RESEARCH REPORT Countering Information Influence Activities The State of the Art 2 Countering Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art, version 1.4 (1 July 2018) James Pamment, Howard Nothhaft, Henrik Agardh-Twetman, Alicia Fjällhed Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University MSB’s points of contact: Fredrik Konnander Publication number MSB1261 – July 2018 ISBN 978-91-7383-865-8 MSB has ordered and financed this report. The authors are solely responsible for the content. 3 Preface This is version 1.4 of a report that aims to provide an overview of current thinking on how to counteract information influence activities. It was commissioned to support the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s (MSB) work in strengthening societal resilience against information influence activities. The report is intended to offer (1) a scientific overview to support the development of the MSB handbook Counter Influence Strategies for Communicators, (2) a guide and framework that can support the development of training and education on counter influence, and (3) a Swedish perspective on the knowledge currently available on information influence activities. The authors wish to thank MSB and the dozens of interviewees and reviewers without whom the study would not have been possible. 4 Foreword The term “Fake News” has catapulted the topic of information operations into the centre of a heated and mostly ill-informed public debate. One common misconception is that the problem is new. Another mistake is to assume that information, as the most visible part of the problem, is necessarily the most important. Both of these are at best only partly true. Political warfare—the disruption of another country’s public opinion and decision-making—dates back decades, if not centuries. Information operations form only part of the subversive arsenal. They are usually conducted along with the use of money, intimidation (legal and physical), cyber-attacks, and many other tactics. But the information environment has indeed changed sharply, and mostly to the advantage of unscrupulous autocratic countries wishing to attack open societies. The internet enables ubiquity, immediacy and, most of all, anonymity of a kind undreamt of in past decades. Technological change has also lowered barriers to entry in the media industries and disrupted the business models of incumbents. The era of media gatekeepers—in effect a cartel of trusted sources—has given way to a kaleidoscope of facts and opinions. This diversity is welcome, but as with all technological change, we are still developing the norms and rules to manage it. In the meantime, our information landscape is ripe for misuse. The abuse of automated communication sources (bots) and paid-for disruptors (trolls) distorts public debate by promoting lies and swamping truth. Our attackers are also aided by weaker social and political immune systems. Amid a general (and largely welcome) decline in deference, respect for experts has diminished. For complex demographic, economic and social reasons, levels of social trust in many societies have ebbed. At least in the short term, these problems are likely to worsen. We have seen attacks on the confidentiality of data (hacking) and its availability (swamping). The looming threat is attacks on data integrity. How will we react to “deepfakes”—seemingly authentic video and audio which purports to show our public figures saying words they never said, and doing things they never did? 5 As this excellent and timely report makes clear, the greatest strength of our societies—a open, robust public debate—now risks being its greatest vulnerability. Unconstrained by the requirements of honesty, truth or self- respect, attackers can use our information system to confuse us and disrupt our public life. This report ably brings modern academic thinking on cognition and other topics to bear on the problem, notably in explaining how we form our individual and collective opinions. It offers no easy answers—indeed, it cautions against them. It notes, rightly, that whereas applications may be legitimate, illegitimate, or outright illegal, the techniques themselves are neutral. Parody and satire, for example, are the lifeblood of a modern democracy. If we cannot mock our rulers, we are not truly free. But the same techniques in the hands of an enemy state are no longer amusing and thought-provoking; they are aimed cynically at increasing polarisation and corroding the trust and respect that are essential for the proper functioning of our public life. Grey areas abound and the choices we face are hard. An entirely passive response invites defeat. An overly zealous one is self-defeating. If we protect ourselves against attacks from autocratic closed societies by giving sweeping and arbitrary powers to our rulers, we may win the battle, but we lose the war. The most important recommendation in this report is therefore to study information operations first, and to act cautiously in trying to mitigate or counter their effects. Crying “wolf!” (or “Fake News!”) at every news item we dislike is a sure way to erode credibility. Our adversaries’ biggest and most effective victories come when we do their work for them. Edward Lucas Senior Vice President at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) July, 2018 6 Table of Contents Preface ..................................................................................................................... 3 Foreword .................................................................................................................. 4 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 8 2. Understanding information influence activities ........................................... 14 2.1 Definition of information influence activities ............................................... 14 2.2 Diagnosing illegitimate influence ............................................................... 16 2.3 Exploitation of vulnerabilities ..................................................................... 18 2.4 Hybrid threats and grey zones ................................................................... 21 3. Identifying information influence activities ................................................... 24 3.1 Influence strategies .................................................................................... 24 Positive, negative, oblique ................................................................ 24 Narratives and facts .......................................................................... 26 Classic vs. cognitive strategies ......................................................... 30 3.2 Influence techniques .................................................................................. 31 Sociocognitive and psychographic hacking ...................................... 33 Social hacking ................................................................................... 35 Para-social hacking .......................................................................... 39 Symbolic action ................................................................................. 41 Disinformation and “fake news” ........................................................ 43 Forging and leaking .......................................................................... 49 Potemkin villages of evidence .......................................................... 52 Deceptive identities........................................................................... 55 Bots, sockpuppets and botnets ........................................................ 56 Trolling and flaming......................................................................... 61 Humour and memes ....................................................................... 65 Malign rhetoric ................................................................................ 68 3.3 Influence stratagems .................................................................................. 70 Black propaganda ............................................................................. 71 Point and shriek ................................................................................ 72 Laundering ........................................................................................ 73 Flooding ............................................................................................ 74 Cheerleading .................................................................................... 75 Raiding .............................................................................................. 76 Polarisation ....................................................................................... 77 Hack, mix, release ............................................................................ 78 3.4 Information influence activities in practice: a case study ............................. 79 4. Counteracting information influence activities............................................. 82 4.1 Approaches to countering information influence activities ........................... 82 4.2 The communicator’s mandate ...................................................................... 85 7 4.3 Preparation ................................................................................................... 88 4.3.1 Societal and organisational preparedness ....................................... 88 4.3.2 Raising awareness...........................................................................