****************************************************** The ``officially released'' date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ``officially released'' date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ``officially released'' date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** DOE v. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA CORP.ÐFIRST CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT ZARELLA, J., with whom ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with and join parts I and VI1 of the majority opinion2 and agree with the majority's determination not to reach the issue of whether the award of damages was excessive. I express no opinion with respect to parts II, III and IV of the majority opinion.3 I write separately because I disagree with the majority's conclusion in part V of its opinion that the thirty year limitation period prescribed by General Statutes § 52-577d applies to an action that sounds in negligence and recklessness. The plain language of § 52-577d compels the conclu- sion that it applies only when an action is premised on intentional misconduct. In a case alleging negligence or recklessness, such as the present case, the two year limitation period in General Statutes § 52-5844 applies. Not only does the plain language of § 52-577d support this construction, but the statutory scheme pertaining to statutes of limitations, the relevant legislative history, and case law from other jurisdictions also indicate that § 52-577d does not apply to actions alleging negligence or recklessness. I would thus conclude that, because the two year limitation period set forth in § 52-584 expired before the plaintiff commenced the present action, the matter is time barred.5 Section 52-577d provides in relevant part: ``Notwith- standing the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, includ- ing emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse . may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority.'' The majority acknowledges that ``§ 52-577d expressly provides that [General Statutes] § 52-577, which applies to intentional torts, does not apply to claims involving personal injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse, [whereas] § 52-577d makes no mention of § 52-584, which applies to claims of personal injury arising from negligence or recklessness . .'' Text accompanying footnote 20 of the majority opinion. The majority con- cludes, however, that the omission of § 52-584 ``tends to create some ambiguity concerning the statute's scope . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Part V of the majority opinion, quoting Doe v. Indian Mountain School, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D. Conn. 1995). In my view, the legislature's deliberate omission of § 52-584 demonstrates its intent to specify that § 52-577d applies to intentional conduct only. The plain language indi- cates that the legislature recognized a conflict between §§ 52-577 and 52-577d, making it necessary to clarify that an action for injuries caused by sexual abuse is subject to the thirty year statute of limitations in § 52- 577d. Perceiving no conflict between §§ 52-584 and 52- 577d, however, the legislature saw no need to mention § 52-584. In other words, because § 52-577d applies to intentional conduct only, it would have been redundant to clarify that it does not apply to claims alleging negli- gence or recklessness. If the legislature had intended for these claims to be subject to § 52-577d, it would have provided, ``[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-577 and 52-584'' in § 52-577d. The fact that § 52-577 is a ``catchall'' provision that applies to intentional torts and other torts not specifically mentioned in other stat- utes does not negate the fact that the legislature, in drafting § 52-577d, perceived and resolved a conflict between §§ 52-577 and 52-577d, and perceived no such conflict between §§ 52-577d and 52-584. Despite the deliberate omission of any reference to § 52-584 in § 52-577d, the majority concludes that negli- gence and recklessness claims are subject to the thirty year statute of limitations because ``[t]he all-encom- passing language of § 52-577d providing that `no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor . caused by sexual abuse' . supports an interpreta- tion that negligence and recklessness claims would also be subject to the thirty year statute of limitations.'' (Emphasis in original.) Part V of the majority opinion. The only way to arrive at this conclusion, however, is to disregard entirely the phrase ``[n]otwithstanding the provisions of § 52-577'' in § 52-577d. Moreover, this con- clusion creates a conflict between §§ 52-577d and 52- 584, when no such conflict exists under the plain statu- tory language. When § 52-577d is construed as written, it applies only when an action is predicated on conduct that amounts to sexual abuse, sexual assault or sexual exploitation, all of which require intentional conduct. Under this straightforward approach, there is no con- flict with § 52-584, which applies only when an action is predicated on negligent or reckless conduct. Moreover, this approach is consistent with our long-standing his- tory of construing statutes to avoid conflict when possi- ble. E.g., Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 539, 552, 46 A.3d 112 (2012). The majority's contrary approach not only ignores the legislature's resolution of the con- flict between §§ 52-577d and 52-577, but creates a con- flict between §§ 52-577d and 52-584 where the legisla- ture saw none. Additional language in § 52-577d compels the conclu- sion that it does not apply to actions sounding in negli- gence or recklessness. Section 52-577d provides that it applies to actions for damages ``caused by'' sexual abuse or sexual assault. The use of the narrow phrase ``caused by,'' rather than more expansive language, indicates that § 52-577d applies only when the action arises from the perpetrator's intentional act that caused the sexual abuse. See State ex rel. Heart of America Council v. McKenzie, 484 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Mo. 2016) (construing statute of limitations for `` `any action to recover dam- ages from injury . caused by childhood sexual abuse' '' and rejecting argument that, because statute did not expressly exclude claims against nonperpetra- tors, such claims could be brought); see also Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1209 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that claim could be brought against nonperpe- trator when statute of limitations governing `` `[a]ny action to recover damages from injury . caused by childhood sexual abuse,' '' by its terms, suggested that nonperpetrator could not be held liable). The majority offers no explanation for how the phrase ``caused by'' includes negligent or reckless conduct but concludes instead that, ``[i]f the legislature had intended to limit the application of § 52-577d to claims against perpetrators . it could have simply said so.'' Text accompanying footnote 21 of the majority opinion. In my view, the legislature did say so by indicating that § 52-577d applies to injuries ``caused by'' sexual assault and by expressly incorporating a reference to § 52-577 while omitting any reference to § 52-584. Moreover, one can argue just as easily that, if the legislature had intended to extend the application of § 52-577d to non- perpetrators, it could have said so. Finally, I am not persuaded by the majority's conclusion that § 52-577d must apply to negligent and reckless conduct because it applies to tort claims for emotional distress. Because such emotional distress claims can be premised on intentional conduct or negligent conduct, a common- sense reading of § 52-577d suggests that it applies to claims for emotional distress premised on intentional conduct but does not apply to claims premised on negli- gent conduct. Not only does the plain language of § 52-577d compel the conclusion that it applies only to actions premised on intentional conduct, but this conclusion is also con- sistent with the statutory framework pertaining to stat- utes of limitations set forth in chapter 926 of the General Statutes. This chapter, which establishes limitation peri- ods for various types of actions, contains separate pro- visions for actions premised on intentional torts and all torts not specifically mentioned in other statutes; see General Statutes § 52-577; see also Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 491, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); actions premised on specific intentional torts; see, e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-577b and 52-577c; and actions premised on negligence or recklessness. See General Statutes § 52-584. It is well established that ``[t]he enactment of [s]tatutes limiting the time within which an action may be brought are the result of a legitimate legislative determination which balances the rights and duties of competing groups.'' (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) St.