Ilrlit,c!d States Gmt~ral Actconnfing Office Report to the Chairrnan, Subcommittee GAO on Investigations and Oversight, Cornrnittee on Science, Space, and T’echnology, House of Represent;atives NASA PROGRAM---~- COSTS Space Missions Require Substantially More Funding Than Initially Estimated I 148971 \ -. - RESTRICTED--Not to be released outside the General Accounting Office unless specifically approved by the Office of Congressional Relations. 5St23b RELEASED Wd)l:NSIAIMW97 United States General Accounting Off¶ce GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International AfTairs Division B-261430 December 3 1,1992 The Honorable Howard Wolpe Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight Committee on Science, Space, and Technology House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: This report responds to your request that we provide information on the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration ’s (NASA) historical experience at estimating space program costs. The Subcommittee was concerned that at the time Congress is asked to authorize the start of new programs estimated to cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, NASA may not have reasonably accurate estimates of their total funding requirements. Specifically, we reviewed the changes from initial to current estimates for major space programs initiated in the past 16 years and studied the reasons for those changes. Almost all of the 29 programs we reviewed required substantially more Results in Brief funding than the initial estimates provided to Congress. Figure 1 shows the extent that current cost estimates changed from initial estimates. Changes in estimates ranged from a 44-percent decrease to a 426-percent increase over the initial estimates. The median change was a 77-percent increase. (See app. I.) Page1 GAO/NSIAD-93-97NASAProgramCod.a B-261430 Figure 1: Changer From Initial to Current Cort Eatlmatsr for 29 NASA Space Program8 100% increase or higher Under Initial estimate l-49% increase \ 11 -: - 50.99% increase L ,i’ ‘\, /’ Source: GAO compilation based on NASA documents. General reasons NASA gave for differences between the initial and current estimates included insufficient definition studies, program and funding instability, overoptimism by program officials, and unrealistic contractor estimates.Specific reasons for changesin estimates included program redesigns,technical complexities, budget constraints, incomplete estimates,shuttle launch delays, and inflationary effects. As a result of these factors, the content and schedule of many programs changed substantially between the initial and current cost estimates. (See apps. II and III.) a Initial cost estimatesare generated during NASA'S phased development Background process. In the preliminary analysis phase, proposed mission and scientific objectives are outlined. During this phase, the NASA field center responsible for the project identifies technical risks and prepares preliminary cost and schedule estimates.A more detailed cost estimate is developed in the definition phase as the mission is better defined. In this phase, preliminary designs,specifications, and managementrequirements are developed. Generally, once the definition phase is completed and the Administrator of NASA approves a new program, it is included in the Page2 GAO/NSIAD-93-97NASAProgramCoste B-861480 President’sbudget and submitted to Congressfor authorization to start the detailed design and development phases.At this time, NASA normally provides Congresswith an initial estimate of the program’s cost. Estimates provided to Congressby NASA typically can include costs for development, mission operations and data analysis,launch services, tracking services,and construction of program-unique facilities. After a program is authorized to begin the detailed design and development phases,NASA provides Congresswith updated information on programs through Project Status Reports. These biannual reports document the initial estimatesand track the costs, schedules,performance, and progress of NASA’majors programs. Developing estimatesin the preliminary analysis and definition phasesis difficult becausethere is often a great deal of uncertainty involved. Margins for uncertainties are built into the estimates in the form of reservesso that a program’s budget better reflects potential resource needs. Reservesare establishedto fund significant changesin the definition or scope of the project, new requirements, engineering changes, schedule slips, increasesin technical or managementcomplexity, and known issueswhose cost impact is uncertain. The level of reservesvaries from program to program and depends on the level of uncertainty and risk of the particular program. NASA considers a reasonablelevel of reservesto range from 10 to 36 percent of a program’s development budget. To determine NASA'S historical experience at providing Congresswith Scope and accurate estimateswhen new program starts were requested,we Methodology compared the initial estimatesprovided to Congresswith the current estimates for space programs that (1) were initiated between 1977and 1991and (2) had initial or current estimated development costs greater than $200million-the threshold established for reporting programs to Congressthrough Project Status Reports. We identified 29 such programs, including planetary missions, space and earth science missions, manned missions and related programs, and other programs such as communications satellites. We did not review the National Launch System or National Aerospace Plane programs because NASA was not the principal agency funding and managingthese programs. We also excluded from our analysis costs for program elements provided by other federal agenciesor international partners. Initial estimates reflect the projected costs at the time a new program was first authorized by Congress.Current estimates reflect the latest estimate as of NASA'S fiscal year 1993budget request for Page8 GAO/NSIAD-93-97NASAPcogramCosta .,.*c:, -,, .:.,;.;: ;, ) B-261430 programs that were in development or launched, or the latest estimate prior to the decision to cancel programs. As agreed with NASA,we consistently used the highest estimates in our analysis where estimates were presented as ranges. To determine the reasons for changesin the estimates,we collected information from NASAon each of the 29 programs, reviewed the Project Status Reports, and interviewed current and former officials at NASA headquarters,the Goddard SpaceFlight Center, the George C. Marshall SpaceFlight Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. In addition, we reviewed our prior reports on 11 of the programs. For the purpose of analyzing specific reasons for estimate changes,we judged a reason to be significant if it was related to a change estimated to cost at least $20 million-10 percent of the minimum cost for programs tracked in the Project Status Reports. To determine inflationary effects, we used NASA’S inflation index to compare the initial and current cost estimates for the development portion of the program budget in fiscal year 1992constant dollars. As requested,we did not obtain official agency comments on this report. However, we discusseda draft of the report with officials from NASA’S Office of the Comptroller and considered their comments in preparing the final report. NASAofficials generally agreed with the facts in the report, but were concerned that readers not simply review the amounts of estimate changeswithout fully considering the reasons for the changesthat are presented in the report. We conducted our work from February to November 1992in accordancewith generally accepted government auditing standards. Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further a distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to interested parties upon request. Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-93-97 NASA Program Costa t B-261430 Pleasecontact me on (202) 276-6140if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. Sincerely yours, wry& Mark E. Gebicke Director, NASA Issues Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-93-97 NASA Program Costs Contents Appendix I Changes in the Total Estimated Cost of 29 NASA Space Programs Appendix II General Reasonsfor ChangesBetween Initial and Current Reasons for the Estimates Changes in Cost Specific Reasonsfor Estimate Changes Estimates for Major Space Programs Appendix III Launch Schedule Changes for Major Space Programs Appendix IV Mqjor Contributors to This Report Ttibles Table I. 1: Initial and Current Program Cost Estimates 8 r) Table 11.1:Reasons for Changesin Cost Estimates 14 Table III. 1: Initial and Current Launch Dates 19 Figure Figure 1: ChangesFrom Initial to Current Cost Estimates for 29 2 NASA SpacePrograms Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-97 NASA Program Coats Abbreviations ACTS Advanced Communications Technology Satellite AFE Aeroassist Flight Experiment ASRM Advanced Solid Rocket Motor ATP Alternate Turbopumps Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility COSTR Collaborative Solar Terrestrial Research CFWF Comet RendezvousAsteroid Flyby EOS Earth Observing System EUVE Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer FE Flight Telerobotic Servicer GAO GeneralAccounting Office GGS Global GeospaceScience GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite CR0 GammaRay Observatory HST Hubble SpaceTelescope LANDSAT Land Remote SensingSatellite NASA National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration NSCAT NASA Scatterometer OMV Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle