Kaleidoscope Volume 9 Article 23 November 2011 The onC tent of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia? Sara Copic Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Copic, Sara (2010) "The onC tent of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia?," Kaleidoscope: Vol. 9, Article 23. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope/vol9/iss1/23 This Summer Research and Creativity Grants is brought to you for free and open access by the The Office of Undergraduate Research at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kaleidoscope by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Spotlight On Summer Research and Creativity Grants Sara Copic phenomena) must be accounted for without invoking other The Content of Consciousness: kinds of substances. Thus, while substance dualism (the idea that there are physical and mental substances which have Do We Need Qualia? different and mutually exclusive properties) is out, property Philosophy is the practice of coming dualism is still in the game. Hence, both an intentionalist and a to understand that with which we believe phenomenist could be property dualists, holding the view that we are most intimately familiar – our mental properties (thoughts, beliefs, phenomenal experience) social norms, the golden rule, learning, are fundamentally irreducible to their physical realizers (Heil our consciousness (to name just a few). Of course, there is 177). Since qualia preclude functional, cognitive, or intentional a sense in which we are all familiar with and understand characterization, they must, if they exist, supervene on these consciousness: we experience it in our normal waking life. To mental properties. If qualia are real, supervenience would be borrow from Thomas Nagel, each of us knows “what it is like” true and intentionalism false (Block). to experience the world from a certain point of view. However, Secondly, the philosophical debate over the putative experience of, does not necessarily yield insight into, and it is existence of qualia and their first person accessibility is a parcel perhaps our very familiarity with consciousness that deludes us of a greater debate about a paradigm of the mental called into believing we comprehend it. When we begin to question functionalism. In functionalism, mental states are part of this phenomenon, the very thing that defines who we are, we a causal network. For instance, if you stub your big toe on uncover that we hardly know our own minds. your bed post, you are most likely, under normal conditions, Therefore, it is not surprising that, “The greatest chasm going to experience pain. According to functionalism, this in the philosophy of mind – maybe even all of philosophy pain state was caused by your tissue damage, and in turn – divides two perspectives on consciousness.” The point of causes pain behavior and avoidance behavior (perhaps you contention revolves around the existence of qualia, or intrinsic wince, rub your toe, and watch out for furniture in your qualities of our experience, and our purported awareness of path in the future). Here, pain acts as a causal intermediary them. In other words, the question, “Is there anything in between tissue damage and pain behavior (Kim). The qualia phenomenal consciousness that escapes or goes beyond the debate factors into this because philosophers want to know intentional, cognitive, and functional?” has spurred great if our phenomenal experience, “what it is like” for a subject debate in recent times, and brought about two main theories to experience something, can be characterized functionally. If to answer the question. not, functionalism would prove to be an incomplete picture of These competing views are called intentionalism (or the mind’s workings. Here, we will focus more specifically on representationism) and phenomenism. Intentionalists claim the qualia debate, though issues about functionalism will be that phenomenal conscious experiences, such as seeing embedded within the discussion. red or feeling pain, are nothing more than intentional or Several questions accompany the issues noted above. representational mental contents. (There is a debate about the Are there such properties as qualia? If so, do we have first- nature of this content, that is, whether it is “narrow” or “wide” person access to them, and how can we become aware of content, a point which lies outside our scope.) In contrast, them? Why would qualia accompany or supervene on our phenomenists argue that qualia (which, by definition, escape conscious experiences (in a way, this question poses Chalmers’ intentional, cognitive, and functional characterization) are “hard problem” in different terms)? What are the appeals of real, and that we have first-person access to them. According intentionalism versus phenomenism, or vice versa? How does to phenomenism, we can attend to and be aware of the vehicle each theory account for our phenomenal experience? What is the 2 of representation of our experiences, as well as of phenomenal relationship between phenomenism and epiphenomenalism ? characters that are intrinsic but do not represent anything. Finally, if qualia exist, do they present a serious challenge for This paper will explore the chasm between intentionalism functionalism? Here, the exploration of these issues will be and phenomenism, and ultimately attempt a defense of the guided by the views of Gilbert Harman and Ned Block, who former. represent intentionalism and phenomenism, respectively. First, let us develop a framework for our approach There are three main arguments for qualia that Block to consciousness, which is relatively uncontroversial in and Harman both discuss. The most famous of these is the contemporary philosophy of mind. All of the topics discussed inverted spectrum argument, which we will explore last. Let here will accord with physicalism, the idea that our universe us turn to the argument from awareness of qualia during only contains matter (atoms and their subparticles, bosons, experience. This argument takes the following form: When and the like) and energy (fermions, light, etc.). Under the one experiences redness or pain, one is aware of an intrinsic physicalist doctrine, all phenomena (including mental quality of one’s experience, where “an intrinsic quality is a Kaleidoscope | Volume 9, 2010 | The University of Kentucky Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship Spotlight On Summer Research and Creativity Grants quality something has in itself, apart from its relation to other qualia (what he calls the “intrinsic features of experience”). things,” (Harman 664). An intrinsic quality of a subject’s While Harman’s objection to the pro-qualia argument from experience (or a quale) cannot be characterized functionally, awareness may seem like a minor victory for intentionalism since functionalism defines mental events in terms of their (and by extension, functionalism), Ned Block attempts a relations to each other, to their physical causes, and to behavior. defense of its premise in his article, Mental Paint. Block is one Therefore, functionalism does not offer a complete picture of of the main proponents of phenomenism, and claims not only our (conscious) mental activity (Harman). that qualia, intrinsic properties of our experiences, exist, but How might an intentionalist respond to this argument? that there are some which represent intentional content, and Gilbert Harman responds by calling the premise into some which accompany it but represent nothing at all. He question. In fact, Harman claims that we cannot be aware of calls the former sub-category of qualia “mental paint” and the the intrinsic qualities of our experiences except in special cases latter “mental oil” (Block 34). that do not pose a problem for functionalism; for instance, Block argues that Harman is wrong about awareness, you may be able to become aware of the intrinsic qualities though not about attention5. He argues that we can be aware of your experiences by observing your own brain in a mirror during a surgery (Harman), but this kind of access to the intrinsic qualities of your experience occurs from the third Harman invokes a very clear person perspective, and thus is not the same kind of access example to support his case. He writes that phenomenists are talking about. It is important to note that access to our qualia, if they exist as defined above, is only a that if you have a pain in your leg, challenge for functionalism if it is first person access3. Harman “It is very tempting to confuse features claims that we can only be aware of our intentional mental of what you experience as happening in content, meaning the objects that are represented and not the medium which represents them, although it can be easy to your leg with the intrinsic features of confuse the intrinsic quality of the represented object of our your experience. But the happening in experience with the intrinsic quality of the experience itself your leg that you are presented with is the (Harman). According to Harman, the premise of the argument from awareness falls prey to this confusion. intentional object of your experience; it is Harman invokes a very clear example to support his case. not the experience itself” (668). He writes that if you have a pain in your leg, “It is very tempting to confuse features of what you experience as happening in your leg with the intrinsic features of your experience. But of qualia, even when we are not attending to them. Block the happening in your leg that you are presented with is the writes, “Another way to appreciate the point: stick your finger intentional object of your experience; it is not the experience in front of your face, then focus on something distant. It does itself” (668). not seem so hard (at least to me) to attend to and be aware of Harman invokes a useful analogy to showcase this point aspects of the experience of the finger as well as of the finger” further.