................................................8 1. Informing the media .............................................................................................................8 2. Involving civil society ..........................................................................................................8 3. Facilitating, not arbitrating ...................................................................................................9 4. Keeping substance, not language..........................................................................................9 5. Keeping the focus on a comprehensive settlement...............................................................9 C. NEW APPROACHES TO THE ISSUES ............................................................................................10 1. The new Cyprus republic....................................................................................................10 2. Governing the state.............................................................................................................12 3. Security and demilitarisation..............................................................................................12 4. Making a property settlement acceptable ...........................................................................15 5. From settlers to immigrants................................................................................................16 III. THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE PLAYERS..........................................................................17 A. TURKEY’S CHALLENGE.............................................................................................................17 1. Ankara’s EU conundrum....................................................................................................17 2. Political turbulence in Ankara ............................................................................................18 B. THE UN’S CENTRAL ROLE........................................................................................................21 C. THE EU’S RESPONSIBILITY.......................................................................................................21 D. GREECE AND THE UK ...............................................................................................................22 IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CYPRUS .......................................................................................................................25 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .............................................................................26 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE................................................................27 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES.........................................................................................29 Europe Report N°194 23 June 2008 REUNIFYING CYPRUS: THE BEST CHANCE YET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS A new peace process in Cyprus offers the best oppor- to meet to develop options for the leaders to discuss. tunity in decades to solve the intractable division of Momentum must be maintained. Sceptics and nation- the island. The turnabout is largely due to the surprise alists on both sides are waiting for opportunities to election of Demetris Christofias to the Greek Cypriot derail the talks. Indeed, criticism of the process from presidency. He, together with his Turkish Cypriot the former hardline leaders, Tassos Papadopoulos, the counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, are demonstrating Greek Cypriot president who lost his re-election bid political will to make the current UN-mediated talks in February 2008, and Rauf Denktash, for decades the succeed. Key players like Turkey are being constructive. Turkish Cypriot strongman, underlines how committed The outside world, particularly the UN and European Christofias and Talat are to reaching a solution. Union (EU), needs to fully engage in support of a comprehensive settlement that will improve Cypriot The position of Turkey is crucial, given its geographic security and prosperity, free Turkey to continue its proximity, large garrison on the island and extensive movement into Europe and overcome a problem that support for the Turkish Cypriot administration. The is increasingly damaging to EU policy in the region ruling AK Party government is supporting the settle- and beyond. ment process as it did in 2004, and the foreign ministry says it is determined to reach a solution. The Turkish Since their first meeting on 21 March 2008, Christofias military is sticking to its 2004 acceptance of troop and Talat have opened a new crossing at Ledra Street withdrawals in return for the right deal and has been in the capital, Nicosia, and made solid progress in constructive so far. The Turkish Cypriots say they have preparatory talks. In a joint statement on 23 May, they Ankara’s full backing to reach agreement along the well- committed to establishing a bicommunal, bizonal established UN parameters. Chances of success would be federation as a partnership with a single international higher if there was less internal political turmoil in Tur- identity and two equal Constituent States. The presi- key due to the court case against the AK Party, but do- dents are expected to meet again on 1 July and an- mestic disputes do not rule out progress on Cyprus. nounce agreement on measures to improve bicom- munal coordination in health, road safety and the Distrust between Greek Cypriots and Turkey is a key environment. Either then or at the latest in mid-July, obstacle. Ankara remains suspicious of the Greek they should press forward and announce a 1 Septem- Cypriots’ intentions, despite a turnabout in their posi- ber 2008 start for full-fledged negotiations. tion under Christofias, and Greek Cypriots remain convinced that Turkey is insincere and unreliable. Both sides know this is only a beginning, but that it These two parties barely know each other, having not could be the last chance for reunification for the fore- talked for 40 years, and are all too ready to believe seeable future. Several dynamics encouraging parti- extremist rhetoric in nationalist media. Ankara should tion have emerged since the Annan Plan was accepted communicate with Greek Cypriots, even as it refuses by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the Greek to recognise their government as representing all in- Cypriots in 2004 referendums. Failure in these nego- terests on the island, just as Greek Cypriots should tiations would trigger a cycle of vengeful politics and work more willingly with the longstanding Turkish mistrust on the island; further complicate EU-Turkey Cypriot administrative structures. EU states and other and EU-NATO relations; make the Cyprus problem a external parties can facilitate better communication. permanent irritant in the heart of the EU; and, if the 2007 rhetoric over Cypriot oil prospecting was an in- The UN Secretary-General should appoint a new dication, bring new military tensions to the island. high-level special adviser to facilitate the full-fledged talks and ensure that all regional and other interna- In the run-up to and during the full-fledged talks, work- tional players are fully informed and supportive. The ing groups and technical committees should continue EU, which risks real damage to many areas of policy Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet Crisis Group Europe Report N°194, 23 June 2008 Page ii if the Greek Cypriot-Turkish relationship breaks down, and lowering the profile of its troop presence on must engage more with the process, including making Cyprus. preparations now for financial instruments to support 8. Implement unilaterally, to show commitment to a any settlement. carefully negotiated, comprehensive final settle- The economy and security of both communities on ment based on the well-established UN body of Cyprus, as well as Turkey, would significantly benefit work, the pledge in the 2005 Additional Protocol from the right comprehensive settlement under the to the EU-Turkey Customs Union and open air- EU roof. As they work for difficult compromises, all ports and seaports to Greek Cypriot traffic. should move beyond painful memories and past dis- trust to focus on this goal. To the EU and Governments of EU Member States: RECOMMENDATIONS 9. Reach out actively to pro-solution leaders on both sides while supporting the Cypriot-driven proc- To the Greek Cypriot Administration: