CODESRIA 12th General Assembly Governing the African Public Sphere 12e Assemblée générale Administrer l’espace public africain 12a Assembleia Geral Governar o Espaço Público Africano ةيعمجلا ةيمومعلا ةيناثلا رشع ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻔﻀﺎء اﻟﻌﺎم اﻹﻓﺮﻳﻘﻰ Rethinking the Public Sphere and Social Order in the Niger Delta: The Polycentric Planning Approach Shittu R. Akinola Covenant University 07-11/12/2008 Yaoundé, Cameroun Abstract This paper is a product of many years of experience and research on the Niger Delta. It identifies some of the reasons for the failure to transform rhetoric into reality by the Nigerian-state, multinationals/shadow-state and NGOs in the region. The structurally-defective and centralized governance arrangements in the Niger Delta has engendered increasing deprivation, neglect and orchestrated politics of exclusion by the Nigerian-state against the people of the Niger Delta. The public sphere is dominated by the few elite with “particularistic” concerns at the exclusion of the people. The consequent stiff resistance, violent reactions, militancy and hostage taking triggered by this politics of exclusion in the region have confirmed that people matter in politics. The trend of insecurity, corruption among public officials, the loss of life and property as well as the failure of military option by the Nigerian-state in the region clearly point at the failure of centralized governance arrangements. Using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, this paper identifies and discusses repetitive missing links as well as the areas that are neglected by scholars and policymakers in the governance of community affairs in the Niger Delta. The point of departure of this paper, therefore, is in problem solving and solution seeking. This paper provides case studies in the Niger Delta to demonstrate principles and practices needed to make polycentric planning, self-governance and adaptive development strategies resolve socio-economic and political crisis. It argues that in some ways, the weakness of centralized and structurally- defective governance in the Niger Delta provides an opportunity for community self-governing institutions to play the role that governments and their agencies have abandoned. In view of this, the failure of structurally-defective governance in the region calls attention to polycentric planning and decision making arrangements whereby community self-governing institutions could play critical and indispensable role by bringing the Niger Delta people into the main stream of socio-economic and political decisions, thereby synergizing the efforts of the state, oil companies and community institutions through bottom-up and integrative planning. It is in the light of this exigency that this paper develops an African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) that derives inspirations and workability mechanisms from eleven (11) African development models that cut across several sectors of the economy in the Niger Delta. It is imperative for African scholars, using CODESRIA Initiatives, to apply these models for implementation so as to demonstrate examples of how to address the challenges in the Niger Delta. 2 Introduction In spite of the fact that Nigeria relies on oil as the main source of its revenue, the Niger Delta communities where the crude oil is extracted generally suffer poverty, neglect, environmental degradation, denial of fundamental human rights and transport bottlenecks (Naanen 1995; Obi 2004:450; Akinola 2008b). The public sphere is dominated by the few elite with “particularistic” concerns at the exclusion of the people. The affluence exhibited by many workers of the oil companies and political office holders in Nigeria sharply contrasts with the social deprivation of most residents of oil communities whose livelihoods are threatened (Akinola 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2005d, 2008b; Obi 2004:448). In response, the people of oil communities resisted this oppression of the federal government in various ways (Douglas and Ola 1999:334; Obi 2000a:281). Consequently, four major groups, as identified by Akinola (2008b), with diverse interests have emerged strategizing for different reasons. The first two groups belong to the elites, while the other two are the non-elites. In the first group are the politicians and bureaucrats who are mostly corrupt. The other group of the elites, though very few, identify themselves with the ordinary man in the oil communities. In this group were people like Ken Saro Wiwa and other eight Ogonis who were hanged by the military regime of Late General Sanni Abacha in 1995. Similarly, the non-elites “organize” themselves into two camps. The first group of non-elites adopts crude approach of violence, hostage taking, vandalization of oil installations, etc. in making pressure to bear on the Federal Government and oil multinationals/shadow-state. In the second group of non-elites are the grassroots who invest their sovereignty horizontally in one another through collective action and self-organizing arrangements to address infrastructural problems at the community level. The orchestrated politics of exclusion in the region breeds resentment and aggression. Consequently, the challenges in the region have become complex, complicated and hydra-headed with various dimensions – social, economic, political and technological. These alienating divisions between stakeholders in development are legacies of colonialism which were adopted by successive post-colonial Nigerian governments. As expected, most economic and political decisions in the region do not reflect the aspirations of the people. The problem is largely a case of institutional dilemma which confirms the problem of “disconnect” caused by the absence of appropriate institutional mechanisms that could motivate the people (elite and non-elite) to work together as partners in development in the region. Without the citizens playing active role in decision making, governance process would continue to exclude and marginalize them. If citizens (at the community level) are excluded from rules making, how can the elites who make and impose rules on citizens interpret such rules in favour of the latter? The argument is that both 3 elite leadership and the people would need to work together as colleagues with equal standing within the public sphere and governance arenas. This paper identifies the missing links as well as the areas of neglect by scholars and policymakers in the governance of public sphere and community affairs in the Niger Delta. It uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in engaging empirical data to discuss repetitive missing links between and among the stakeholders in the governance of public sphere in the Niger Delta. According to some Tocquevillian analytics, the public sphere as one of the four terrains of the public landscape is the central axis of public life where deliberation according to “universal rules” exposes citizens to competing viewpoints through public debates, teaches them to become critical, tolerant and enabling them to transform their “particularistic” concerns into “universal” ones. In addition, the public sphere, more than any of the other domains, provides women, as well as racial, ethnic, and other marginalized groups, a way of broadening the public agenda and therefore a way of gaining access and entry into public life (Mansbridge 1983; Habermas 1989; Warner 1990; Colas 1997; Alger 1998; Forment 2003:16- 17). The point of departure of this paper, therefore, is in problem solving and solution seeking. The paper found that the bane of governance and development in the region is the problem of disconnect, hence Master Plan and dialogue alone are insufficient to resolve the problems in the region. As long as the stakeholders in development – governments, oil companies, other agencies and the Niger Delta people – operate on parallel lines, instead of as colleagues with equal standing within governance and development arenas, the crisis in the region may be difficult to resolve. If we understand society as a system of human cooperation, the Hamilton ([1788] 1961:33) puzzle can be formulated as two questions: Are people of the Niger Delta capable of cooperating with one another to organize people-oriented government that will produce accountable leaders of their choice? If the answer is affirmative, under what conditions can they cooperate to achieve such a goal? Since elites leadership in the Niger Delta could not respond appropriately to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry, it is imperative to search for alternatives. Incidentally, recent findings confirm that the local people through self-governing institutions in the region have been able to respond to some challenges by exploring pre-colonial governance heritage and to certain extents have been able to address their daily needs (Akinola 2008b). How did these peoples cope and how are they coping? What lessons can we learn from these people-centred creativities and adaptation strategies? How can we reconstruct and reconfigure the public sphere 4 in the Niger Delta to synergize the efforts of the people through their institutions and that of governments to resolve the lingering socio-economic crises and poverty in the region? In view of this, the failure of structurally-defective centralized governance and decision making calls attention to polycentric planning and decision making arrangements that regard community self-governing institution as a major player in crisis resolution and development in