Security Council Distr.: General 23 December 2020

Security Council Distr.: General 23 December 2020

United Nations S/2020/1283 Security Council Distr.: General 23 December 2020 Original: English Letter dated 23 December 2020 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2528 (2020), have the honour to transmit herewith the Group’s midterm report in accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution. The enclosed report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 23 November 2020 and was considered by the Committee on 3 December 2020. The Group would appreciate if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Virginie Monchy Coordinator, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Signed) Nelson Alusala Expert (Signed) Mélanie De Groof Expert (Signed) Gora Mbaye Expert (Signed) Sophia Pickles Expert (Signed) Maia Trujillo Expert 20-15808 (E) 301220 *2015808* S/2020/1283 Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Summary During the reporting period, the security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo was characterized by pockets of intense violence. In this context, in early October 2020, President Félix Tshisekedi made a three-day visit to Goma, holding a series of consultations and chairing a mini-summit, including on security issues, with the Heads of States of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. In North Kivu, operations of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, FARDC) scattered the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) into several mobile groups and extended the ADF area of operations. While supply chains were disrupted, ADF continued to attack FARDC and civilians. ADF demonstrated improved knowledge of improvised explosive device construction techniques. While Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for many attacks in Beni territory, the Group of Experts was unable to establish any direct link between the two groups. In Beni territory, some cultivation, harvest and sale of cocoa was linked to armed activity by ADF, Mai-Mai groups, unidentified armed assailants and some FARDC members. Many cocoa farmers struggled to access fields due to insecurity, and attacks on cocoa farmers rose during harvest periods. Cocoa, including from areas under armed control, was smuggled into Uganda during 2020, while many cocoa supply chains were opaque. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) split into two factions: one led by former NDC-R leader and sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033) and the other by his deputy, Gilbert Bwira Chuo. NDC-R continued to benefit from the diversion of government stocks, with several FARDC officers supplying them with weapons and ammunition. FARDC contributed to the NDC-R split, its restructuring and the strengthening of the Bwira faction as a proxy to track down the Guidon faction and fight other armed groups. Criminal networks were involved in the smuggling of tin, tantalum and tungsten originating from mine sites under armed group occupation. Tantalum was the most confiscated of the three minerals at the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda border between January and September 2020. In Ituri, the signing of ceasefire agreements beginning in mid-July 2020 by Lendu armed groups, commonly known as Coopérative pour le développement du Congo or CODECO, marked a relative lull in attacks in Djugu and Mahagi territories. At the time of drafting of the present report, western Djugu territory and northern Irumu territory were the most affected by violence, primarily due to the reluctance of some Lendu factions to adhere to the ceasefire process and activities of the recently created Force patriotique et intégrationniste du Congo armed group and the self- defence group Zaïre. The Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple Congolais (URDPC/CODECO) and the Armée de libération du Congo (ALC/CODECO) used children, a sanctionable act. Some FARDC members deployed in Ituri committed exactions against Lendu civilians. 2/201 20-15808 S/2020/1283 Combatants of Lendu factions conducted an increasing number of attacks on gold-trading hubs and mining areas in gold-rich Djugu and Irumu territories. Zaïre elements were also present in gold-mining areas, but rarely targeted gold or gold miners. Cross-border gold smuggling from Ituri into Uganda continued. In southern Irumu territory, the number of attacks against civilians by armed groups coming from North Kivu, including ADF, increased with FARDC operatio ns, leading to large population displacements and exacerbating tensions between communities. A September attack in Payi targeted Hutus, also referred to as Banyabwishas, in particular. The process for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri resumed on 19 October 2020, after stalling following a 30 September 2020 clash with FARDC. In South Kivu, the structure of Mai-Mai Yakutumba changed following the defection of deputy leader Alonda Bita in August 2020. The armed group continued to finance its activities through the illegal exploitation of gold in the Misisi area and illicit logging, particularly of redwood, a species protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Raia Mutomboki factions of the Butachibera and Hamakombo groups were involved in the illegal taxation of local communities to access forests, particularly in Kalehe territory. The Group of Experts is concerned by, and continues to investigate, the escalation of violence in the highlands of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga territories by armed groups and the attribution of collective responsibility to communities for their attacks, as well as inflammatory speech. Members of the Rwanda Defence Force were present and conducted operations in North Kivu from late 2019 to early October 2020 in violation of the sanctions regime. The Burundi National Defence Force and the Imbonerakure youth group launched incursions into South Kivu between November 2019 and July 2020, also in violation of the sanctions regime. Two seizures of weaponry, in Kinshasa in October 2019 and Gbadolite in April 2020, showed the continued existence of internal trafficking networks, sometimes with cross-border spillovers. 20-15808 3/201 S/2020/1283 Contents Page I. Introduction ................................................................... 5 II. North Kivu .................................................................... 6 A. Allied Democratic Forces .................................................... 6 B. Involvement of armed groups and some members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in cocoa in Beni territory ...................... 8 C. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové ............................................ 9 D. Presence of the Rwanda Defence Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ..... 11 E. Tin, tantalum and tungsten and supply chain challenges ........................... 12 III. Ituri .......................................................................... 13 A. Force patriotique de résistance de l’Ituri ........................................ 13 B. Violence against civilians in Djugu, Mahagi and northern Irumu territories ........... 13 C. Armed involvement in gold .................................................. 14 D. Violence against civilians in southern Irumu territory ............................. 15 IV. South Kivu .................................................................... 17 A. Mai-Mai Yakutumba ........................................................ 17 B. Incursions into the Democratic Republic of the Congo of members of the Burundian National Defence Force ..................................................... 18 C. Gold supply chain challenges................................................. 19 D. Involvement of armed groups in timber and charcoal ............................. 19 V. Seizures of weapons in Gbadolite and Kinshasa ...................................... 20 VI. Recommendations .............................................................. 20 Annexes* .............................................................................. 21 * The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing. 4/201 20-15808 S/2020/1283 I. Introduction 1. The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2528 (2020), were appointed by the Secretary-General on 20 July 2020 (see S/2020/726). 2. The mid-term report of the Group is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 2528 (2020). In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution 2360 (2017), as reaffirmed in resolution 2528 (2020), the Group continued to exchange information with the panels of experts on the Central African Republic and South Sudan. Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 3. The Group expresses its gratitude for the support and collaboration provided by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic

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