NAEEM A HMAD SALIK Missile Issues in South Asia NAEEM A HMAD SALIK Naeem Ahmad Salik is a Brigadier in the Pakistan Army, currently serving as the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate at the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters. He has taught in the Defense and Strategic Studies Department at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islmabad, and was a visiting fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in 1995. He has published extensively on the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of India and Pakistan. or years, South Asia has been recognized as one of During the Cold War confrontation between the two the world’s most conflict-prone areas. Since the superpowers, the approximately 30 minute flight time of Fovert nuclearization of the region in May 1998, it intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) provided just has also been characterized as the most likely place for a enough time for decisionmakers on either side to confirm nuclear conflict. The current military standoff between the veracity of warning signals of an impending missile the two South Asian nuclear rivals, which cumulatively strike and then make appropriate decisions to meet the have deployed one million soldiers along their common threat. However, in South Asia, owing to the geographi- border, has kept the international community on tenter- cal contiguity of the two antagonists, a shorter-range mis- hooks for the last six months. sile would take only three to five minutes to reach its target, The proliferation of missiles around the world, espe- while medium-range missiles would take roughly ten min- cially in some of the most volatile regions such as the utes, leaving very little time for the decisionmakers to Middle East and South Asia, has also been a major cause verify the accuracy of the warning and then to make a of concern for the international community. The fact that rational decision on how to respond to the threat. It is ballistic missiles are ideally suited for delivering weapons precisely for this reason that the introduction of missiles of mass destruction (WMD), and that major players in has accentuated the volatility of the regional security en- both these regions are known to possess WMD capabili- vironment and is justifiably viewed as a destabilizing ele- ties, has further accentuated the seriousness of the prob- ment. With both India and Pakistan now known to be lem. Technology control regimes, in particular the Missile nuclear capable states, these missiles, once fitted with Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have succeeded nuclear warheads, can cause devastation in case of a only in slowing the pace of development of missiles but launch based on a false warning, a misperceived warning have failed to halt their spread to additional countries, signal, or an unauthorized use, because, unlike an aircraft, mainly because of their selective application and duplicity a missile, once launched, cannot be called back. of approach. Additionally, cruise missile technology, with Compounding this danger, the two countries lack req- its ever-growing potential, has largely been ignored as yet, uisite surveillance and early warning assets, a deficiency while the tricky issue of space launch vehicle (SLV) tech- that is not likely to be addressed, at least in the short term. nology, with its clear potential for conversion into mili- The most serious problem, however, is that even if state- tary uses, has also yet to be resolved. of-the-art surveillance means were available, they could detect only the launch of a missile but could not provide The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 47 NAEEM A HMAD SALIK information as to what kind of a warhead it is carrying. fact has been alluded to by a prominent U.S. analyst Obviously, basing its assessment on the worst-case sce- Rodney Jones, who has stated that: nario, the side at the receiving end will inevitably assume As with nuclear weapons capabilities, India has that any missile launched against it must be carrying a set the pace in the acquisition of missile deliv- nuclear warhead. A response based on this assumption, ery capabilities on the subcontinent. Pakistan therefore, could result in catastrophic consequences. This invariably has come from behind, usually fac- logic also leads to the conclusion that if rational ing tougher procurement obstacles and the con- decisionmaking is assumed on both sides, using conven- sequences of greater planning uncertainty.4 tionally armed ballistic missiles in a bilateral nuclear envi- ronment would not only be imprudent, it will also be highly The first major manifestation of India’s missile ambi- improbable. tions was the test firing of the medium-range Agni on May 22, 1989. This missile, with a range of 1500 kilometers EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN MISSILE (km) and a payload of 1000 kilograms (kg), was clearly a PROGRAM nuclear capable system.5 True to their tradition, however, The Indian and Pakistani missile programs differ both the Indians preferred to call it a “technology demonstra- in terms of their scope and their underlying motivations. tor.” Bharat Warrianwala, an analyst at the Institute of The Indian missile program is a derivative of its civilian Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, aptly summed space program, which was initiated in 1967 and was sharply up this apparent contradiction, stating, “Like good Hin- upgraded in 1970. The program had greatly benefited dus and pacifists, we say the program is only for peaceful from generous technological assistance from advanced uses, but the ‘Agni’ is, in every sense, a system for nuclear industrialized nations. As far back as 1974, the Director weapons.”6 of the Indian Space Commission claimed that the country Prior to this, in February 1988, India had tested its 150 already possessed the ability to produce medium-range km/1000 kg missile, the Prithvi, based on the Russian SA- ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with locally produced solid fuels 2 missile. However, testing of this Pakistan-specific mis- 1 and guidance systems. As noted by U.S. national secu- sile did not ruffle any feathers around the world. India rity analyst Janne Nolan: then proceeded to conduct 15 more tests of the road- Unlike the growth of its defense industry, the mobile Prithvi before inducting it into the 333 and 334 steady expansion of India’s military space po- Missile Groups of the Indian army. Reportedly, the In- tential has occurred until recently without much dian army now has 75 Prithvis in its inventory. A longer- active scrutiny from more advanced nations. range version of the Prithvi with a range/payload Under the peaceful cast of civilian research, the configuration of 250 km/500 kg is undergoing trials for nation had considerable latitude to acquire ultimate induction in the Indian air force. Yet another ver- needed technologies and expertise through rou- sion of this missile is under development for installation 2 tine and unpublicized channels. on Indian Navy surface vessels. The missile, called In 1983, India embarked upon a dedicated military mis- Dhanush, with a reported range of 350 km, has already sile program through the initiation of an ambitious effort undergone two tests.7 Once deployed, it will constitute a known as the Integrated Guided Missile Development novel experiment, since naval surface platforms usually Program (IGMDP). The program had the declared ob- carry cruise rather than ballistic missiles for anti-ship or jective of developing five missile types: Nag, an anti-tank land attack missions. In view of its highly toxic liquid fuel, guided missile (ATGM); Trishul, a short-range surface- storage of the Dhanush on board ship will pose serious to-air missile (SAM); Akash, a medium-range SAM; hazards for the crew. Interestingly, the significance of the Prithvi, a short-range battlefield support missile; and Agni, Prithvi is generally underrated by security analysts around an MRBM.3 The implementation of this program irrevo- the world because of their lack of familiarity with the cably put India on the path to becoming a major missile geostrategic situation prevailing in South Asia. Pakistan’s power, generating irresistible pressure for its main regional geographical shape and its lack of strategic depth vis-à- rival, Pakistan, to follow suit and thereby setting the stage vis India means that even this so-called short-range battle- for a potentially dangerous missile race in South Asia. This field support missile has strategic connotations: from 48 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 NAEEM A HMAD SALIK launch sites in India, it can reach most of the strategic named PJ-10, on June 12, 2001. According to reports targets inside Pakistan, including the capital, Islamabad. appearing in Indian print and electronic media, the pro- India tested longer-range versions of the Agni in April pulsion system of the missile was provided by the 1999 and again in January 2001.8 These rail-mobile mis- Russians—in clear violation of MTCR Category II guide- siles are based on solid-fuel propulsion, unlike the first lines—while the Indians contributed the “indigenously 11 Agni, which had a solid-fueled first stage based on the developed” guidance system. The advertised range of U.S. Scout rocket and a liquid-fueled second stage based this missile is 280 km and its payload capability is report- on the Prithvi. However, the mismatch between solid- and edly in the range of one-half metric ton—a range/payload liquid-fuel propulsion caused the failure of two of its first capability just below the 500 kg/300 km threshold that three tests, before the program was frozen in the mid- triggers the strictest export controls under the MTCR. The 1990s, ostensibly after intense U.S. pressure on the specifications of the Brahmos will thus allow Russia to Narasimha Rao government.