50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister, 208, 213

50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister, 208, 213

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76793-4 - Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective Thomas B. Pepinsky Index More information Index 50 Reasons Why Anwar Cannot coalitions and, 3, 16–17, 19, 265 Become Prime Minister, 208, economic interests and, 3, 20, 264 213 in Indonesia, 118 Abdul Rahim Noor, 201, 211–13 in Malaysia, 119–54 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 192, 208, in Mexico. See Mexico, 1982 crisis, 211, 222 policy response to; Mexico, 1994 Abdurrahman Wahid, 155, 187 crisis, policy response to ABRI and regime survival, 4, 8–9. See also business interests, 46–47, 52, 172–73 economic crises, and regime and democratization, 191. See also change TNI theory of, 16–20, 36–39 factionalism, 50–51, 162, 163, 174, theories of, 4–7 177, 179, 186 during twin crises, 22–32. See also and fixed capital, 47, 52, 61, 173, twin crises, solutions to 182, 184, 186 in Uruguay. See Uruguay, financial and models of New Order politics, crisis, policy response to 78–79, 80 Affifudin Omar, 141, 200, 201 and patronage, 44, 45–46, 60 Ahmad Mohd. Don, 131, 151, 203, personnel rotation in, 45 211 relationships to ethnic Chinese, 47, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, 74, 205, 207–8, 53, 56–57, 59, 60–61, 184 210, 213 and rise of New Order, 17, 42–43 Ali Abul Hassan Sulaiman, 132, 212 and social order, 44, 47, 183 Allende, Salvador, 239, 242 support for Soeharto, 169, 170, 175, Alliance. See BN, formation of 179–80 Alternative Front. See BA adjustment policy, 2, 3–4 Amanah Saham Bumiputra. See ASB in Argentina. See Argentina, financial Amanah Saham Nasional. See ASN crisis, policy response to Amien Rais, 160, 170, 175, 185 in Chile. See Chile, financial crisis, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik policy response to Indonesia. See ABRI 313 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76793-4 - Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective Thomas B. Pepinsky Index More information 314 Index Anwar Ibrahim capital controls and. See allegations of sexual impropriety, democratization, and capital 203, 208–9, 213 controls arrest and trial, 213–14, 215 cross-national patterns, 34–35, criticisms of, 195, 214, 217 226–37 and IMF. See IMF, and Malaysia, economic crises and. See economic initial policy similarities crises, and regime change and NEAC. See NEAC, and Anwar in Indonesia, 2, 274 Ibrahim existing theories of, 156–66 ouster, 211–13 in Latin America, 263, 268 relationship with Mahathir theory of, 3–4, 8–9, 14–15, 18–20, Mohamad. See Mahathir 30–32, 36–39, 271–74 Mohamad, relationship with Anwar Ibrahim BA, 193, 276 rise to power, 199 coherence of, 196, 217, 218 role in adjustment policy. See electoral disadvantages, 216–17, adjustment policy, in Malaysia 218 ties to Malay entrepreneurs, 70, 76 electoral results, 220–22 and UMNO Youth, 207–8. See also formation, 215 UMNO, Youth wing and patronage system, 197 Apkindo, 87, 89 platform, 216, 217 Arab-Malaysian Group, 73, 134, 139 Badan Intelijen Strategis. See Bais Argentina, 12 Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara. See capital inflows, 244–45 Bakin coalition structure, 17, 243–45 Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran financial crisis Cengkeh. See BPPC policy response to, 247 Badan Urusan Logistik. See Bulog and regime collapse, 245, 247 Badan Usaha Milik Negara. See Armed Forces of Indonesia. See ABRI BUMN ASB, 66 bahaya laten komunisme. See payouts during Malaysia’s crisis, balatkom 141–42 Bais, 51 Asian Development Bank, 138 Bakin, 51 ASN, 66 Bakrie & Brothers, 55 payouts during Malaysia’s crisis, Bakrie, Aburizal, 54, 55, 93, 98, 112, 142 169, 191 Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia. See Bakun Dam, 124, 125, 126 Apkindo balance-of-payments crisis. See asset specificity. See capital mobility exchange rates, crises Astra International, 55, 57, 59 balatkom, 187 Austral Plan, 247 Bambang Trihatmodjo, 54, 55, 101 authoritarian breakdowns Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd. See absence in Malaysia, 2, 192–94 BBMB existing theories of, 193–98 Bank Central Asia, 96, 97, 104, 181, adjustment policy and. See 187 adjustment policy, and regime Bank Indonesia. See BI survival Bank Indonesia Certificates. See SBI © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76793-4 - Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective Thomas B. Pepinsky Index More information Index 315 Bank Indonesia liquidity support. See unity during Malaysia’s crisis, 193, BLBI 197, 200, 201, 202, 205, 216 Bank Negara Malaysia. See BNM BNM, 130–32, 135, 138, 144, 200 Bank Umum Nasional, 97, 104 opposition to adjustment policy, banking crises, 20. See also twin crises 131–32, 151, 203, 211–12 Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia. Boix, Carles, 272 See BLBI Borneo. See East Malaysia Barisan Alternatif. See BA BPPC, 87, 89 Barisan Nasional. See BN Bratton, Michael, 273 Bates, Robert H., 272 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 268 Bawazier, Fuad, 104, 112, 113, 115, Bulog, 46, 48, 87, 89 178, 265 bumiputra BBMB, 135, 137, 138 definition of, 61 Bellin, Eva, 268, 272 favoritism in public policy. See Berdikari, 46 adjustment policy, in Malaysia; Berjaya Group, 76 Malay supremacy Berkeley Mafia, 43–44 overlap with Malay, 61–62 BI, 82, 91–93, 94, 96–97, 99, 100, underdevelopment of, 62 105–9 BUMN, 46–47, 91 and bank closures, 99–102 Buy Malaysia campaign, 129, 146 and bank restructuring. See IBRA and banking policies during the Cameroon, 16, 33, 231 crisis, 99–105 capital account policy. See also liquidity support. See BLBI exchange rates; monetary policy personnel shakeups, 93, 102, 113, in Indonesia, 3, 58, 105–15, 117–18, 170–71, 177 176, 178 Bimantara, 111 in Malaysia, 2, 3, 143–52, 175, 192, BLBI, 96, 104–5 197, 203, 211, 212, 215, 216, BN, 62, 67, 68, 141, 152, 192, 193, 217 194, 195, 200, 203, 205, 206, logic of, 6, 23, 24, 26–30, 31, 32, 207, 211. See also Gerakan; 226, 264, 269–70. See also MCA; MIC; UMNO adjustment policy, during twin 1995 election results, 198 crises 1997 by-election results, 201–2 and regime survival. See 1999 election campaign, 216–18 democratization, and capital 1999 electoral results, 192, 220–22 controls electoral advantages, 197 capital controls. See capital account foreign criticisms of, 203 policy formation of, 63 capital liquidity legitimacy, 196 distinction from capital mobility, and Malaysia’s party system, 79 24–25 and patronage, 68, 69, 151, 196, capital mobility. See also capital 209 account policy and race relations, 205 and adjustment policy preferences, two-thirds majority. See DR, BN’s 26–30, 30–32 two-thirds majority in and authoritarianism, 271–72 UMNO domination of, 63 cross-national patterns in, 270 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76793-4 - Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective Thomas B. Pepinsky Index More information 316 Index capital mobility (cont.) and regime survival, 242 definition of, 24–26 Chinese (ethnic group in Southeast in Indonesia, 58–59. See also capital Asia) account policy, in Indonesia; in Indonesia Chinese (ethnic group in capital assets, 3, 25, 58–60, 173, Southeast Asia), in Indonesia, 190. See also konglomerat capital assets cronies, 2, 40, 41, 44, 45, 53–61, and adjustment policy. See 84, 265. See also ABRI, adjustment policy, in Indonesia; relationships to ethnic Chinese capital account policy, in discrimination against, 54, 57–58, Indonesia 111, 171, 174–75, 176, and regime survival. See 186–87, 276. See also media, in authoritarian breakdowns, in Indonesia, targeting of Chinese in Indonesia exodus, 3, 164, 173, 183–84, in Malaysia, 75–76. See also 186 adjustment policy, in Malaysia; history, 54 capital account policy, in violence against, 3, 43, 155, 156, Malaysia; Chinese (ethnic 167, 174, 182. See also May group in Southeast Asia), in 13–14 riots Malaysia, capital assets in Malaysia, and adjustment policy. See capital assets, 41, 76, 77, 150, adjustment policy, in Malaysia; 206, 121. See also UMNO, and capital account policy, in Chinese capital Malaysia discrimination against, 201, 206, and regime survival. See 223 authoritarian breakdowns, diversity among, 61 absence in Malaysia history, 63 Ca´rdenas, Cuauhte´moc, 257, 260 political organization. See DAP; Ca´rdenas, La´zaro, 251, 252, 257 Gerakan; MCA; MCP case selection, 9, 226 violence involving, 63, 218 Case, William, 196 Chinn, Menzie, 227, 229, 254, 269 causality, 3, 8–9, 11, 237. See also Chua, Christian, 57–58 coalitions, as causal variables, CLOB, 149 comparative method Clove Marketing Board. See BPPC CBS, 111–14. See also exchange rates, coalitions in Indonesia and adjustment policy. See CDRC, 138–139 adjustment policy, coalitions Central Limit Order Book. See CLOB and Chandra Muzaffar, 215 in Argentina. See Argentina, Chandra, Siddharth, 163 coalition structure Chicago Boys, 239–42, 244 as causal variables, 3–4, 6–7, 12–13, Chicago Road to Socialism, 242 14–15, 264, 266–67, 267–69, Chile, 12, 18, 34, 238 271, 272–73 capital inflows, 241 in Chile. See Chile, coalition coalition structure, 17, 239–40 structure financial crisis difficulty of changing, 16–17. See policy response to, 241–42 also commitment problems © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76793-4 - Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective Thomas B. Pepinsky Index More information Index 317 distributional conflict within, 6, debt 30–32, 265, 271 and adjustment policy preferences, in Indonesia, 42–61 26–32 in Malaysia, 61–77 and exchange rates, 21, 23 in Mexico. See PRI, changing in Indonesia, 84–87, 97, 107.

View Full Text

Details

  • File Type
    pdf
  • Upload Time
    -
  • Content Languages
    English
  • Upload User
    Anonymous/Not logged-in
  • File Pages
    14 Page
  • File Size
    -

Download

Channel Download Status
Express Download Enable

Copyright

We respect the copyrights and intellectual property rights of all users. All uploaded documents are either original works of the uploader or authorized works of the rightful owners.

  • Not to be reproduced or distributed without explicit permission.
  • Not used for commercial purposes outside of approved use cases.
  • Not used to infringe on the rights of the original creators.
  • If you believe any content infringes your copyright, please contact us immediately.

Support

For help with questions, suggestions, or problems, please contact us