Inga Schei Lokman Slim LEBANON in CONFLICT 2013 - 2014 Hayya Bina Blank Page Inga Schei Lokman Slim LEBANON in CONFLICT 2013 - 2014 Hayya Bina Hayya Bina The Lebanese Association for Inclusive Citizenship October 2015 Tel.: 01/274004 I P.O. Box: 11-5222 Beirut Lebanon www.hayyabina.org I [email protected] Hayya Bina Design by: Hisham Salam This report was produced as part of “Understanding Fault Lines in a Changing Lebanon: Perspectives of Emerging Grassroots Religious and Traditional Leadership,” a program funded by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). The views expressed herein are Hayya Bina's alone and are not intended to reflect or substitute for those of USIP. To enable sharing of the documentation on which this report is based, Hayya Bina and UMAM Documentation and Research partnered to add two new sections to UMAM's online database, Memory At Work (www.memoryatwork.org). Titled (in Arabic) fahras al-onf fi lubnan 2013 and fahras al-onf fi lubnan 2014, these sections contain most of the open source, Arabic language documentation used to compile this report. Blank Page صفحة بيضاء Lebanon 2013 – 2014 “Stability” vs. “Instabilities” The year 2015 had barely begun involved in the Jabal Mohsen when a double suicide bombing bombing. But accusatory fingers struck a café in Jabal Mohsen were also being pointed at the just outside of Tripoli. The attack in Ain al-Helwe Palestinian refugee this largely Alawi area (essentially camp east of Saida, where Tripoli the capital for Lebanese Alawi) Islamists sought refuge following claimed the lives of seven people the LAF's substantial military and injured 35 others. The most operation to "pacify" the city in interesting aspect of this incident October 2014. In concert with is that the two young men who the “Sunni-oriented” actions and perpetrated it were themselves associated accusations, more residents of Tripoli. They lived in its was heard about reactivating poorest quarter, al-Mankoubeen, the Bekaa-oriented security which is within walking distance plan announced several months to the café they targeted. earlier. Though public statements Ironically, al-Mankoubeen refer only generally to the Bekaa, translates to “the Quarter of the it is common knowledge (at Unfortunates!” least among the Lebanese) that the epicenter of unrest in Two days after the bombing, a the Bekaa is almost exclusively special ISF detachment forcibly the north. That area, associated relocated the (Sunni) Islamist historically with the production "landlords" of Roumieh Prison's of drugs, has emerged over time B block, and their parish, to and through wars as the hub for another area in the prison. The a variety of criminal activities pretext for that action was including kidnapping for ransom, that some prisoners in block arms smuggling and even more B—transformed over the years “traditionally,” auto theft. The (thanks to the blessings of some idea behind the security plan politicians) into something of called for enforcement of the an Islamist principality—were law via a reinvigorated program 7 to arrest criminals. The approach to the strain caused by that was considered particularly tremendous influx, a quasi- important because the dramatic consensual political decision was increase in crime included made in late 2014 by Tammam incidents that endangered “civil Salam's “National Interest” peace” and were even linked to government to close Lebanon's terrorist activities.1,2 borders to newcomers from Syria and adopt a “zero Syrian Today, however, not everything refugee” policy. Enforcement of that affects Lebanon takes that decision began in early 2015. place within its borders. On January 18, 2015, for instance, In contrast to the security an Israeli helicopter attacked events that would soon begin a joint Hezbollah-IRGC patrol to unfold, 2015—from a political in the southern Syrian region of perspective—began on what Quneitra.3 The strike reminded the seemed a reassuring note. For Lebanese that several thousand example, none of the incidents of their countrymen, primarily that occurred succeeded Shia, are involved in armed in interrupting the dialogue conflicts outside the country. As commenced in December if it were a tennis game, people 2014 between the pro-Saudi held their breath in anticipation Sunni Future Movement and of the return, which came pro-Iranian Shia Hezbollah (an quickly enough when Hezbollah engagement that coincided with launched a “restrained” response general appeasement by the in the contested Shebaa Christian allies of the two large Farms area that straddles the “Muslim” actors). Nevertheless, Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli tri-border the aphorism used to describe zone. That action closed the that initiative was not particularly brief episode. Similarly, as the reassuring, as the entities involved Lebanese remain involved in (which had been members of Syria, refugees from that country the same government since the have also emerged as a new beginning of 2014) agreed that and populous demographic the talks were needed to “cool within Lebanon itself. In response down the Sunni-Shia tension.” 1 On November 15, (Christian Maronites) Sobhi and Nadimah Fakhri were killed at home in Btedii, in northwest Bekaa. They died at the hands of Shia criminals from the Jaafar clan who were fleeing the LAF patrol that was pursuing them. The gunmen entered the Fakhris' home intending to steal their vehicle, but when the family resisted, the criminals shot the couple and their son. The issue spiked tensions in the Bekaa and stoked emotions among the Christian community to the point that Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi intervened. He urged the government to exact justice for the couple's murder and called on the Jaafar family to hand over the killers and reject any “political immunity” the criminals might enjoy. Today, the killers remain free. 2 See page 94, footnote 5. 3 Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. "Top Iranian general and six Hezbollah fighters killed in Israeli attack in Syria." The Guardian. January 19, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/top-iranian-general-hezbollah-fighters-killed- israel-attack-syria. 8 9 Realistically, that slogan says as somehow fail to guarantee much about the state of Sunni- some form of calm within the Shia tension in the country as country). Further, the exclusive it does about the balance of character of the ongoing inter- roles within the various Lebanese Muslim dialogue illustrates the communities. For instance, the new “division of labor” that vague notion of easing Sunni-Shia exists within Lebanon's various tension via dialogue conducted communities and underscores between the two "camps" (each just how little the Christians count of which asserts that it represents when it comes to preserving the the respective communities security of the country. involved) clearly takes precedence over the election In general, January 2015 may be of a new Lebanese president. considered representative of the More to the point, Salam's motivations behind, and actors "National Interest" government involved in the violence Lebanon (formed in early 2014) was witnessed in 2013 and 2014 and seated thanks to a "nihil obstat" for which this report seeks to registered by the Saudis and account. The areas described Iranians (acknowledgments herein include: brokered by France on behalf - Sunni-Shia tension of the international community). - Political polarization Moreover, the new government - Security-oriented attempts to was formed in anticipation of an contain violence enduring presidential vacancy, - Interplay between events since all involved were well and actors on both sides of aware of how difficult it would the Lebanese/Syrian border be to agree on a successor to President Michel Suleiman (who - Social decay that has was elected under exceptional affected some areas and circumstances in May 2008 fomented their "reinvention" following the Doha Agreement as hotbeds for extremism that ended the country's "mini- - Political protection of civil war" and who left office at criminal acts in some areas the expiration of his term on May At several instances during these 25, 2014). It must also be noted two years, Lebanon seemed to that these political machinations be losing its fragile equilibrium have prevailed over any and on the edge of collapse. Yet attention being given by the regardless of that impression or State to ensure at least minimal how likely the country's implosion functioning of its institutions (as may be in the future, Lebanon if their full functionality could never fails to remain resilient in the 8 9 face of new and/or worsening with the actors involved challenges. That resilience begs (including ground actors and the question: "Is the country key actors, and decision and simply experiencing a resurgence opinion makers) and another of “more of the same” kinds of effort that focused on assembling violence and responding to them those same actors in various with "more of the same" kinds of regions throughout Lebanon in fixes?" While that query comes an attempt to tackle specific to mind frequently and is entirely tensions and sources of violence. legitimate, another question As work on this report progressed, deserves to be asked: "To what its structure and design were extent are Lebanese leaders in revised to ensure the output the various communities and product would not be an exercise groups (even if they are clients of in simply "checking the boxes." regional superpowers) actually Rather, we hoped to design controlling their communities a flexible template that could and guaranteeing that the be reproduced easily and on same level of resilience shown a regular basis. Notably, the thus far will remain evident?" substance of this report benefits Obviously, the dilemma faced directly from those meetings and by Lebanon's Sunni community— interviews. which is currently experiencing a significant leadership crisis that Initially, the report focused on parallels its feverish soul-searching gathering data for the 2013 – process—comes immediately to 2014 period within the following mind.