INNOVATION IN THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN IRAQ, 2005-2007 By James A. Russell War Studies Department King’s College, University of London Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD, July 2009 ABSTRACT This dissertation critically examines the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq by a series of U.S. Army and Marine Corps units operating in Anbar and Ninewa provinces in Iraq from late 2005 through early 2007. The popular narrative of the American counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq is that military success followed the ‘surge’ of American troops in the spring 2007 and the appointment of General David Petraeus as the ground commander committed to counterinsurgency operations. While both factors were undoubtedly important in America’s counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, the research in this book demonstrates that this narrative is somewhat misleading. I argue that by the time Petraeus took over command to “rescue” the counterinsurgency campaign in early 2007, American military units had already built successful counterinsurgency competencies and were experiencing battlefield success – most dramatically in the battle for Ramadi in the fall of 2006. The process of successful adaptation in the field began in late 2005 in Anbar and Ninewa provinces and did so with little direction from higher military and civilian authorities. I argue that that the collective momentum of tactical adaptation within the units studied here can be characterized as organizational innovation. I define innovation as the widespread development of new organizational capacities not initially present in these units when they arrived in Iraq and which had only tangential grounding in previous military doctrine. The new capacities built iteratively over time changed the way these units fought the counterinsurgency. This dissertation’s case studies detail a process of wartime innovation that featured a series of organic, bottom-up tactics and techniques developed within the battalions and brigades fighting the insurgents. CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION 1 II THEORIES OF MILITARY INNOVATION 47 III WARTIME INNOVATION IN WESTERN ANBAR 91 FALL 2005-SUMMER 2006 IV WARTIME INNOVATION IN ANBAR 169 FALL 2005-SUMMER 2006 V WARTIME INNOVATION IN NINEWA PROVINCE 257 COIN OPERATIONS IN MOSUL AND NORTHERN IRAQ SEPTEMBER 2005 – JULY 2006 VI CONCLUSION 369 BIBLIOGRAPHY 395 LIST OF FIGURES 1-1 PROCESS OF BOTTOM MILITARY INNOVATION IN IRAQ 10 1-2 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW THREATS, 2006 30 1-3 JOINT VISION 2020, FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE 36 1-4 UNIT LOCATIONS USED IN STUDY 39 1-5 BREAKDOWN OF UNITS IN STUDY 41 3-1 AL QAIM AREA, WESTERN IRAQ 101 3-2 DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES, SEPTEMBER 2005, WESTERN ANBAR 101 3-3 TRIBES OF AL QAIM 104 3-4 2/2 NON-KINETIC EFFECTS 112 3-5A 3-6 TACTICAL FOOTPRINT, OCTOBER 2005 115 3-5B 3-6 TACTICAL FOOTPRINT, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2005 115 3-6 1-7 LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION, SPRING 2006 118 3-7 1-7 LOO DETAILED BREAKDOWN 119 3-8 1-7 TACTICAL FOOTPRINT, MAY 2006 120 3-9 PROJECT METRO ELEMENTS 125 3-10 1-7 ATTACK TRENDS 130 3-11 SABER AREA OF OPERATIONS 145 3-12 FORTS ON IRAQ-SYRIAN BORDER 147 3-13 4-14 FUSION CYCLE 149 3-14 4-14 COIN METHODOLOGY 155 3-15 4-14 NON-LETHAL COIN 159 ii 3-16ª KHE SANH COP, WESTERN ANBAR 162 3-16B GUAM COP, WESTERN ANBAR 162 3-17 BPS BOXER, VERA CRUZ, WESTERN ANBAR 162 3-18 AL QAIM NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL SECTORS 162 3-19 PROJECT METRO DETAIL 163 3-20A CMO PROJECTS, WESTERN ANBAR 163 3-20B CMO PROJECTS, WESTERN ANBAR 163 3-21A CMO PROJECTS, WESTERN ANBAR 163 3-21B CMO PROJECTS, WESTERN ANBAR 163 3-22A BORDER FORT 53,IRAQ-SYRIAN BORDER 164 3-22B BORDER FORT 47, IRAQ-SYRIAN BORDER 164 3-23 COP ANAH 165 3-24 CHICKEN FARM ARMS CACHE 165 3-25 4-14 ARMS CACHE FIND 166 3-26 JULY 2006 ANAH RAID 167 3-27 IRAQI POLICE RETURN TO RAWAH 168 4-1 2/28 UNIT ELEMENTS 177 4-2 2/28 FIXED LOCATIONS, JUNE 2006 179 4-3 2/28 FOB LOCATIONS 180 4-4 2/28, ISF LOCATIONS 194 4-5 1/1 SUBORDINATE UNITS 203 4-6 1/1 AREA OF OPERATIONS 207 4-7A TRIBAL COOPERATION, RAMADI, JUNE 2006 213 4-7B TRIBAL COOPERATION, RAMADI, JANUARY 2007 213 4-8 1-37 TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN RAMADI 217 4-9 COP CONSTRUCTION DETAILS FOR 1-37 219 4-10 COP GRANT, COP SWORD, COP FALCON 221 4-11 1-37 CENSUS LOOP 224 4-12 1-37 CENSUS WORKSHEETS 225 4-13 1-37 CENSUS ROLL-UP 228 4-14 1-6 AREA OF OPERATIONS 230 4-15 1-6 AREA AT OUTSET OF DEPLOYMENT 234 4-16 GOVERNMENT CENTER RUBBLE REMOVAL, RAMADI 237 4-17 POLICE STATION LOCATION, CENTRAL RAMADI 239 4-18 CLEARANCE OF NORTH CENTRAL RAMADI 241 4-19 1-6 TACTICAL FOOTPRINT, SPRING 2007 242 4-20 RAMADI DISTRICT COUNCIL MEETING 246 4-21 1-6 CMO PROJECTS 248 4-22 INFORMATION OPERATIONS FOCUS 250 4-23 RAMADI MOST WANTED POSTER 251 4-24 ATTACK TRENDS 253 4-25 1/1 CMO SUMMARY 254 5-1 172ND STRYKER BRIGADE AREA OF OPERATIONS 261 5-2 172ND FOB/COP LOCATIONS 264 5-3 172ND DIGITAL NETWORK DETAIL 267 5-4 ISF/IP TRAINING FACILITIES IN NINEWA 287 5-5 IRAQI TELEVISION/INFORMATION OPERATIONS 309 5-6 MOSUL MOST WANTED POSTER 310 5-7 CMO PROJECTS IN NINEWA 314 5-8 2-1 COIN CAMPAIGN METHODOLOGY 318 iii 5-9 MOSUL NEIGHBORHOOD ASSESSMENT 320 5-10 2-1 PATTERN ANALYSIS FINDINGS 321 5-11 2-1 ISR COLLECTION PLAN, BATTLE MAPS, NOVEMBER 2005 322 5-12 2-1 HUMINT RESULTS, FALL 2005 325 5-13A 2-1 RAID RESULTS 327 5-13B 2-1 RAID RESULTS 328 5-14 ROLL-UP OF OPEL GANG 329 5-15A NEIGHBORHOOD DATA ANALYSIS, SITEMPS 333 5-15B SITEMP, APRIL 2006, EASTERN MOSUL 334 5-16 2-1 ‘WHEEL OF STUFF’ 337 5-17 2-1 INTEGRATED TARGETING 338 5-18 2-1 ATTACK TRENDS 340 5-19 COMPANY C/1-17 AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY 342 5-20 COMPANY C ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 343 5-21 SMALL KILL TEAM OPERATIONS, MAY 2006 347 5-22 SMALL KILL TEAM TACTICS, JANUARY 2006 349 5-23 SMALL KILL TEAM OPERATIONS RESULTS 350 5-24 4-11 AREA OF OPERATIONS 353 5-25 4-11 LOCAL LIAISON DETAILS 357 5-26 4-11 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF AREA OF OPERATIONS 358 5-27 4-11 COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS 360 iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The United States stormed into Iraq in March 2003 boasting the world’s best trained and equipped military. Using a host of technologies and new weapons that had been integrated into its force structure over the preceding decade, the invasion force made quick work of its adversary in a march on Baghdad that took only three weeks.1 The invasion unveiled a ‘Shock and Awe’2 campaign of rapid dominance packaged under the ostensibly new paradigm of ‘effects based operations.’3 The invasion framed the impressive application of combined arms conventional military power that routed Saddam’s armies and quickly delivered American forces into downtown Baghdad. The invasion force applied a new generation of sensors, standoff munitions and digitized command and control systems to great effect during the invasion against a marginally competent enemy.4 The invasion seemed to confirm the primacy of American global military power. 1 As detailed in Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006). 2 First introduced into the lexicon of public discourse by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996). Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers told reporters in March 2003: ‘The best way to do that [end the conflict] would be to have such a shock on the system that the Iraqi regime would have to assume early on the end was inevitable.’ As quoted in Eric Schmitt and Elisabeth Buhmiller, ‘Threats and Responses; Attack Strategy; Top General Sees Plan to Shock Iraq Into Surrendering’, New York Times, March 5, 2005. 3 Paul Davis, Effects Based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), 7. He defines the term as: ‘…operations conceived and planned in a systems framework that considers the full range of direct, indirect and cascading effects – which may, with different degrees of probability – be achieved with the application of military, diplomatic psychological, and economic instruments.’ 4 The role of advanced ‘transformational’ capabilities in the invasion is interestingly addressed by Steve Biddle, ‘Speed Kills: Reevaluating the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 3-46. Biddle argues that As is widely known, however, the actual invasion of Iraq only represented the opening phase of the war. Unfolding events gradually drained away the initial sense of optimism over the removal of Saddam and the defeat of his army as the security environment inside Iraq deteriorated over the summer of 2003. By the winter of 2003- 4 it became clear that, while Saddam’s army had been defeated, armed resistance to the invading and occupying force had only just begun. While the United States political leadership tried to discount and marginalize the initial appearance of Iraqi resistance groups in the summer and fall of 2003,5 the American military gradually became aware it was immersed in a full-blown insurgency – a kind of warfare for which it had failed to prepare.6 The American military slowly came to the inescapable conclusion that the methods and equipment for defeating Saddam’s Army wouldn’t work against increasingly well organized and adaptive insurgent groups.