digitales archiv ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Candeias, Mario Book Left-wing strategies in the euro crisis Provided in Cooperation with: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Berlin und Brüssel This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/11159/142 Kontakt/Contact ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft/Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Düsternbrooker Weg 120 24105 Kiel (Germany) E-Mail: [email protected] https://www.zbw.eu/econis-archiv/ Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieses Dokument darf zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken This document may be saved and copied for your personal und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie and scholarly purposes. 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Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft zbw Leibniz Information Centre for Economics anaLysen Parties and democracy LeFt-WING STRATEGIES IN tHe eURO CRISIS a CoMMenTed oVerVieW Mario Candeias Contents 1 Authoritarian neoliberalism and post-democracy in the European Union 2 1.1 Surfing on the waves of the crisis: The German export economy 4 1.2 A perspective for the countries in crisis? 7 1.3 Southern Europe – a special economic zone? 9 2 EUROPE.left? A synopsis of (diverging) positions in the Left Party 13 2.1 Short-term crisis intervention 13 2.2 Financial market regulation and a public banking system 15 2.3 A European clearing union 19 2.4 Marshall Plan, European industrial policy and a socio-ecological re-orientation 20 2.5 Fair taxes: wealth is taxable 21 2.6 Social corridors and minimum standards 22 2.7 The euro exit – selected positions from outside the party 23 3 Re-foundation of Europe 26 3.1 From pro-European to Euroscepticism 26 3.2 The condensation of societal mobilisation 28 3.3 Strategic disruption 30 3.4 Winning the majority in the heart of the beast? 32 Literature 35 2 1 AUtHoRItARIAN NEOLIBeRALIsM AnD POST-DeMoCRACY In tHe eURoPeAn UnION It seems to have been confirmed that mines the bourgeoisie’s social foun- authoritarianism is (probably) the ‘last dation” and therefore – particularly in conjuncture’ of neoliberalism (Can- times of crisis – makes the bourgeoisie deias 2004 and 2009). Neoliberalism “yearn for the former more incomplete, confronts the crisis (as in earlier major more undeveloped, and precisely on crises) through an intensification of the that account less dangerous forms of old mechanisms of regulation (Can- this [democracy’s] rule” (Marx, MEW deias 2008; IfG 2011). The crisis is being 8: 140). For Friedrich August von Hayek used to strengthen neoliberal principles (1980: 156), a pioneering neoliberal the- through the implementation of cuts in orist, and ordoliberals such as Wilhelm social services and the intensification Röpke (1958: 107) democracy and dic- of the ‘debt brake’ (or Schuldenbremse tatorship are therefore not irreconcilable in German), and to help anchor these opposites, but rather different methods principles constitutionally in the whole of gaining power. of Europe. The aim is to re-establish the By no means does the technocratic ‘trust’ of financial markets and to disci- political ‘solution’ help to overcome pline politics. Whenever it is perceived the (organic) crisis; it simply ensures an as necessary elected governments are unjust distribution of crisis outcomes, forced to step down and are replaced and safeguards dominant interests in by supposedly neutral technocrats, as times when the ruling neoliberal bloc happened in Greece and Italy in 2011. has long forgone its ability to lead and This leads to power being re-distributed to organise an active consensus. The via constructed, supra-national con- increasing political instabilities, particu- straints to justify social cuts including larly in some eurozone countries, are cuts to working rights, as well as privati- a symptom of this. Between 2009 and sations and the expropriation of debtors. 2012, there were early elections and gov- This serves to delegitimise the claims ernment reshuffles in 12 EU countries, of people whose primary interest is not of which nine were eurozone countries. ‘stability-oriented’: employees, unions, With the exception of Belgium, these the unemployed and the socially margin- were all caused by disputes over the alised. “To an even greater extent than extent of social cuts under the diktat of before, the re-orientation of the EU is the Troika: the European Commission, becoming a decisive terrain for the strug- the European Central Bank and the gle surrounding social developments, International Monetary Fund. But the also in Germany” (IfG 2011: 6). governments that remained in office, Marx describes a post-democratic situ- for example, in Greece, Portugal, Spain ation in the following terms: democracy and Slovenia, are also unstable. At the is the “complete” political form of the end of February 2013, the Bulgarian capitalist mode of production. “Instinct”, government stepped down, and estab- though, teaches the bourgeoisie that lishing a government proved to be very democracy “at the same time under- difficult in Italy. Be it by social demo- crats or conservatives, authoritarian (the five stars movement), and in Poland, 3 ‘austerity measures’ are being enforced the Palikot Party. Even more worrying is on populations irrespective of mass the fact that the strength of right-wing protests. Even within their own ranks, parties (both populist and extremist) is political parties are losing legitimacy: growing in Greece and Italy. It is growing 1.5 million Portuguese citizens (15 per even more so in Hungary, which has cent of the population) followed the call become the first EU country whose par- by the Indignants movement to protest liament has withdrawn the right of the on the first March weekend in 2013 and constitutional court to determine the demanded – much like demonstrators in conformity of new laws with the consti- Spain – that the government step down tution. This turns the defence of democ- and end their destructive cuts. The Troika racy into a European task, whereby, con- price tag for loans of 78 billion euros for sidering the widespread perception of a Portugal, 65 billion for Spain and 31.5 lack of opportunities for participation, it is billion for Greece (the next credit tranche) necessary to unite the struggles of social consists of strict austerity measures that movements and left-wing parties. will do away with the last remnants of In the core European Union countries, the European welfare state. In Bulgaria, the number of protests will also rise. Par- with its rudimentary welfare state, the ticularly if the agreements – which had to drastic rise of electricity prices and other be signed by Ireland, Greece and Portu- living expenses have not been compen- gal in order to receive EU rescue pack- sated by social security. Consequen- ages – on the deregulation of national tially, people took to the streets day after labour markets and further privatisations day, asserting their right to a home with contained in the Memoranda of Under- heating. Severe confrontations between standing are implemented. France is the police and protesters occurred at the already witnessing protests against end of February 2013, which eventually socialist government policies that, based led Prime Minister Bojko Borissow to on the Gallois report1 and similar to the step down. How long the Greek gov- German Agenda 2010, are spurring a ernment can continue to withstand the cutback of worker’s rights and social pressure of protests and general strikes security. is as unclear as the situation in Slovenia In southern Europe, coercion is laid bare; or Spain, where government politicians effort is no longer made to develop a are involved in corruption, and auster- consensus. Faced by the uncertainties ity measures are implemented without caused by the crisis, the ruling classes remorse. are divided over the measures needed to Wherever the left has become insignif- end it. The regulation of financial markets icant, or social movements are weak or has come to a halt, debt reduction has without political partners or where these failed and financial over-accumulation is partners (and this includes the left) have become part of the establishment and 1 In a report for the French government ex-EADS CEO Louis Gallois proposes 22 measures, part of which he calls “compet- therefore incapable of providing society itiveness shock”, to promote competitiveness particularly in with alternatives, anti-parties develop. industry and the labour markets. In essence, these measures are about reducing unit wage labour costs by 30 billion euros In Italy it is Beppe Grillo’s Cinque Stelle (see also Dell Home/Wolf 2013). 4 growing (albeit more slowly than before The green economy’s potential cannot 2008). Still, with a view to the authori- be exploited under authoritarian neolib- tarian preservation and exercise of state eralism (left-wing Keynesian solutions power, the ruling classes are unified in are currently even less enforceable). their strategic focus on “the state as Antonio Gramsci distinguished between the ultimate guarantor of their survival” two forms of authoritarianism (or Caesa- (Porcaro 2013: 135). This is done ‘step- rism): one that permits only a quantitative by-step’ in the dark, and an incremental development of the particular society (the policy is enthroned as an act of rationality policy of Napoleon III), and forms (relating in uncertain times. The crisis continues to to Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte) that require adaptation, and principles have actually lead to qualitative innovation (see to be thrown overboard: whether this ibid.: Heft 1, 194 f.).