CHAPTER 8 GREECE N discussing after the war the decision to send British troops to Greece I in early 1941, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the nava l view at the time was that politically the decision was right, but it wa s doubted if the naval, military and air resources were equal to it . No doubt our opinions were somewhat influenced by the fact that we were i n possession of the Libyan coast as far west as Benghazi. From the Navy's point of view this facilitated the supply of Malta and the passage through the Sicilia n Narrows, and conditions would be better still if the advance were continued towards Tripolitania.l The decision aggravated the immediate problem of supply and transporta- tion by sea. Air Marshal Longmore, in his dispatch covering air operations from January to May 1941, instanced as a prominent feature the par t played by the occupation of territory in adding to or reducing the potentia l scale of air attack on ships at sea . As a result of the decision to go to the aid of Greece, the Navy could only view with some concern th e certainty of operations in the Aegean under air attack from the Dodecanes e Islands, and the possibility of losing the advantage conferred by possession of the Libyan coast . It was not, however, the British decision to aid Greece, but the German decision to aid Italy which was the main factor in shapin g immediate events and which, while British successes in Libya were a t their flood, seriously limited the power of the fleet in the central Mediter- ranean. Early in January, strong German air forces, mostly dive bomber s and fighters, arrived in southern Italy and Sicily. In greater strength than available British air forces, far more efficient than the Italian, they nullifie d the effects of Taranto, temporarily denied the Central Mediterranean to the British fleet, and by reducing Malta's effectiveness strengthened th e Axis communications with North Africa and made possible the rapid rebuilding of the army there with both Italian and German forces . The British Navy had throughout regarded Malta as "the keystone o f victory in the Mediterranean".2 This view was not originally held by the army and air force, who considered that the island could not be held against continuous air attack from Sicily and possible invasion . 3 Nor, from German reports after the war, was Malta's strategic importance at firs t realised by them or the Italians, with very few exceptions. But from the beginning of 1941 the influence it could exert in the Mediterranean gener- ally and on the campaign in Cyrenaica in particular, was progressively appreciated by both sides . i Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p . 315 . 2 Cunningham, p. 257 . 2 As another "prominent feature " of operations in the Mediterranean from May 1940 to May 1941 , Longmore instanced "the unexpected survival of Malta as an operational air base ". As suc h it was essential to the Mediterranean Fleet in operations against enemy convoys to Libya. 300 GREECE Jan-Apr 1941 The desirability of eliminating Malta as a threat to his communication s was recognised by Hitler early in 1941 when he decided to send force s to North Africa, and on the 3rd February he told his military adviser s that the island must be bombed incessantly. Twelve days later he expanded these ideas to include the possibility of occupying Malta, together wit h Corsica and the French Mediterranean coast, in case the British should continue their advance in North Africa and occupy Tripolitania . The German General Staff prepared an operational study dated 15th March, the operation to be almost entirely German, though a minor part was allotted to the Italian Navy . Events, however, did not favour the immediat e prosecution of the plan . Developments in the Balkans and the Aegean (where German airborne troops it had been intended to use in the pro - posed attack on Malta were used, and suffered heavy losses, in the invasio n of Crete) caused its postponement, and later plans for Malta's occupatio n in 1941 were also shelved. The reduced scale of air attack on the island at this period, and th e reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet, enabled the British to bas e surface forces on Malta for a few weeks during April and May, thei r task being to harry Axis communications with North Africa . Jervis, Nubian, Mohawk and Janus of Captain Mack 's 4 14th Flotilla arrived there o n 10th April. In the early hours of the 16th, on a fine clear night with a good moon, the flotilla intercepted and destroyed an enemy convoy of five merchant ships and three destroyers bound for Libya . 5 Five day s later the battle fleet bombarded the enemy 's main African supply port, Tripoli. Perth took part in the operation, but not in the actual bombard- ment. Soon afterwards the 14th Flotilla was replaced at Malta by th e 5th Flotilla, but during May this had to be withdrawn to reinforce th e fleet, and Malta was again without surface forces . The running of convoys to and from Malta was one of the reason s for a complex operation by Force "H" and the Mediterranean Flee t early in January . Another was the passage of a convoy through the Mediterranean from Gibraltar . The occasion was to be made one for offensive operations against the Dodecanese Islands and shipping on th e Italian coasts . Force "H", covering a convoy ("Excess") of four merchant ships, one , the Essex (11,063 tons), for Malta, and the remainder for Greece, left Gibraltar on the 7th January . The same day various coordinated move- ments began in the Eastern Mediterranean . The 3rd Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Renouf)—Gloucester, Southampton, and destroyers— sailed from the Aegean to meet Force "H" west of the Sicilian Narrows . A Malta convoy of two merchant ships escorted by Calcutta, Diamond, and Defender, left Alexandria . The 1st Division of the 7th Cruiser Squad- ron (Rear-Admiral Pridham-Wippell), Orion and York also sailed from ' Rear-Adm P. J . Mack, DSO ; RN. (HMS Lord Nelson 1914-16 .) Comd HMS Janus 1940, HM S Jervis 1940-42, and Capt (D) 14 Flotilla 1940-42, HMS King George V and Flag Capt to C-in-C Home Fleet 1942-43 ; Rear-Adm Force "V" 1943. B . 6 Oct 1892 . Killed in aircraft accident, 29 Apr 1943 . 6 Mohawk was torpedoed and sunk during this encounter . 9-11 Ian CRUISER SQUADRON 301 Alexandria, and Ajax and Perth left Piraeus to join them at Suda Bay. The Australian cruiser was shaking down as a unit of the 7th Squadron, of which she and Ajax formed the Second Division. The two ships had been patrolling in the western Aegean since the 1st of the month . The battle fleet (Cunningham), Warspite, Valiant, Illustrious, and destroyers, sailed from Alexandria to the westward, providing general cover . By mid- morning on the 9th Cunningham was midway between Greece and Malta , where he was joined by Pridham-Wippell's force . (Here, for a few hours , Sydney and Stuart were also in company on their way from Malta to Alexandria, as recounted in Chapter 5 .) In the afternoon the 7th Cruise r Squadron was detached to cover the convoys arriving at and leaving Malta. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was well ahead through the Sicilian Narrows , meeting Force "H" to the west of Sicily. So far all had gone according to plan. After dark on the 9th, Force "H" handed "Excess" over to the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which was joined by the cruiser Bonaventure, 6 come with Force "H" from the west to join the Mediterranean Fleet . The east- ward passage of the Narrows began . Early on the morning of the 10th , off Pantelleria, two enemy destroyers were sighted by Bonaventure, and in a sharp dawn action one was sunk. By daylight the battle fleet was on the scene, and it was as the destroyers were taking station when th e battle fleet turned after the convoy, that the first of a series of blows fell . The destroyer Gallant struck a mine and had her bows blown off . The stern portion was taken in tow and escorted to Malta under cover of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and Bonaventure. Meanwhile the Alexandria convoy had reached Malta safely, and the east bound convoys had sailed from the island, while "Excess", covered by the battle fleet, was approaching from the westward . Shortly afte r noon, large formations of aircraft were sighted . They were German, and "a very heavy, determined and skilful dive bombing attack developed on the fleet, mainly directed at Illustrious, and lasting for some ten minutes". That ten minutes sufficed to change the whole naval situatio n in the Central Mediterranean . Illustrious was hit by six heavy bombs, an d hauled out of line heavily on fire and with her steering gear out of action . She fought back hard with her armament, and despite a second div e bombing attack four hours later, reached Malta, steered by her mai n engines, at 9 .45 p.m., an hour after Essex, which had been detached fro m "Excess". Little damage was done to the rest of the battle fleet, whic h throughout the 11th steered eastwards in close support of "Excess" . That afternoon, however, the German dive bombers had a further success . In an attack on the 3rd Cruiser Squadron returning to join the battle fleet after covering Gallant to Malta, they hit Gloucester and Southamp- ton, the last-named badly .