International Journal of East Asia Studies, 22(1) (2018), 72-93. U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power? Chamaiporn Siangyen1 1 Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand This article is part of a master’s thesis entitled “U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia: More Hard or Soft Power?”. Corresponding Author: Chamaiporn Siangyen, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok 10200, Thailand E-mail: [email protected] 72 Abstract This article examines the U.S. smart power strategy employed in Southeast Asia by the Obama government. It argues that, even though under the leadership of Obama the United States claimed to pursue a new and softer approach to reengag- ing Southeast Asian states, the U.S. rebalancing strategy did not in fact differ much from that of the Bush administration. Evidence shows that, although the Obama ad- ministration professed to change to a smart power framework, considerably more resources were still allocated to hard power than soft power. Hence, the essence of American smart power, as conducted by President Obama, was predominantly an extension of the hard power policies of his predecessor. Keywords: smart power, rebalancing strategy, Southeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy 73 บทคัดย่อ บทความนี้มีเป้าหมายในการศึกษายุทธศาสตร์อ�านาจฉลาด (smart power) ของ สหรัฐอเมริกา ซึ่งรัฐบาลโอบามาน�ามาใช้ในภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ บทความนี้เสนอว่า แม้ สหรัฐอเมริกาภายใต้การบริหารของประธานาธิบดีโอบามาจะอ้างว่าได้ใช้วิธีการใหม่และนุ่มนวลใน การด�าเนินนโยบายต่างประเทศเพื่อกระชับความสัมพันธ์กับประเทศในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ แต่ ในความเป็นจริงยุทธศาสตร์ปรับสมดุล (rebalancing strategy) ของรัฐบาลโอบามานั้นมิได้มีความ แตกต่างมากจากนโยบายของรัฐบาลจอร์จ ดับเบิลยู บุช หลักฐานจากการวิจัยพบว่าภายใต้กรอบ นโยบายอ�านาจฉลาดนั้น ทรัพยากรจ�านวนมากได้ถูกจัดสรรเพื่อน�ามาด�าเนินนโยบายอ�านาจแข็ง (hard power) มากกว่าอ�านาจอ่อน (soft power) ดังนั้น อาจกล่าวได้ว่าสาระส�าคัญของอ�านาจฉลาด (smart power) ของสหรัฐอเมริกาภายใต้รัฐบาลโอบามา เป็นส่วนขยายของนโยบายอ�านาจแข็ง (hard power) ของรัฐบาลจอร์จ ดับเบิลยู บุช ค�ำส�ำคัญ: อ�านาจฉลาด, ยุทธศาสตร์ปรับสมดุล, เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้, นโยบายต่างประเทศของสหรัฐอเมริกา 74 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power? Introduction The presidency of Barack Obama appeared to mark a shift in U.S. foreign policy from the Bush administration. Under the banners of “hope” and “change”, Obama proposed to set a new tone for U.S. foreign policy by using smart power in the Asia-Pacific region. The proposal was broadly welcomed by American people and media, especially those dissatisfied with Bush’s unilateral approaches. During his first few months in office, President Obama’s efforts in distancing himself from his predecessor’s approach to foreign policy led some political observers to believe that Obama’s new smart power strategy would be principally dominated by the use of soft power. Adding to this, during his first 100 days in office Obama received pos- itive press feedback for moving quickly on key foreign policy agendas. Renowned CNN correspondent Christine Amanpour commended Obama for laying the ground for a new direction of U.S. foreign policy, especially in dealing with Iran and North Korea on nuclear issues, ordering a close of Guantanamo Bay detention center and pledging to end the U.S. war in Iraq (Amanpour, 2009). The Guardian also report- ed positively on the Obama government’s increasing engagement with Myanmar, which was regarded as a significant change from the previous government (MacAs- kill, 2009). However, despite such initial enthusiasm, documentary analysis shows that U.S. smart power, as employed by the Obama administration, was essentially a continuation of Bush-era hard power, without significant increase in the use of soft power resources. What is Smart Power? The concept of smart power was initially introduced to the International Re- lations (IR) community in 2003 by Joseph Nye, an American political scientist who was Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration. The concept was broadly defined as a mix of hard and soft power. In 2007, a more compre- hensive explanation of smart power was put forward in a report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission on smart power, co-chaired by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye. The report describes ‘smart power’ as follows: “Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also in- 75 International Journal of East Asia Studies, 22(1) (2018) vests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action” (Armit- age & Nye, 2007). In other words, smart power emphasizes the necessity of matching a strong military with strong partnerships, alliances, and institutions. Smart power also con- sists of public diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, development assis- tance, and disaster relief (Nye, 2009). The smart power framework encourages a state to invest in both hard and soft power to ensure accomplishment of its foreign policy goals. According to its proponents, a well-crafted smart power strategy com- prises clear objectives, practical implementation plans, and sufficient hard and soft power resources and recognizes that policymakers must take into account the geo- political context of the country or region where the strategy is to be employed. The CSIS report suggested that, in order to regain America’s positive im- age in the ASEAN region following the end of Bush’s presidency, the United States should develop a strategy to reengage key regional countries and institutions such as ASEAN. In this way, the U.S could promote regional peace and stability through cooperation, particularly where there were shared interests. Consequently, in 2009, the Obama government adopted some of the CSIS Commission’s recommendations as part of its official approach toward the Asia Pacific region. Turning the Strategy into Practice: The ‘3D’ Approach: Defense, Development, and Diplomacy President Obama appointed Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State, with the task to oversee the formulation and implementation of smart power policy. During her testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2009, Secretary Clinton articulated that smart power would be at the heart of American foreign policy. The smart power strategy was articulated as a ‘3D’ Framework: Defense, De- velopment, and Diplomacy. The framework was officially introduced to the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) as the administration’s primary foreign policy ap- proach, 76 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power? “The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplo- macy, and development. The men and women in our armed forces perform their duties with courage and skill, putting their lives on the line time and time again on behalf of our nation. And in many regions, they serve alongside civilians from the State Department and USAID, as well as other government agencies, like USDA. We work with the military in two crucial ways. First, ci- vilians complement and build upon our military’s efforts in conflict areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, they use diplomatic and development tools to build more stable and peaceful societies, hopefully to avert or end conflict that is far less costly in lives and dollars than military actions.” — Secretary Hilary Clinton’s testimony to SAC, April 30, 2009 According to Secretary Clinton, the Obama administration intended to put its key principles into practice to solve modern transnational challenges in the 21st century and at the same time to advance American national interests overseas. She further stated that both hard and soft power resources would be integrated into the policy and that the U.S. military would play a crucial role in implementing the poli- cy, not only in the area of security, but also in diplomacy and development. Three key governmental agencies, namely the Department of State (DoS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD) were assigned to implement the 3D policy. However, due to their differing internal planning processes, finding a common ground for these agencies to develop a unified plan was challenging. As a result, the 3D Planning Group was created to develop a guideline that would help these agencies understand each oth- er’s roles and plans. The guideline served as a tool to unite their efforts in order to improve the effectiveness of their interventions (USAID, 2012). The essence of each ‘D’ of the framework is examined in more depth in the following sections. Defense President Obama’s decision to apply a smart power strategy towards the Asia Pacific demonstrated a reprioritization of Washington’s geopolitical interests, particularly in the security realm. In an attempt to reverse the perception of U.S. neglect of the region, President Obama increased the U.S. defense budget to nearly US$700 billion in 2010 (see Figure 1), a sizable amount of which was allocated to in- tensifying bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. 77 International Journal