Section 24—Role of Public Prosecutor and Private Counsel in Prosecution The upshot of this analysis is that no vested right is granted to a complainant or informant or aggrieved party to directly conduct a prosecution. So far as the Magistrate is concerned, comparative latitude is given to him but he must always bear in mind that while the prosecution must remain being robust and comprehensive and effective it should not abandon the need to be free, fair and diligent.So far as the Sessions Court is concerned, it is the Public Prosecutor who must at all times remain in control of the prosecution and a counsel of a private party can only assist the Public Prosecutor in discharging its responsibility. The complainant or informant or aggrieved party may, however, be heard at a crucial and critical juncture of the Trial so that his interests in the prosecution are not prejudiced or jeopardized. It seems to us that constant or even frequent interference in the prosecution should not be encouraged as it will have a deleterious impact on its impartiality. If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge harbours the opinion that the prosecution is likely to fail, prudence would prompt that the complainant or informant or aggrieved party be given an informal hearing. Reverting to the case in hand, we are of the opinion that the complainant or informant or aggrieved party who is himself an accomplished criminal lawyer and who has been represented before us by the erudite Senior Counsel, was not possessed of any vested right of being heard as it is manifestly evident that the Court has not formed any opinion adverse to the prosecution. Whether the Accused is to be granted bail is a matter which can adequately be argued by the State Counsel. We have, however, granted a full hearing to Mr. Gopal Subramanium, Senior Advocate and have perused detailed Written Submissions since we are alive to impact that our opinion would have on a multitude of criminal trials. [Sundeep Kumar Bafna Versus State Of Maharashtra & Anr., (2015) 3 Scc (Cri) 558; (2014) 16 Scc 623, Criminal Appeal No. 689 Of 2014 [Arising Out Of Slp (Crl.)No.1348 Of 2014] Ss. 31, 427, Penal Code (45 of 1860), Ss. 53, 300 – Sentence of life imprisonment – Implies imprisonment till end of normal life of convict – Cannot be directed to run consecutively Section 31 of the Code which deals with conviction for several offices at one trial. Section 31(1) deals with and empowers the Court to award, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the IPC, several punishments prescribed for such offences and mandates that such punishments when consisting of imprisonment shall commence one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct unless the Court directs such punishments shall run concurrently. The power to award suitable sentences for several offences committed by the offenders is not and cannot be disputed. The order in which such sentences shall run can also be stipulated by the Court awarding such sentences. So also the Court is competent in its discretion to direct that punishment warded shall run concurrently not consecutively. Section 427 (2) carves out an exception to the general rule recognized in Section 427 (1) that sentences awarded upon conviction for a subsequent offence shall run consecutively. The Parliament, it manifest from the provisions of Section 427 (2), was fully cognizant of the anomaly that would arise if a prisoner condemned to undergo life imprisonment is directed to do so twice over. It has, therefore, carved out an exception to the general rule to clearly recognize that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately tried and held proved the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively. Thus while multiple sentences for imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences punishable with imprisonment for life, can be awarded cannot be directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over each other so that any remission or commutation granted by the competent authority in one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for the other. Muthuramalingam & Ors. V. State Rep. by Insp. of Police, 2016 Cri.L.J. 4165 (SC) Sec. 41 - Discussing the law as laid in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.(1994) 4 SCC 260 ; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 ; State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi (1995) 4 SCC 262 ; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and another (2014) 8 SCC 273 and Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 8 SCC 1 held that not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu v. State of W.B.[(1997) 1 SCC 416], there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of CrPC. The investigating officers in no circumstances can flout the law with brazen proclivity. In such a situation, the public law remedy which has been postulated in Sube Singh v. State of Haryana[(2006) 3 SCC 178], Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P.[ (2012) 1 SCC 748], comes into play. The constitutional courts taking note of suffering and humiliation are entitled to grant compensation. That has been regarded as a redeeming feature. In the case at hand, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, the court think it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence. It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised. Dr. Rini Johar & Anr. V. State of M.P. & Ors. 2016(4) Supreme 397 AIR 2016 SC 2679 (Writ Petition (CRIMINAL) No. 30 Of 2015) Sec. 88- Applicability- S. 88 of Code can be availed only in case person for whose appearance or arrest summon or warrant has been issued to be present in such Court- Accused not appearing personally before Court cannot get benefit of S. 88 of Code. As far as the provisions of Section 88 Cr.P.C. are concerned, as quoted above, such provisions can be availed only in case the person for whose appearance or arrest the summon or warrant has been issued to present in such Court. Section 88 Cr.P.C. also does not speak to exempt the accused without executing the bond with or without sureties for his appearance in the Court. In view of the provisions of Section 90 Cr.P.C., this provisions is also applicable only to every summon and every warrant of arrest issued under this Code. Admittedly, the petitioner has not yet appeared personally before the Court. Therefore, he cannot get the benefit of Section 88 Cr.P.C. (Arvind Kejriwal v. The State of U.P. & others, 2016 CRI.L.J. 128 ; 2015 (6) ALJ 542) Section 99 -Capacity of official discharge - be determined by regular trial after examining the facts, circumstances and evidence on record. A news item on various dates in the year 2007, allegedly making false implication against Rajiv Trivedi, Additional Commissioner of Police (Crimes and SIT), Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, with regard to the Sohrabuddin encounter case was published by the appellants in the respective publications and was telecast on CNN-IBN. A representation was given by the him to the Andhra Pradesh State Government seeking previous sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.‗) for prosecution of the appellants for offences punishable under the provisions referred to supra. Accordingly, the previous sanction was accorded by the State Government in favour of the second respondent permitting him to file complaints against the appellants through the State Public Prosecutor before the appropriate court of law against the individuals connected with electronic and print media. The determining the question on whether or not the accused while committing the alleged act at the point of time was in the capacity of his official discharge of his public functions or otherwise, is to be determined by regular trial after examining the facts, circumstances and evidence on record. [Rajdeep Sardesai Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. AIR 2015 SC 2180] Section 125- Conviction of husband for bigamy - Justifiable reason - Staying separately. The wife has not been maintained by her husband. It appears from the record that respondent the husband had been convicted for committing the offence of bigamy but the appeal filed against the said order was pending at the relevant point of time. The wife is not paid any amount of maintenance though she is staying separately. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that the wife is staying separately without any justifiable reason and she should be maintained by respondent - husband. [Smt. Munni Bai v. Bhanwarilal And Anr., AIR 2016 SC 2224] Whether Section 125 CrPC is applicable to a Muslim woman who has been divorced. In view of the law settled in Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan (2014) 12 SCC 636 : AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 463 ; Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 : AIR 2001 SC 3958 and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. (2014) 12 SCC 646, held YES. It needs no special emphasis to state that when an application for grant of maintenance is filed by the wife the delay in disposal of the application, to say the least, is an unacceptable situation. It is, in fact, a distressing phenomenon.