W&M ScholarWorks Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 4-2014 Commitment without Control: The Burdensharing Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance Jake A. Douglas College of William and Mary Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses Part of the American Politics Commons, Asian Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Douglas, Jake A., "Commitment without Control: The Burdensharing Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance" (2014). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 28. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/28 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Commitment without Control: The Burdensharing Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelors of Arts in Government from The College of William and Mary by Jake Arthur Douglas Accepted for _____________________________ (Honors) ___________________________________ Tun-Jen Cheng, Director ___________________________________ Sophia Hart ___________________________________ Hiroshi Kitamura Williamsburg, Va April 11, 2014 Douglas 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 3 Chapter 1: Introduction to the Burdensharing Dilemma ................................................................. 4 Chapter 2: The Burdensharing Dilemma in US Alliances .............................................................. 7 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 7 Extended deterrence and alliance restraint .............................................................................. 7 Forward deployments and automaticity in post-WWII American alliances ......................... 13 Economic (rather than strategic) explanations of alliance burdensharing ............................. 21 Theory ........................................................................................................................................ 23 Methods and scope .................................................................................................................... 28 Chapter 3: Burdensharing in the Cold War ................................................................................... 31 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 31 The End of WWII and the Early Cold War ............................................................................... 32 From Korea to Vietnam ............................................................................................................. 38 The Nixon Shocks and Détente ................................................................................................. 41 The End of Détente to the End of the Cold War ....................................................................... 48 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 52 Chapter 4: Burdensharing in the Rebalance to Asia ...................................................................... 54 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 54 Reaffirming the American Commitment… to Burdensharing .................................................. 54 The Eroding Asian Military Balance ......................................................................................... 57 Fears of Tactical and Strategic Entrapment ............................................................................... 64 Overcoming the Burdensharing Dilemma? ............................................................................... 71 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 73 Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 75 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 78 Douglas 3 Acknowledgements A thesis is lonely work, but it could not been finished at all without the encouragement, emotional support, funding, and intellectual stimulus of a number of interested and caring individuals. I am forever grateful to the people who helped me along the way. Tun-Jen Cheng, my honors adviser, was a careful guide and infinitely resourceful. I am thankful for his great kindness, in both his personal relations and the countless hours he spent with me discussing strategic issues. Sophia Hart and Hiroshi Kitamura, my committee members, were teachers early in my time at the College. In many ways, the roots of this thesis can be traced back to their insights. The Charles Center, their donors, and the W&M Government Department funded my research over the summer and school year. I hope this product is worth their investment, and I am deeply indebted to their generosity. John Baltes, a mentor, was a fantastic lecturer in political theory and one of my first truly brilliant professors. Hugh and Harry White, inspirations and friends, have given me hope that we may yet avoid another tragedy in great power politics. Dylan Kolhoff, my favorite China hand, was a go-to expert in all things China. His intelligence and familiarity with the region were among my most critical resources. Paul and Janet Douglas, my parents, encouraged and helped me at every turn. Lexie Mellis, my lovely girlfriend, suffered through many missed dates and busy weekends. As all will attest, putting up with my incessant chattering on US-Asia relations is no easy burden, but she was incredibly supportive throughout the process. Zackary Quaratella and Benjamin Reynolds, my most trusted intellectual companions, I owe you the most. I would have neither the passion nor appreciation for the task of self- cultivation and learning I do today without your friendship. For this and many other reasons, I dedicate this thesis to you. Douglas 4 Chapter 1: Introduction to the Burdensharing Dilemma On November 23, 2010, North Korean artillery shelled South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island, killing four in one of the most serious clashes since the Korean War. South Korean artillery responded in kind within minutes. The crisis eventually stabilized, but not before another exchange of fire. Peace may not have prevailed, however, if the Washington had not restrained Seoul from further escalation. Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense at the time of the incident, wrote in his memoir that “South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery.”1 The South Korean government has declined to comment on Gates’s version of events.2 Yet it is obvious there had been calls in the South for a more forceful approach to North Korea’s military provocations, especially since after the March 26 sinking of the Cheonan. South Korean President Park Geun-hye has since adopted a policy of ‘active deterrence.’ Her military commanders will now counter attacks immediately without regard for “political considerations,” perhaps including strikes on North Korean nuclear sites.3 This has raised the distinct possibility of US involvement in a peninsular war without either its foreknowledge or consent.4 This is just a brief story of one trilateral relationship, but it exposes a great deal about the nature of American alliances in the post-World War II era. In a November 2012 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), National Security Adviser Thomas 1 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014): 497. 2 “Gates Says US Prevented South Korea Airstrike on North,” Defense News, January 15, 2014. 3 “South Korea Leader Park Geun-Hye Vows to Strike Back at North Korea,” News.com.au, April 2, 2013. 4 Patrick M. Cronin, “If Deterrence Fails: Rethinking Conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” Center for a New American Security (March 2014): 11-12. Douglas 5 Donilon likened alliances to “assets on a balance sheet.”5 Yet the alliance problems detailed above show they can also be liabilities. Since the early Cold War, the United States has maintained a system of extended deterrence around the world. Its centerpiece, in contradistinction to other eras of great power politics, has been the physical garrisoning of allied territory. To deter would-be aggressors, Americans have demonstrated with this ‘tripwire’ strategy that they could not possibly avoid involvement. Even so, Washington has often recognized the costs of such a total commitment for intra-alliance management. When an adversary knows the United States is automatically committed, so does the security partner. Although America may not want war and its enemy