THROWING IN THE TOWEL: WHY INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE By Colin P. Clarke B.A., Loyola University Maryland, 2002 M.S., New York University, 2007 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Pittsburgh in partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2012 i UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS This dissertation was presented By Colin P. Clarke It was defended on 18 October 2012 and approved by Professor Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Lecturer, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) Dr. Donald M. Goldstein, Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) Dr. Forrest E. Morgan, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation Dr. Phil Williams, Professor/Director of Ridgway Center, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) ii THROWING IN THE TOWEL: WHY INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE Colin P. Clarke, B.A., Loyola University (’02); M.S., New York University (’07) University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Copyright © by Colin P. Clarke 2012 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................. 1 1.2 METHOD ............................................................................................................. 4 1.2.1 Case Selection ................................................................................................... 4 1.2.2 Analytic Framework........................................................................................ 6 1.2.3 Independent Variables and Associated Preliminary Hypotheses ............... 7 1.2.3.1 Operational Tools .................................................................................. 7 1.2.3.2 Organizational Tools ........................................................................... 13 1.2.4 Contextual Factors/Condition Variables ..................................................... 22 1.2.5 The Dependent Variable: Why Do Insurgents Negotiate? ........................ 29 1.3 SCOPE ................................................................................................................ 35 2.0 THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) ............................. 36 2.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND ............................................................... 36 2.1.1 Operating Logic ............................................................................................. 38 2.1.2 Type of Insurgency ........................................................................................ 41 2.1.3 Approach ........................................................................................................ 42 2.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS ................................................................................. 44 2.2.1 Sanctuary/Safe Haven ................................................................................... 45 iv 2.2.1.1 Why was sanctuary/safe haven such a valuable resource? ............. 46 2.2.1.2 How did it change over time? ............................................................. 49 2.2.2 Training/Tacit Knowledge Transfer ............................................................ 50 2.2.2.1 Why was tacit knowledge transfer such a valuable resource? ........ 51 2.2.2.2 How did it change over time? ............................................................. 57 2.2.3 Funding/Financing ........................................................................................ 59 2.2.3.1 Why was financing such a valuable resource? ................................. 60 2.2.3.2 How did it change over time? ............................................................. 64 2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS ......................................................................... 67 2.3.1 Command and Control ................................................................................. 68 2.3.2 Group Composition ....................................................................................... 71 2.3.2.1 Gerry Adams ....................................................................................... 71 2.3.2.2 Martin McGuinness ............................................................................ 76 2.3.2.3 Ivor Bell ................................................................................................ 78 2.3.2.4 Joe Cahill ............................................................................................. 79 2.3.3 Ideology........................................................................................................... 80 2.3.4 Popular Support ............................................................................................ 83 2.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda ....................................................................... 86 2.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING .............................................................. 87 2.4.1 Goals/Objectives ............................................................................................ 88 2.4.2 Seminal Events ............................................................................................... 89 2.4.2.1 Internment without Trial ................................................................... 90 2.4.2.2 “Bloody Sunday” (1972) ..................................................................... 91 v 2.4.2.3 Hunger Strikes (1981) ......................................................................... 93 2.4.3 Previous Attempts at Conflict Resolution ................................................... 94 2.4.3.1 Sunningdale Agreement (1973) .......................................................... 95 2.4.3.2 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) ........................................................... 97 2.4.3.3 Downing St. Declaration (1993) ......................................................... 97 2.4.4 Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) ............................................................ 99 2.4.4.1 Ceasefire (1974-1975) ........................................................................ 100 2.4.4.2 Impact of the Eksund (1987) ............................................................ 102 2.4.4.3 Cease Fire (1994) ............................................................................... 105 2.4.5 Decision-Making Structure and Process ................................................... 108 2.4.5.1 Army Council/General Army Convention ...................................... 108 2.4.5.2 Abstentionism .................................................................................... 109 2.4.5.3 Decommissioning ............................................................................... 111 2.4.6 Why did the PIRA Negotiate? .................................................................... 113 3.0 HIZBALLAH: THE PARTY OF GOD ................................................................. 121 3.1 BRIEF HISTORY/BACKGROUND ............................................................. 121 3.1.1 Operating Logic ........................................................................................... 122 3.1.2 Type of Insurgency ...................................................................................... 124 3.1.3 Approach ...................................................................................................... 126 3.2 OPERATIONAL TOOLS ............................................................................... 127 3.2.1 Training ........................................................................................................ 129 3.2.1.1 Why was training such a valuable resource? ................................. 129 3.2.1.2 How did it change over time? ........................................................... 137 vi 3.2.2 Intelligence ................................................................................................... 138 3.2.2.1 Why was intelligence such a valuable resource? ............................ 139 3.2.2.2 How did it change over time? ........................................................... 144 3.2.3 Weapons/Ammunition ................................................................................ 145 3.2.3.1 Why were weapons/ammunition such a valuable resource? ......... 146 3.2.3.2 How did it change over time? ........................................................... 149 3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL TOOLS ....................................................................... 150 3.3.1 Command and Control ............................................................................... 151 3.3.2 Group Composition ..................................................................................... 154 3.3.2.1 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah ............................................ 155 3.3.2.2 Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah .................................................................. 158 3.3.2.3 Ayatollah Ruholla al-Musavi Khomeini ......................................... 162 3.3.3 Ideology......................................................................................................... 163 3.3.4 Popular Support .......................................................................................... 166 3.3.5 Public Relations/Propaganda ..................................................................... 169 3.4 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING ............................................................ 172 3.4.1 Goals/Objectives .........................................................................................