Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -32 70 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] The Iraqi Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War: Who Are the Players? Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Working Draft, Revised: March 1, 2 006 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the CSIS Cordesman: Players in Iraq’s Insurgency 3/1/06 Page ii Table of Contents I. CHARACTERIZING TH E INSURGENCY ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 1 THE REGIONAL , SECTARIAN , AND ETHNIC NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY ................................ ................................ .2 ESTIMATES OF TOTAL INSURGENT FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 4 THE IRAQI INSURGENCY VS . OTHER INSURGENCIES ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 5 COMPARISONS OF INSURGENT AND IRAQI FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 7 THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEM ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 7 Insurgent Intelligence Capabilities ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 7 Counterintelligence and Iraqi Government Efforts ................................ ................................ .............................. 8 FINANCING THE INSURGENCY ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 9 THE ROLE OF CRIME AND CRIMINALS ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 11 The Impact of Crime on the Insurgency ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 11 The Strength of Criminal Activity ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 12 II. THE DOMINANT ROL E OF IRAQI SUNNI ARA B IN SURGENTS ................................ ............................ 14 THE AREAS OF MAJOR SUNNI INSURGENT INFLUENCE ................................ ................................ ............................ 15 SUNNI ISLAMIST EXTREMIST AND NEO -SALAFI VS . “N ATIONALIST ” INSURGENTS ................................ .................. 16 THE NATURE AND ROLE NEO -SALAFI AND ISLAM IST EXTREMIST GROUPS ................................ ............................. 17 An Addiction to Violence and Extremism ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 18 Guessing at Their Strength ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .19 KEY ISLAMIST EXTREMIST GROUPS ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 20 AL QA’IDA IN TH E TWO RIVERS AND THE “Z ARQAWI FACTOR ” ................................ ................................ .............. 25 The Zarqawi Organization Structure and Its Strength ................................ ................................ ....................... 25 The Zarqawi Hunt ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 28 Zarqawi Ties to Bin Laden and Outside Sunni Islamist Gro ups ................................ ................................ ........ 31 The Zarqawi “War” Against Shi’ites ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 35 “Overkill” Against Fellow Muslims ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 36 Zarqawi and Syria ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 38 Expanding the Battle: Operations Outside Iraq ................................ ................................ ................................ .38 Zarqawi and “Weapons of Mass Media” ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 44 OTHER SUNNI ARAB INSURGENT GROUPS : THE “N ATIONALISTS ?” ................................ ................................ ......... 45 Planing Befoire, During, and Immediately After the War? ................................ ................................ ................ 46 The Motives of the More “Nationalist” Insurgents ................................ ................................ ............................ 47 Ba’athists, Non -Ba’athists, or Semi -Ba’athists? ................................ ................................ ................................ 48 Other “Nationalist” Sunni Insurgents ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 49 The Searc h for Power and the Possibility of Dialogue ................................ ................................ .................... 49 TENSIONS AND CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNI “N ATIONALISTS ” VERSUS SUNNI “I SLAMIC EXTREMISTS ?” .................. 50 Divisions Over Playing a Role in the Political Process ................................ ................................ ..................... 50 Iraqi Government Negotiations with “Nationalist” Insurgents ................................ ................................ ......... 53 THE ROLE OF SUNNI ARAB MILITIAS ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 56 The Positive Side of the Militia Story ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 56 The Negat ive Side ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 57 III. THE ISSUE OF FO REIGN VOLUNTEERS ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 60 THE UNCERTAIN NUMBER , SOURCE , AND ROLE OF FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS ................................ ............................ 60 NUMBER AND NATIONAL ORIGIN OF FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS ................................ ................................ .................. 62 Saudi Militants in Iraq: A Case Study ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 65 SYRIA AND FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 68 IRAN AND FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 69 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with th e written permission of the CSIS Cordesman: Players in Iraq’s Insurgency 3/1/06 Page iii IV. THE UNCERTAIN ST ATUS OF THE SHI'ITES ................................ ................................ ........................... 71 SHI ’ITE FACTIONS AND THE VARIOUS MILITIAS ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 71 THE ROLE OF MOQTADA AL -SADR ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 77 INTERNAL SHIITE DIVISIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 79 INSURGENT PRESSURE ON THE SHI ’ITES TO MOVE TOWARD CIVIL WAR ................................ ................................ 80 V. THE KURDS AND OTH ER MINORITIES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 85 KURDISH PARTIES AND THE KURDISH MILITIAS ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 85 TENSIONS BETWEEN THE KURDS AND OTHER IRAQIS ................................ ................................ .............................. 86 UNCERTAIN KURDISH UNITY ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 87 THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCES AND OIL ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 88 THE TURKISH QUESTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 88 VI. THE ROLE OF OUTS IDERS IN THE INSURGE NCY ................................ ................................ ................. 89 CREATING A “S HI ’ITE CRESCENT ”? ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 89 THE VIEWS OF THE ARAB GULF