204 CHAPTER VIII. THE BATTLE OF DIAMOND HILL.* Whilst Lord Roberts paused for a few days to adjust the dis- ordered city of Pretoria, the Boers fell back in dejection toward the east. The loss of the capital, though their leaders made Effect of the Ught of it in Speech and proclamation, had, indeed, robbed them ^^ more than a seat of of more, even, than a moral Pretoria. Government— rallying point. These deprivations are always rather civil than military, demoralising, perhaps, to a populace, but possibly affecting little an army still in the field with a set task before it. By theAngloBoerWar.comfall of Pretoria, however, Botha's commandos lost not only these—for they themselves were the populace—but also their raison d'etre as military forces, than which no consciousness is more enervating to soldiers. No troops, moreover, could have been quicker than the Boers to grasp this sudden reduc- tion to futility. Their individual intelligence, their skill in warfare which they had exerted to the utmost with no better result than tliis, their knowledge of the theatre of war, and their rapid information of events all over it, all conspired to reveal to them unmistakably their real situation. They who had stood fruitlessly on guard along strong frontiers, in front of two capitals, and around three besieged towns, could feel as little hope as pride in being called upon now to cover nothing but a fugitive Government installed in a railway carriage. Yet beyond this there seemed nothing left to do. Many, misHking the prospect, made for their homes ; many surrendered ; the remainder, about seven thousand men with twenty guns, drew See maps Nos. 44 and 44 (a). THE BATTLE OF DIAMOND HILL. 205 rein at the exhortations of their generals, and faced the lost capital on a position fifteen miles eastward. It was characteristic of the native military acumen of the Boers that at this dark moment all eyes turned for light to the Orange Free State. The British, invulnerable in front, now trailed lines of communication of an immense length. They had marched many hundreds of miles ; their supplies, both of food and clothing, their numbers, and health, must be at a low ebb. Best of all, the disconcerting mobility of the cavalry had now, surely, almost disappeared from lack of horse-flesh. " Horses," wrote the President to one of his generals, " are lying dead in one row from Kroonstad The troops are even riding mares with foals following." And as for the infantry, " they are weary, done up, and without food . can scarcely keep up any longer, and are longing for the war to cease."* Now, therefore, was the time to strike at the rear of this ex- hausted host, to break the slender tube by which it drew in strength, sustenance and speed, and, if the truth must be spoken, to turn its gazeAngloBoerWar.comaway from a beaten army which could no longer look it in the face. Such were the hopes and fears which, animating those who stayed by Botha, caused them to call to General C. De Wet in the south for help. Nor did they call in vain. Already, on June 5th, De Wet had followed up his capture of Spragge's Yeomanry by surrounding a convoy of fifty wagons, escorted by two hundred Highlanders, which was on its way to join Colvile at Heilbron. The whole fell into his hands. De Wet's successes. How, on June 7th and following days, he swooped upon the line at various points, destroying the track and bridges, putting a thousand men hors de combat, and burning immense quantities of ammunition, clothing and foodstuffs, is told elsewhere. To compare smaller things with greater, Stonewall Jackson himself had not at Manassas, f thirty-eight years earlier, fuller temporary possession of his enemy's communications than had the Free State leader during the second week of June, 1900. * Letter from President Kruger to General Grobelaar, June loth, iqcx). t August 27th, 1862. 2o6 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. These feats, though they revived somewhat the failing spirits of Botha's troops, disturbed but little the British Commander- in-Chief. He had fully foreseen them ; and despatching south- ward Lord Kitchener and a column,* under Smith-Dorrien, to re-establish his broken connection, he turned to push Botha further from the city. With this end in view he had disposed his troops from the moment of the capture of Pretoria. Two brigades of cavalry and two of mounted infantry were already at Silverton and Koedoes Poort ; Ian Hamilton, intended to act once more upon the flank, had been dropped at Irene. On June 7th, leaving Maxwell with the 14th brigade to garrison Lord Roberts Pretoria, Lord Roberts moved out eastward with the Xlth «^twani division, screening his front from Doom Poort down to Irene with mounted men. Next day, whilst the Xlth division ad- vanced to Silverton, French took the ist and 4th cavalry brigades and Hutton's force of mounted men northward to Kameel Drift, where fifty Boers came into his bivouac and gave up their arms. Hamilton, from Irene, sent his infantry (21st brigade) and artillery (76th and 82nd R.F.A.) to Garsfontein, and hisAngloBoerWar.comcavalry (2nd and 3rd cavalry brigades) and mounted infantry to Zwavel Poort, where contact with the hostile out- posts was gained. These movements were closely observed by the enemy. At 11 a.m. a 6-in. Creusot gun, mounted on a railway truck, opened fire from Pienaar's Poort on the Xlth division at Silverton, a distance of nearly five and a half miles. Pole-Carew replied with two 5-in. guns, one of which, after twelve rounds, burst a shell between the rails thirty yards in front of the muzzle of the cannon at 9,680 yards range, destroying the track, whereupon the Boer gunners withdrew their piece. For the next two days no movements beyond reconnaissance were undertaken, and this for two reasons. In the first place. Lord Roberts, anxious to prevent the degeneration of the cam- paign into that aimless and bitter guerrilla contest which from Composition : 19th brigade with the ist Suffolk regiment ; 74th battery R.F.A., four guns 8ist battery R.F.A., 8th mounted infantry, mounted infantry of the C.I.V., section 7th company R.E. THE BATTLE OF DIAMOND HILL. 207 history and the character of his opponents he knew to be immi- nent, was at this time in negotiation wdth Botha on the subject of a general capitulation. This, indeed, he might have brought about, seeing that the spirit of the burghers and their leaders had never been more faint, had not the successes of De Wet super- vened at this critical moment, interfering even more with the British Commander-in-Chief's negotiations than with his com- munications. Cheered by tales of captured battalions, of sacked trains, of destroyed railways, Botha turned a deaf ear, and announced his intention of fighting to the last. This being so, extreme caution became necessary. Lord Roberts' field army, depleted by the wastage of his long march, and by garrisons and railway guards dropped on the way, numbered now no more than about sixteen thousand men. The enemy, it is true, possessed but half this number ; but he was stretched out on either side of Pienaar's Poort in positions almost unassailable in front, the flanks of which were hard to find. Botha, in fact, for so many months student perforce of Commandant- turning movements, had determined on this occasion not to be Botha^s dispositions, outflanked atAngloBoerWar.comany cost ; and he followed every investigation to the north by French's patrols, and to the south by the scouts of Ian Hamilton, by a corresponding drawing out of his wings, until his men were entrenched over twenty-five miles of intricate and mountainous country. His line of defence, which faced nearly due west, was bisected by the Pretoria—Delagoa Bay railway, which, at Pienaar's Poort, penetrated the barrier by a deep ravine. North of the Poort a range of heights ran brokenly up to Krokodil Spruit, lofty everywhere, but especially formid- able where, at the uppermost extremity, it was gathered into a triplet of peaks, Louwbaken-Kameelfontein Ridge—Krokodil- spruit Hill. Below the western foot of these ran the level and open Kameelfontein Valley, some seven miles long and two to three broad, entrance to which from the British side was by a drift immediately below Louwbaken. Thus ramparted on one margin, the valley was on its opposite edge walled in by the isolated Boekenhoutskloof Ridge, forming a defile as dangerous from its surroundings asMt appeared tempting as an avenue 2o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. around the Kameelfontein Ridges. The Boekenhoutskloof Ridge, projecting westward, formed a strong outwork in advance of the flank of the main position, of which it raked the narrow approaches as a caponiere rakes the ditch. Nevertheless, it was not at first held by the enemy, Snyman, who was posted on the extreme right, contenting himself with watching the exit of the valley from the hills above and eastward of Krokodilspruit Drift. There he joined hands with De la Rey, who occupied the Kameel- fontein section, their combined forces amounting to some four thousand men with eleven to fifteen guns. In the Boer centre, guarding either side of Pienaar's Poort, rose two tall and elongated features, the southernmost standing also over the pass of Donker Poort. Southward of this again, ground equally high trended slightly eastward, parallel to the Pienaar's river, by Donkerhoek and Diamond Hill to Mors Kop, throwing bushy spurs of such proportions down to the gorge about Mooiplaats, Kleinfontein and Tweedracht, that it was hard to say which formed the stronger holds, the under- featuresAngloBoerWar.comor the main kopjes behind.