AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY THEOLOGY Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996),87-141. Printed in the United States ofAmerica. Copyright © 1996 Cambridge University Press 1057-0608/96 $7.50 + .10 Volume 5, Number I, March 1996 The Semantic Principles underlying Saint Contents Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics ofBeing Augustine on Theological Fatalism: The Argument of De Libero Arbitrio 3.1-4 GYULAKLIMA DAVID P. HUNT 1 Department of Philosophy University of Notre Dame and On a Sophisma ofRichard Kilvington and a Problem ofAnalysis Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy BERNARD D. KATZ 31 Expositions ofthe Text: Aquinas's Aristotelian Commentaries I. INTRODUCTION: SEMANTICS AND METAPHYSICS JOHN JENKINS 39 As I hope the title clearly indicates, this article is not intended to contribute Nicholas ofAutrecourt and William ofOckham on Atomism, its ounces to the tons ofliterature on Aquinas's metaphysics ofbeing. On the N ominalisnl, and the Ontology ofMotion contrary, its primary motivation is the perhaps deplorable, but certainly not BLAKE D. DUTTON 63 negligible, fact that the very form ofdiscourse within which the substantive claims of that literature, as well as Aquinas's own claims, are formulated is 1 The Semantic Principles Underlying St. Thomas Aquinas's radically different from that of contemporary philosophical discussions. Metaphysics of Being GYULA KLIMA 87 Research for this paper was completed during my Morse Fellowship, which exempted me from teaching duties at the Philosophy Department ofYale University in the academic year 1994-95. I thank Desmond Paul Henry, John Jenkins, Heikki Kirjavainen, Eleonore Stump, andJack Zupko, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank my new colleagues at the University ofNotre Dame for a very lively and thorough discussion of the same material during my first visit here. My special thanks go to Scott MacDonald for his detailed and perceptive comments, as well as for his general suggestions for improving the presentation of the material. My original plan was to provide a nontechnical exposition of the semantic principles underlying Aquinas's metaphysics ofbeing and goodness. I had to realize, however, both that if I do not want to compromise precision I cannot completely abandon technicalities (though I tried to relegate them mostly to the footnotes) and that the further considerations that link the notion of being to the notion of goodness would already exceed the limits of a single research paper. A full account of these further considerations, as well as the technicalities only out­ lined here, will be provided in my book under preparation: Meaning, Nature, Concept. Nevertheless, I do hope that the foregoing considerations will already prove useful in interpreting the passage that most clearly relates the notion of being to the notion of goodness, while also explains the difference of their predication simpliciter and secundum quid: sn q. 5, a~ 1. 1. For pregnant expressions of the keen awareness of isolation in many con­ temporary Thomists, see the numerous essays devoted to this problem in D. W. Hudson and D.W. Moran, eds., The Future ofThomism, American Maritain Associa­ CAMBRIDGE tion Publications (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Of UNIVERSITY PRESS II II I course, one cannot ignore the tremendous amount of good work done by philoso- 1057-0608(199603)5:1 ;1-5 87 88 GYULA KLIMA SEMANTIC PRINCIPLES OF AQUINAS 89 Facedwith this different form ofdiscourse, modern readers are eitherwilling biguous, especially today, after the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, when (and able) to 'Join in," in which case they may become "players" ofthe rele­ everyone seems to have his or her own "philosophy of language" and vant "language game," or they are unwilling (or unable) to do so, in which "theory of meaning and/or reference."4 The primary aim of this article, case theywill be left ultimately "intellectuallyintact" by these claims. In either therefore, is to spell out with clarity and precision the underlying semantic case, without careful reflection on the general principles governing "the principles of the very form of discourse presupposed by Aquinas's substan­ game," this willingness (and ability) on the part ofthe modern reader will be tive metaphysical claims concerning being, clearly distinguishing the for­ determined mostly by vague intuitions and more or less articulated sympa­ mer from the latter. I hope thereby to ensure that the contemporary thies or antipathies, rather than by serious philosophical considerations. reader's willingness (and ability) to participate in the language game of As we know, metaphysics studies the first principles of all knowledge.2 competently evaluating the substantive metaphysical arguments for and But even the metaphysical investigation offirst principles presupposes that against the relevant metaphysical claims will depend not on unexamined we understand what is meant by these principles and their terms; that is, intuitions but rather on a careful consideration of these underlying princi­ even metaphysical principles presuppose certain semantic principles. As ples themselves. Aristotle advises in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, in all disputations To be sure, in this article I cannot undertake a presentation of these about first principles, the ultimate appeal should be to what both we and underlying semantic principles as ones that we absolutely have to accept; our opponents mean, indeed, to what both ofus should mean by our phrases I shall try merely to articulate as clearly as possible what it is that we if we are to maintain mutual understanding in the framework of rational have to accept for a competent evaluation of the substantive metaphysical discourse.3 However, such an appeal is far from compelling or even unam- arguments. However, of course, even within the framework of this more modest enterprise, I will have to show that these semantic principles are at least acceptable, that is, that they are consistent in themselves and do phers, apparently also ofsome analytic background (e.g., Bochenski, Henry, Geach, not commit anyone willing to maintain them to some manifest falsity or Kenny, Kretzmann, McInerny, Stump, Veatch, Weidemann, just to name a few, nonsense. without aiming at completeness), to overcome this "language barrier." However, as far as I know, no comprehensive attempt has been made to date to state those In the next section, therefore, I will begin the discussion with the formal semantic principles, which as such, regardless of the metaphysical contents introduction of the basic concepts we need for the clear formulation of the of their particular instances, by reason of their formality, constitute the very form relevant semantic principles. I start with Aquinas's concept of meaning, of discourse presupposed in Aquinas's (and I would add, also his contemporaries') or-using a transliteration of medieval terminology to distinguish it from metaphysical discussions. I hope the statement and discussion of these principles below will also shed some more light on exactly how I conceive of the separation of contemporary conceptions-signijication. However, as we shall see, there metaphysical from formal semantic principles. are difficulties even at the very beginning, for Aquinas's Aristotelian con­ 2. For this point, which of course does not define the proper subject matter of cept of signification apparently commits him to some "mysterious," nonex­ metaphysics but is a consequence of the fact that metaphysics is the study ofbeing qua istent objects of signification. So in section III I point out how Aquinas's being, see In meta. lb. 4, le. 5. References to Aristotle are given by referring to distinctions between different senses of 'being' might be used to eliminate Aquinas's commentaries. For St. Thomas's works I used the supplemental volumes our misgivings concerning such objects.s However, this solution will leave to R. Busa (ed.), Index Thomisticus, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980). us with a set offurther, rather disturbing questions concerning the concep­ 3. Cf. In meta. lb. 4, le. 7. It is important to realize in this connection that the tual apparatus used in this discussion. So in section IV I provide a systematic main thrust of Aristotle's arguments is that those who deny the first principle (i.e., account of this conceptual apparatus as it functions in Aquinas's theory of the principle of noncontradiction) cannot possibly mean what they say. It is also signification and predication, addressing various ontological and epistemo­ important in this regard to consider what Aristotle and St. Thomas, in his commen­ logical concerns contemporary philosophers may have regarding these tary on the Posterior Analytics (hereafter PA) and in several other places, say about the order of questions to be answered by a demonstrative science. The question of semantic theories. Having thus placed Aquinas's notions of signification what a thing is (quid est?) is preceded by the question of whether the thing is (an est?), but even this question presupposes that we know what is meant by the name ofthe thing in question (quid significaturper nomen). Cf. "antequam sciatur de aliquo 4. Cf. "the double indexical definition ofmeaning" provided by William Lycan: an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitio­ "meaning = df whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now"; nes. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi quoted by M. Devitt, "The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics," Journal ofPhi• de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen. Propter quod losophy, 91 (1994): 545-72, at 548. etiam Philosophus in iv Metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia 5. Fregean connotations aside, throughout this article, by a sense of an analogi­ docet incipere a significatione nominum" (In PA lb. 1, le. 2, n. 5). For the signifi­ cal term I simply mean one ofits several but related significations.