www.ssoar.info Czech-German Relations after the Fall of the Iron Curtain Kunstat, Miroslav Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Kunstat, M. (1998). Czech-German Relations after the Fall of the Iron Curtain. Sociologický časopis / Czech Sociological Review, 6(2), 149-172. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54281 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. 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Czech-German Relations after the Fall of the Iron Curtain MIROSLAV KUNŠTÁT* Institute for International Studies, Charles University, Prague Abstract: The paper deals with Czech-German relations from 1989-90, i.e., the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start of democratic reforms in former Czecho- slovakia, up until the signing of the Czech-German declaration on mutual relations and their future development in January 1997. In the introduction, relations between these countries before 1989 are outlined, with emphasis on the meaning and practi- cal implementation of the so-called Prague Agreement of 1973. The period 1989-90 is seen in the light of the new historical chances and hopes that the political changes brought. However, soon after the mood turned more sober, in the period from German unification to the end of the Czechoslovak Federation. Ne- gotiations on the Czechoslovak-German treaty signed in February 1992 clearly showed that relations were only very slowly emerging from their past captivity. After the birth of the Czech Republic, relations became more intense in the eco- nomic sphere, but stagnated politically. The events that arose from the 1938 Munich Agreement, the consequences of German occupation and the post-war transfer of Sudeten Germans, were the subject of debate and controversy at the highest political level. Negotiations on the Czech-German declaration clarified all aspects of bilateral prob- lems and speeded up the dialogue between both societies. The quality and stability of Czech-German relations are directly linked to the creation of a new, unified and peaceful Europe. Czech Sociological Review, 1998, Vol. 6 (No. 2: 149-172) 1. A Historical Introduction: A Brief Outline of Relations between West Germany and the former Czechoslovakia before 1989 The basically pragmatic relations between West Germany (the old FRG) and the former Czechoslovakia had already begun to change before 1989 with the start of a number of collaborative projects. In 1967 it was agreed to set up commercial representations with consular powers in both Prague and Frankfurt. This had a rather ambivalent effect as it contributed to a review of the Hallstein doctrine but at the same time reflected the en- trenched Czech position which wanted to finally break with this doctrine – in the interests of East Germany (GDR) – by exclusively pressing for full diplomatic relations. On 13 December 1966, Chancellor Kiesinger’s so-called grand coalition of the CDU/CSU/SPD listed the normalisation of relations between Czechoslovakia and West Germany and the elimination of the effects of the Munich Agreement as one of its aims (following on from the so-called peace note of the Federal Government on 24 March that year). Even greater emphasis was put on this by Willy Brandt’s social-liberal coalition in its foreign-policy platform announced on 28 October 1969.1 Paradoxically this took place *) Direct all correspondence to PhDr. Miroslav Kunštát, Institute for International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Rytířská 31, 110 00 Praha 1. 1) Europa-Archiv, Folge 7/1966, pp. D 172-D 173. In the so-called peace note, the Federal Gov- ernment had stated its view that the Munich Agreement (implicitly accepted as having been in 149 Czech Sociological Review, VI, (2/1998) only a few days after the Czechoslovak government took unilateral measures to drasti- cally limit the almost free movement of persons to Germany and other western countries (subject only to normal visa regulations). The initial rather exploratory negotiations from the period of the Prague Spring, which the former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiří Hájek described in his memoirs,2 could only be followed up in a completely new, i.e., multilateral framework. These were characterised by the relatively well-defined but unsophisticated standpoints of the then German opposition (CDU/CSU), in commenting on the ratification of the so-called Treaty of Prague between Czechoslovakia and West Germany (dating to the first quarter of 1974 and not, unfortunately, taken into account in Brach’s otherwise very worthy 1973 work on the treaty),3 although the cutting edge of their criticisms was understandably directed at the main figures of the new German ‘Ostpolitik’, Egon Bahr and Willi Brandt. The so-called Heck Statement which represented the views of a minority of the foreign committee of the German Bundestag, on 11 June 1974, presented the following picture:4 According to it, the Federal Republic of Germany was being de facto “forced” by the Soviet Union – by promises of concessions on internal German relations, on Berlin, etc. – to respect the connections between the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of 6 May 1970, Article 6 of which states that the 1938 Munich Agreement was forced on Czechoslovakia under the threat of force and an aggressive war (…) and therefore that “all its conse- quences are invalid”, and the Soviet-German treaty of August 1970, based on the so- called ‘Bahr Plan’ from late May of that year, as well as the even clearer consequences of the German-Soviet communiqué from Oreanda on 18 July 1971. This almost literally adopted into Czechoslovak-German affairs the relevant points of the Bahr Plan agreed between Bahr and Gromyko immediately after the latter’s return from Prague, where he went for the signing of the new Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty. In Oreanda it was clearly stated that “the relevant treaties with the German Democ- ratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic form an indivisible whole” and that “questions arising in negotiations between the Fed- force up to 15. 3. 1939) was “torn up” by Hitler himself and had no territorial significance. As it had already stated on several occasions, the Federal Government therefore had no territorial claims to Czechoslovakia. It stressed, “…dass dies die verantwortliche Darstellung der deutschen Politik ist”. In its answer to this note in May 1966, the Czechoslovak government insisted on an explicit declaration that the Munich Agreement had been invalid from the outset. C.f. Europa-Archiv, Folge 11/1966, pp. D 287-D 289 and Deutsche Politik 1966, Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundes- regierung (17), Bonn 1967, p. XVI and pp. 10-11; Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung 1969 (20), Bonn 1970, pp. 39, 84-85. For a summary see e.g. Müller, A.: Die Tschechoslowakei auf der Suche nach Sicherheit, Berlin 1977, pp. 164-220, 361-381. C.f. also Müller, A., Utitz, B.: Deutsch- land und die Tschechoslowakei, Freudenstadt 1972. 2) Hájek, J.: Begegnungen und Zusammenstösse. Erinnerungen des ehemaligen tschecho- slowakischen Aussenministers, Freiburg/Br. pp. 178-181, 210-211; Hájek, J.: Paměti (Memoirs), Prague 1997, pp. 278-279. See also Šnejdárek, A.: “Jaké vztahy k NSR?” (What Sort of Relations with Germany?), Rudé právo, 17. 4. 1968, or Müller, A.: “Die Haltung der ČSSR gegenüber der BRD während des Prager Demokratisierungsprozesses”, Osteuropa 4/1969, and many others. 3) Břach, R.: Smlouva o vzájemných vztazích mezi ČSSR a SRN z roku 1973 (The 1973 Treaty on Relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany), Prague 1994. 4) Deutscher Bundestag (DBT) – 7 Wahlperiode, Drucksache 7/2270. 150 Miroslav Kunštát: Czech-German Relations after the Fall of the Iron Curtain eral Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic which relate to the invalidity of the Munich Agreement must be resolved in a way that is acceptable to both parties.” The 1973 Treaty of Prague did not however just resolve the problem of the Munich Agreement. Its fruits, in the form of humanitarian supplements, were