Science Studies 2/2002 Book Reviews Helen E. Longino: The Fate of Knowledge Princeton University Press. Princeton and Oxford, 2002. 233 pages. In this book Helen Longino seeks to pro- philosophical assumptions. She regards vide an account of sociality of knowledge the empirical contributions by sociolo- that would help overcome some long- gists of scientific knowledge as valuable. standing problems in epistemology and She is less satisfied with the normative philosophy of science. As Longino sees epistemological claims and assump- it, the discussion between sociologists of tions made by the advocates of social scientific knowledge and philosophers studies of science. For example, she finds of science is at an impasse. Normatively the formulation of relativism by Barnes motivated philosophers and empirically and Bloor highly ambiguous. She traces oriented sociologist talk past each other the problem to an implicit assumption because of their radically different con- that rationality and the influence of so- ceptions of knowledge. In Longino’s di- cial interests somehow exclude each agnosis, the principal reason for their other’s. She finds similar ambiguities in mutual misunderstanding derives from the writings of Harry Collins, Karin the fact that neither group has really Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour. Her sorted out the relation between rational general conclusion is that social studies and social. According to Longino, there of science leaves unresolved the prob- is a strong tendency to regard these two lems related to normative aspects of the categories as mutually exclusive. Her concept of knowledge. central thesis is that this opposition can I find Longino’s interpretation of so- be dissolved if we conceptualise knowl- ciological approaches inaccurate in edge and rationality as social concepts. some crucial respects. For example, she It would allow for a more fruitful rela- claims that the supporters of the Strong tionship between sociologists and phi- Programme implicitly deny, “cognitive losopher of science, and also help solve accounts – that is, accounts that appeal some perennial problems in the philoso- to agents’ reasons – have explanatory phy of science, for example the problem value” (p. 21). This is absurd. Only a brief of underdetermination. look at any writings by the members of Longino discusses the background for the Strong Programme shows that they her argument in chapters 2 and 3. In explain scientists’ actions by referring to chapter 2, she describes various ap- their beliefs, inferences, and intentions. proaches in social studies of science and Similarly her central claim that sociolo- points out some ambiguities in their gists are committed to the dichotomy of Science Studies, Vol. 15(2002) No. 2, 78–81 Book Reviews social and epistemic sounds highly im- in the philosopher’s and the sociologist’s plausible. People like David Bloor have sense. spent a long time arguing against this Longino’s central claim is that the sys- specific assumption. The problem is that tematically different approaches to he has not been very successful in get- knowledge by sociologists and philoso- ting this message through to his philo- phers explain their deep disagreements sophical critics. concerning science. As a way out of this In chapter 3, Longino turns to phi- impasse Longino proposes that we keep losophers’ responses to social studies of these six senses of knowledge separate. science. She discusses briefly responses Furthermore, she suggests that we can by Alvin Goldman and Susan Haack and dissolve the rational-social dichotomy rightly finds them unconvincing. More by taking a fresh look at some traditional extensively she discusses the views re- philosophical dichotomies. She claims cently put forward by Philip Kitcher. She that the critics of social studies of science has some interesting comments on tend to assume that individualism, Kitcher’s approach and I wish she had monism and non-relativism go hand in elaborated her critique a bit further. For hand. Similarly ‘the sociologizers’ tend example, her arguments against Kitcher’s to assume that the opposites of these model of rational closure controversy are positions are a tight package. If one valuable. wishes to be a non-individualist about Longino outlines her own approach in the subject of knowledge and pluralist chapters 4 and 5. She starts by distin- about the nature of knowledge, one is guishing three senses of knowledge and also bound to be a relativist. Longino both empirical and normative ap- rightly points out that there is no such proaches to each meaning of the term. implication. First, knowledge can be understood as To overcome the rational-social di- knowledge producing practices. When a chotomy Longino proposes an inte- sociologist understands knowledge in grated notion of knowledge that would this sense, she is interested in practices help to relate empirical studies of scien- that succeed in fixing belief in some tific practices to normatively responsive community. This approach is contrasted reflections of the philosophers. Her idea by philosopher’s normative attitude. The is that if we start to see epistemic activi- philosopher is primarily interested in ties as social practices we can see more processes that are able to justify the ac- clearly their justificatory role. Instead of quisition of belief. Similar difference can seeing social as an opposite of epistemic, be found in the second sense of the term we should see epistemic evaluation as a knowledge. Here the sociologist is inter- communal practice. For this purpose ested in what people in a certain group Longino sketches accounts of observa- accept as knowledge, whereas the phi- tion, reasoning, scientific theories and losopher is interested in which beliefs of truth. These accounts include interest- these people are justified. Lastly, the ing ideas but they remain too sketchy to third sense of knowledge refers to the be evaluated properly. For example, she corpus of knowledge in the community. suggests that we replace the notion of Also this notion can be understood both truth with the notion of conformation. 79 Science Studies 2/2002 According to Longino, this concept is however, see the relevance of her norms better suited for understanding the con- for the descriptive work in science stud- tent of scientific knowledge, because it ies. Why should historians and sociolo- applies to non-linguistic items of knowl- gists of science use the same notion edge like diagrams, maps and graphs, knowledge as normatively oriented phi- and unlike the binary everyday notion losophers? Their work should be sensi- of truth, it allows for degrees of fit. In tive to the conceptions of knowledge the these ways the new notion is broader in people they study have. And as they are its scope of application than the tradi- not evaluating the rationality of the peo- tional notion of truth. However, her ple they study, they do not have any use discussion leaves open the question for the normative notions suggested by whether the notion of conformation Longino. Maybe we should leave our would help us with some of the concep- notion of knowledge less integrated than tual problems with the traditional con- Longino proposes. A disunified notion cept of truth. of knowledge would still be compatible In chapter 6, Longino applies her ac- with the sprit of her explanatory plural- count to the problem of underdetermi- ism. nation and also proposes a set of norms Chapter 7 elaborates some of her ba- for social creation of knowledge. These sic ideas by comparing them to alterna- norms are the most interesting part of tive accounts of social epistemology. the book. These norms regulate the criti- The main problem of her discussion cal discursive interactions in the creation is its briefness. The extremely short of knowledge. According to Longino, sketches of the competing theories fail epistemically acceptable social processes to do justice to their authors. For exam- of knowledge production require appro- ple, a more extensive discussion of theo- priate venues for the critical discussion, ries of Miriam Solomon and Steve Fuller an active uptake of the criticism, public would have helped to illuminate the im- standards of evaluation, and finally, tem- plications of her own approach. In this pered equality of intellectual authority. chapter she also takes up the case of The satisfaction of these features of the creationism in order to address the wor- idealized epistemic community assure ries that her norms of knowledge pro- that theories and hypotheses accepted duction are too lax to have any norma- in the community will not incorporate tive bite. She argues that her account is the idiosyncratic biases of the individu- stringent enough to rule out current als or subgroups. Based on these norms forms of scientific creationism as candi- she offers her own definitions of various dates for knowledge. I think she suc- faces of knowledge. She argues that her ceeds in this, but I wish she had used this social account of knowledge helps to example to elaborate further her ac- bridge the distance between empirically count of normatively appropriate social minded sociologists and normatively processes of knowledge production. oriented philosophers of science. Her The last chapter takes up the issue of account certainly provides some inter- explanatory pluralism. She uses the ex- esting ideas for philosophers and others ample of twentieth century biology to involved in normative issues. I cannot, argue for the plurality of cognitive stand- 80 Science Studies 2/2002 ard and aims in science. Again, I am sym- thors in science studies and philosophy pathetic to her central claims, but dis- of science are too often inaccurate and appointed to the programmatic nature unfair, on the other hand the presenta- of her discussion. For example, the no- tion of her own ideas are too sketchy to tion of explanatory pluralism remains be really convincing. For those inter- vague as she does not elaborate her no- ested in her ideas, I suggest her earlier tion of explanation.