The Psychopathological Antecedents of Conspiracy Belief Christopher Thomas Thresher-Andrews Department of Psychology Goldsmiths, University of London A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Goldsmiths, University of London in June 2019 Declaration of Authorship I, Christopher Thomas Thresher-Andrews hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Christopher Thomas Thresher-Andrews June 2019 2 Acknowledgements Firstly, I must express my sincere gratitude to Chris French and Alan Pickering, my research supervisors, for their expert guidance, passionate encouragement and helpful reviews of this work. I would also like to thank Ashok Jansari for his advice and assistance in successfully navigating postgraduate research as a mature part-time self- funded student. I would also like to extend my thanks to Daniel Freeman (for helpful advice on measuring paranoia), Lyn Ellett (for sharing her paranoia manipulation resources and guidance on its success), Jennifer Whitson (for sharing her concept identification task resources), Rob Brotherton (for kind advice at the beginning of my PhD), and Joseph Uscinski (for helpful comments and suggestions on the direction of this work). Special thanks are extended to Toby Rivers for his unwavering friendship and support throughout my studies, and finally to my father, Steve, for his support both financially and emotionally; this journey would not have been possible without him. 3 Abstract A conspiracy theory can be defined as an alternative explanation for an event that reveals the presence of a hidden group with malevolent intent. Conspiracy theories attract themselves to significant world events with political and social ramifications, and attempt to describe them through the lens of a monological belief system that sees conspiracy as the overwhelming explanation for humanity’s struggles. Although the psychological work exploring the various factors associated with conspiracy belief has grown considerably, the literature has only recently moved to experimental designs that aim to explore causal mechanisms. The current thesis, using a psychopathological framework, attempts to contribute to this. Study 1 found that participants who felt a lack of control showed significantly higher belief in conspiracy theories. Despite this causal link between personal control and conspiracy belief, further analysis in Study 2 raised doubts over the manipulation’s validity. Studies 3-5 attempted to manipulate feelings of paranoia and measure their effect on conspiracy belief; unfortunately, all three studies failed to significantly increase participants’ paranoid feelings. Study 6 attempted a self-esteem manipulation, which again failed to show a significant effect. Correlational work from this chapter found significant relationships between paranoia and conspiracy theories, but not self-esteem or political orientation. Finally, Study 7 successfully demonstrated a relationship between delusional ideation and conspiracy belief. A minority of this non-clinical sample exhibited a jumping-to-conclusions bias when measured using the beads task, but this bias was not related to delusional ideation or conspiracy belief. Study 8 found that belief in conspiracy theories was also related to schizotypy and a range of cognitive biases. To conclude, the thesis discusses the limitations of applying psychopathological models to explain conspiracy theory belief, providing evidence that although conspiracy theories are unlikely to be products of delusion they likely share similar cognitive antecedents. 4 Table of Contents Declaration of Authorship 2 Acknowledgements 3 Abstract 4 Chapter 1. General Introduction Overview 11 What is a “conspiracy theory”? 11 Conspiracy theories through history 12 What insight does psychology offer? 13 Aren’t conspiracy theories just harmless fun? 14 Conspiracy theories: working definition 15 Conspiracy theories: measurement challenges 21 Conspiracy theories: prevalence 24 Conspiracy theories and their real-world effects 27 The current psychological literature 30 Who believes in conspiracy theories? 30 Individual differences 33 Cognitive biases and other adaptive psychological mechanisms 39 Overall summary of the current literature 43 Limitations of the literature and objectives for this thesis 44 Research programme 47 Chapter 2. Conspiracy Theories and Personal Control Introduction 48 Overview of studies in this chapter 50 Study 1: Manipulating a lack of control and its role on generic conspiracist 51 ideation Introduction 51 Method 52 5 Results 56 Discussion 60 Study 2: Assessing the effect of a concept identification task on feelings of 63 personal control Introduction 63 Method 65 Results 68 Discussion 71 General discussion 73 Chapter 3. Paranoia, The Self, and Conspiracy Theories Introduction 77 Sub-clinical paranoia and the continuum hypothesis 77 Paranoia and conspiracy theories 78 The role of the self in paranoia, persecutory delusions, and 80 conspiracy belief Overview of studies in this chapter 83 Study 3: The effect of a scrambled sentences task manipulation of sub- 83 clinical paranoia on conspiracy theory belief Introduction 83 Method 84 Results 87 Discussion 89 Study 4: The effect of a 2-way mirror manipulation of paranoia on 91 conspiracy theory belief Introduction 91 Method 93 Results 96 Discussion 100 Study 5: The effect of a simulated CCTV manipulation of paranoia on 103 conspiracy theory belief 6 Introduction 103 Method 104 Results 107 Discussion 108 Study 6: The effect of a self-esteem manipulation on conspiracy theory 111 belief Introduction 111 Method 113 Results 115 Discussion 118 General discussion 119 Overall summary 123 Chapter 4. Delusional ideation, jumping to conclusions, and conspiracy belief Introduction 124 Jumping to conclusions 126 Overview of studies in this chapter 129 Study 7: The beads task, sub-clinical delusional ideation and conspiracy 129 theory belief Introduction 129 Method 130 Results 132 Discussion 135 Study 8: Expanding the beads task and its relationships with sub-clinical 137 delusional ideation, cognitive biases, schizotypy and conspiracy theory belief Introduction 137 Method 138 Results 142 Discussion 145 General discussion 148 7 Chapter 5. General discussion 151 Key findings 151 Revisiting the aims of this thesis 151 Key findings 151 Implications 153 Limitations 155 Directions for future work 157 Overall conclusion 159 References 161 Appendix 3.1. Scrambled sentences for paranoia and control conditions 183 Appendix 3.2. Original self-esteem manipulation by Arndt and Greenberg 184 (1999) Appendix 3.3. Personality feedback from self-esteem manipulation by Arndt 186 and Greenberg (1999) 8 List of Tables 2.1. Means and standard deviations for Study 1. 57 2.2. Correlation matrix for Study 1. 59 2.3. Means and standard deviations for Study 2. 68 3.1. Means and standard deviations for Study 3. 87 3.2. Correlation matrix for Study 3. 88 3.3. Means and standard deviations for Study 4. 96 3.4. Partial correlation matrix for Study 4. 99 3.5. Means and standard deviations for Study 5. 107 3.6. Correlation matrix for Study 5. 108 3.7. Means and standard deviations for Study 6. 115 3.8. Correlation matrix for Study 6. 117 4.1. Means and standard deviations for Study 7. 132 4.2. Correlation matrix for Study 7. 134 4.3. Mean comparisons for those who did and did not jump to conclusions in 135 Study 7. 4.4. Means and standard deviations for Study 8. 140 4.5. Correlation matrix for Study 8. 144 9 List of Figures 2.1. Example presentation of concept identification task. 54 3.1. Illustration of experimental room layout. 94 3.2. Interaction of self-esteem and mirror condition on paranoia scores. 100 3.3. Example concept with coarse flankers, inverted trapezium, star-shaped field, 105 yellow square, and horizontal stripes. 4.1. Best-fit model demonstrating the relationships between labelled factors of 143 delusional ideation and cognitive biases, with conspiracy belief. 10 Chapter 1 General Introduction Overview Princess Diana was murdered by the British Secret Service because she was pregnant with Dodi Fayed’s baby. The government is adding fluoride to our drinking water in an attempt to weaken the population. Barack Obama is a Kenyan-born Muslim and thus was ineligible for the Office of the President of the United States. All of these statements have appeared at some point or another in popular media, been debated by politicians, challenged and denied by government departments, and been propagated heavily over the internet (for a review, see Aaronovitch, 2009; Byford, 2011). Thirty eight percent of the UK population believe Diana’s death was not an accident (Gardiner & Thompson, 2012). Even after two presidential terms, 28% of Americans (and 53% of Republicans) thought Obama was not born in the United States (Moore, 2016). But these statements are not true. They are examples of a cultural shift in the popularity of “conspiracy theories”; alternative narratives of a world overshadowed by malevolent groups hell-bent on the destruction of civil liberties, freedom and democracy (Walker, 2014). They suggest that governments, secret religious groups, scientists or private industry (often many of these combined) are responsible for either causing or covering up significant major world events for their own criminal ends. What is a “conspiracy theory”? Traditionally, the definition of a “conspiracy” is from the legal interpretation of an “agreement