Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2014 The Global Health Security Agenda in an Age of Biosecurity Lawrence O. Gostin Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] Alexandra Phelan Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1356 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461850 312 JAMA 27-28 (2014) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, International Law Commons, International Public Health Commons, and the Public Policy Commons Opinion VIEWPOINT The Global Health Security Agenda in an Age of Biosecurity Lawrence O. Gostin, JD In May 2009, President Obama launched the Global Robust Detection O’Neill Institute for Health Initiative with ambitious goals of reforming for- The GHS Agenda facilitates robust detection through National and Global eign assistance, expanding programs, and coordinat- real-time biosurveillance and modern diagnostics to re- Health Law, ing agencies. Despite progress, these goals have been liably conduct 5 of 10 core diagnostic tests within a health Georgetown University Law Center, only partially achieved. Yet 5 years later, on February care setting or laboratory.Laboratory capacity should in- Washington, DC, and 13, 2014, the White House launched another bold clude IHR-notifiable diseases (eg, novel influenza sub- World Health initiative—the Global Health Security Agenda (GHS types), as well as WHO’s leading causes of death in low- Organization Collaborating Center on Agenda), a US-led diplomatic collaboration with 30 income countries. The GHS Agenda will support the Public Health Law and countries, international organizations, nongovernmen- establishment of 1 trained field epidemiologist per Human Rights, tal organizations, and public/private entities. The GHS 200 000 population in target countries through finan- Washington, DC. Agenda aims to “accelerate progress toward a world cial and technical assistance, depending on national eco- safe and secure from infectious disease threats.”1 Does nomic status. Alexandra Phelan, LLM, BBiomedSc the GHS Agenda signal the end of the Global Health (Hons) Initiative, and is the policy shift toward securitization a Effective Response O’Neill Institute for positive step for global health? The GHS Agenda aims for Emergency Operations Cen- National and Global ters to activate a coordinated response within 2 hours, Health Law, Georgetown University The GHS Agenda including rapid response units—multidisciplinary teams Law Center, Theintertwiningofglobalhealthandsecurityfollowsaline deployed to a public health emergency to investigate, Washington, DC. of international agreements. The 2003 global outbreak evaluate patients, collect samples, oversee contain- of severe acute respiratory syndrome energized the in- ment (eg, isolation or quarantine), and communicate ternational community, leading to the revised Interna- among health authorities. In a suspected or confirmed tional Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005, which set global biological attack, response teams would collaborate with standards for surveillance and response to pandemic law enforcement. threats. Adopting an “all-hazards” approach, the revi- sion covered “public health emergencies of interna- Setting Norms Without Adequate Funding tional concern” rather than the 3 diseases covered in the The GHS Agenda signals a major advance in global health old regulations (cholera, yellow fever, and bubonic security. Whereas the IHR is framed in broad terms, the plague).TheIHRestablishedsystematicapproachestoin- agenda specifies action steps, such as early detection, ternationalcooperation,surveillance,riskassessment,and laboratory capacity, and rapid response—with defined responsecapacities,improvingtheglobalresponsetothe benchmarks. While WHO has been unable to negotiate 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak. However, by its imple- amultilateralagreementonantimicrobialresistance(per- mentation deadline in mid-2012, only 42 (22%) of 194 hapstheworld’sleadinghealththreat)oronresearchand WorldHealthOrganization(WHO)memberstateshadre- development, the GHS Agenda prioritizes cross-border ported fully developed core competencies, including leg- cooperation on virus sharing and research. As a US-led islation, surveillance, response, and preparedness consortium, the GHS Agenda brings together interna- capacities.2 Withthefinalimplementationdeadlineloom- tional organizations, states, nongovernmental organi- ing in June 2016, the White House sought to forge a se- zations,andpublic/privatepartnerships—aninclusiveap- curity framework in the GHS Agenda.3 proach, often politically challenging for United Nations agencies. Enhanced Prevention The obstacles, however, to effective implementa- The GHS Agenda’s “enhanced prevention” has 4 priori- tion are formidable. The United States lacks legitimacy ties: (1) antimicrobial resistance, prioritizing the imple- to set global norms and guide state conformance. mentation of at least 1 reference laboratory per target Without a legal mandate to spearhead global pre- country capable of identifying priority antimicrobial paredness, sovereign states could, over time, fail to Corresponding threats and reporting to the IHR focal point network; comply. With a presidential election in 2016, the next Author: Lawrence O. (2) biosecurity and biosafety, with national systems incumbent could pivot in a different direction. The Gostin, JD, that can identify,secure, and monitor dangerous patho- GHS Agenda’s coordinating function is vital, but the Georgetown University Law Center, O’Neill gens, particularly “gain of function” and “dual-use” re- administration failed to secure seamless coordination Institute for National search; (3) reduced spillover of zoonotic diseases into even across federal agencies. Will it be possible to do and Global Health Law, human populations, such as the March 2014 Guinean so across divergent states? 600 New Jersey Ave Ebola outbreak; and (4) broadened immunization cov- Indonesia’s refusal to share influenza A(H5N1) NW, Washington, DC 20001 (gostin@law erage, with at least 90% of a target country’s 1-year- samples in 2006 destabilized the international commu- .georgetown.edu). olds vaccinated. nity,resulting in WHO’s adoption of the Pandemic Influ- jama.com JAMA July 2, 2014 Volume 312, Number 1 27 Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. Downloaded From: http://jama.jamanetwork.com/ by a Georgetown University Medical Center User on 07/01/2014 Opinion Viewpoint enza Preparedness (PIP) Framework in 2011 to facilitate equitable reduction in global health funding,5 and fiscal conservatives could sharing of samples and vaccines. The PIP Framework, however, does seek further reductions. not expressly cover genetic sequencing data that are increasingly used to transfer knowledge, and it does not cover noninfluenza ma- Securitization of Global Health terials, such as Middle East respiratory syndrome. The agenda can- The GHS Agenda stresses securitization, with important implica- not rectify these deficiencies, which ultimately requires WHO to tions. Biosecurity is high on the national and international agenda, clarify the IHR and PIP Framework. especially with currently circulating novel influenza A(H7N9) and The signal failure of the IHR was the inability to persuade high- Middle East respiratory syndrome. Still, the primary disease bur- income states to help build core capacities in poorer countries. A dens worldwide (and the predominant concern of lower-income US-led consortium could succeed where WHO failed. Yet, President countries) continue to be endemic infectious diseases, noncommu- Obama’s 2015 budget proposal allocates only $45 million to nicable diseases, injuries, and mental health. For most of the world, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention GHS activities,4p82 security primarily means building health systems to meet everyday which will not go far when shared among the initial 10 target coun- needs. Historically,biosecurity has been more a concern of wealthier tries, so far identified only as low- and middle-income countries countries, beginning as far back as the first European Sanitary with a clear need and willingness to make rapid progress. Even if Conference in 1850.6 funding were ample, Congress is unlikely to enact the president’s Securitization has become a common thread in foreign aid and budget, so even sparse funding is not ensured. development in the post-9/11 world. Security has the power to motivate high-income countries to invest and take decisive action. Status of the Global Health Initiative Just as the AIDS pandemic transformed global health assistance, Historically, the Oval Office has launched vital global health pro- biosecurity has the potential to ensure preparedness—a mobiliza- grams, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief tion that may not have occurred if endemic disease was the sole (PEPFAR) in 2003 and the President’s Malaria Initiative in 2005. Ini- political consideration. Reframing global health through the prism tially intended to last only 5 years, both programs were extended of security could be transformative. by Congress. The White House created the Global Health Initiative The GHS Agenda merits support, not only to enhance security to coordinate implementation across