Making a Difference: The Role of a Small State at the United Nations Jim McLay April 27, 2011 The Honorable Jim McLay is the New Zealand Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. am mindful that this address is made to a college that maintains a Center for Peace and Conflict I Studies, including a Model United Nations, and also, in the 1990s, was the first to have a contractual relationship with the UN, when it co-sponsored its International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament.1 It is against this background of Juniata’s links with the world’s most universal inter- governmental organization that I am pleased to address the role of a small state at the United Nations, and how it is that those small states can really “make a difference,” both at the UN, and geopolitically.2 LAYING THE UN’S FOUNDATIONS If the victors of World War II–-initially, the US, USSR, UK and China—had been allowed their way, the United Nations Charter, its founding document (one might almost call it a “Constitution”), would have been dramatically different from the document we have today. Despite the lofty ambitions of President Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” (the Freedoms of Speech, Expression and Worship, and Freedom from Want and Fear), when the “Big Four” got together at Dumbarton Oaks between August and October 1944 to discuss the outline of the proposed United Nations, the resulting draft document was deeply disappointing.3 The prominence of the Security Council, the diminution of the General Assembly, and only a single reference to human rights buried deep in the text, unleashed a stormy and vociferous debate. No matter how important the role of the great powers in defeating fascism, many other countries had contributed blood and treasure to that effort, and they were not impressed. Some of us were there in September 1939, and still there in September 1945, at the surrender ceremony on the deck of the battleship Missouri when Douglas MacArthur—so elegantly, but so simply—expressed the wish “that peace be now restored to the world.” It wasn’t just the great powers; it was us, and others like us, as well. And so it was that, along with many others, New Zealand reacted to those initial proposals with anger, frustration, and deep disappointment. New Zealand’s Ambassador to the US, Carl Berendsen, simply said of the draft Charter, “It aims too low.”4 Even before Dumbarton Oaks, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, expressed his unease in a speech to the Canadian Parliament, arguing that the wartime principles that had driven the Allies, “must be honored, because thousands have died for them,” and that we shouldn't “be undoing in peace 121| Juniata Voices what has been won on the battlefield.”5 We hadn’t fought for a seat at the back of the bus; and so it was that, unhappy with the Dumbarton Oaks’ outcomes, the world’s small and mid-sized nations brought their own agenda to the following year’s San Francisco conference that formally agreed on the Charter. Countries like–-and as unalike as–-New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Lebanon, Egypt, Mexico, Guatemala, and Paraguay (some who had fought in the global war, others who had not) pushed strongly to give human rights a central role in the Charter. New Zealand was at the forefront on the colonial issue, chairing the Trusteeship Committee, which focused on the welfare of indigenous people and their right of self-determination. It also successfully argued for a strengthened role for the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which anticipated, with some foresight, its later, critical role in the development of newly-independent African and other states. And it is the stuff of New Zealand’s UN legend that we strongly opposed giving a Security Council veto to the Permanent Five–-the P5 (the great powers, now with France)–-arguing along with Australia that it would hamstring the search for peace and security. Indeed, the veto was the only provision that was put to a formal vote, at which those who were opposed to the veto were defeated. The final Charter still included much of the original draft, particularly the primary role of the Security Council, with its P5 veto, but human rights had much more prominence and the Charter addressed the contentious issue of the rights of indigenous peoples. This example of small countries standing up to the great powers and influencing that founding document has been repeated throughout the UN’s history–- indeed, throughout wider post-war history. Through almost seven decades of conflict and catastrophe, peace and prosperity, small states have worked to ensure that the great powers do not monopolize an institution whose role and function affects everyone. History has shown (as only history can) that it is in the interests of the international community that small states be represented and heard, and that they can be influential and make a difference in the work of the United Nations and beyond. SMALL STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS When the UN was founded in 1945, it had only fifty-one members. Through decolonization and fragmentation following the end of the Cold War, that number has almost quadrupled. The UN now has 192 members–-over 100 of them with populations under 10 million. If, like the World Bank, we define “small states” as those with populations of fewer than 10 million inhabitants, then from Nauru with around 10,000 to Belarus with 9.5 million, the UN’s membership is dominated by small states–and New Zealand, with 4.4 million, sits right in the middle.6 What, apart from population, are the characteristics of these small states and how do they differ from middle powers and large states? In fact, the characteristics and differences are as many as there are countries, but some are particularly relevant to geopolitics, and to multilateralism as it plays out at the United Nations and elsewhere. Small states usually don’t have the military or economic capability to act 122| Juniata Voices unilaterally beyond their own borders, and must therefore push to ensure equality in their bilateral and multilateral relationships with larger powers. The obvious imbalance between small states and larger powers (predominantly the P5, but also rising powers like Brazil, India, Germany, Japan, South Africa and Turkey) means that multilateral systems based on the rule of law are vitally important for those smaller states, as they prevent that imbalance being used to their disadvantage. They reduce opportunities for the strong to impose on the weak, they help protect national sovereignty, they establish norms that facilitate trade and prosperity, and they allow small states to participate as equal partners in global discussions that directly affect their interest. The UN is not the only multilateral institution–-the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund and others (some related to the UN, some not) are also vital to the interests of small states—but the UN, with the universality and legitimacy it derives from its scope and membership, sits right at the heart of this multilateral system. Others are also important: New Zealand’s economic well-being depends on exports, particularly agricultural, and our economic strength, even survival, is based on our absolute commitment to the multilateral economic architecture of the WTO. But no other entity can claim such universality and legitimacy as the UN; indeed, at no previous time in human history have we had a body of such scope. Only the UN can bring together 192 States to debate almost any issue, to establish human rights norms, and to exercise collective responsibility. The United Nations is the world’s principal peacekeeping body (about 124,000 personnel presently serve in sixteen UN peace operations), and its Security Council can legitimize the use of force when international peace and security are threatened. It is that same UN Security Council to which we turn in times of conflict, and it is the forum through which those conflicts can be (and often are) brought to an end. When conflict broke out in Lebanon in 2006, and in Gaza in late 2008, the Security Council played a key role in bringing the parties to the table to broker a deal.7 It was instrumental in achieving the independence of Namibia,8 and peace and stability in El Salvador.9 It has set up tribunals to deal with genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, partly redeeming its previous inaction in both places. If small states want to participate in all this, then, lacking military and economic might, they must rely more on establishing formal and informal alliances with other states with similar interests. Through such alliances, small states can play a role on the world stage disproportionate to their size. For example, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the group of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which includes many of New Zealand’s close Pacific neighbors, are very active on environmental and climate change issues. For its part, with Canada and Australia, New Zealand often negotiates as the CANZ group, which is regarded as a moderating force and as a bridge-builder in much of the UN's work. We also work 123| Juniata Voices closely with other small states such as Norway, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein, particularly on human rights issues–-indeed, we constantly seek ad hoc groupings to push our point of view. Small states work together because they need to collaborate to wield influence, and the UN is an excellent environment for establishing such groups. SMALL STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY While the great powers of 1945 may still dominate the Security Council of 2011, in the UN General Assembly (or GA) all 192 countries are equal.