TITLE: Islam, Fundamentalism and Public Policy in Central Asia AUTHOR : Martha Brill Olcott Colgate University THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEA N RESEARC H 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W . Washington, D .C . 20036 PROJECT INFORMATION :* CONTRACTOR : Foreign Policy Research Institut e PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Martha Brill Olcott COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 807-2 6 DATE : March 31, 199 3 COPYRIGHT INFORMATIO N Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b y Council Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th e Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials fo r their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o r make such reports and materials available outside the Council or U .S. Government without th e written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o f Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law . The work leading to this report was supported by contract funds provided by the National Council fo r Soviet and East European Research . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of th e author. CONTENTS Abstract 1 Introductio n Islam in Five Newly Independent Muslim States 2 Islam as Enemy of Progress 5 Islam and State Building, Pre-Independence 7 Islam and State Building, Post-Independence 1 5 Tajikistan and the Problem of Islamic Opposition 18 Islam and Foreign Policy 2 0 Looking to the Future : Contradictions of the Situation . 2 2 Footnotes 25 ISLAM, FUNDAMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL ASI A Martha Brill Olcot t Professor, Political Scienc e Colgate Universit y Abstrac t This paper describes the roles of Islam an d fundamentalism in various aspects of the Central Asia n republics (see the Table of Contents), and concludes : 1) The Islamic revival that began in the late 1970s an d early 1980s throughout most of Central Asia now seem s to be irreversible . Religious training for children ha s gone from being the exception to being the rule . In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan ever y community of size has its own mosque, and religiou s burials and weddings are now the norms, as are bi g celebrations to mark circumcision . Even Kazakhstan' s newspapers constantly report the opening of ne w mosques, wherever Kazakhs live in the republic . Th e same is true in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the sout h where the size of the Kirghiz population is onl y slightly higher than that of the Uzbek . Nonetheless i t is by no means clear that this revival will push th e population towards "fundamentalism," a threat that ha s been much bandied about in the Central Asian an d central Russian press since the outbreak of the civi l war in Tajikistan . 2) In the long run, however, particularly given th e dismal economic picture throughout the region, th e reversion to politics of repression is likely t o increase the popularity of Islamic activists, and mak e them join up with the secret fundamentalis t organizations that are forming throughout the area . As the long campaign against the Muslim Brethren in Egypt , or the clerical movement in Iran have shown, Islami c opposition groups can survive long periods o f government persecution . The Central Asian states gaine d their independence without a revolutionary struggle , and may only now, post-independence, produce thei r revolutionary heroes . Introduction Islam In Five Newly Independent Muslim State s Less than two years ago, Central Asia was a collective ter m for a geographic region of the Soviet Union . Technically five separate republics, for most questions of policy they functione d as one, fulfilling Moscow's directives . This was particularl y true with regard to ideological questions---which included publi c policies toward religion . Now of course, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan , Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are all independent, and technicall y free to pursue their own individual policy lines---toward s religion as well as anything else . Though the rights an d responsibilities of policy-makers have changed, the policy-maker s have not . With the exception of civil-war-torn Tajikistan, eac h of the Central Asian states is still headed by its Soviet-er a president . Moreover these men had little time to prepare for the task s that they face . The USSR's transformation from a single state t o twelve republics occurred with no forewarning and in the span o f a week . By comparison, England's pull-out from India an d Pakistan is one of gradual withdrawal . While there were lots o f signs to indicate that the USSR was on the verge of collapse , Central Asia's leaders ignored these forewarnings . They supported the failing union to the end, making no contingency plans for it s possible demise . In the process of this transition Islam has gone from bein g a minority faith, a largely suppressed religion of the colonized , to being the majority faith of newly independent populations . While the Central Asians once had to hide their practice o f Islam, now they are not only free to follow the dictates of thei r conscience, but laws have been changed to make it easier for the m to do so . However, the question of the relationship of Islam to th e 2 state remains as contentious as ever . In certain situations eac h of the region's presidents has boasted of leading a Musli m nation, while in other circumstances they have denied that thei r countries are Islamic . All five countries are secular states, though constitution s or fundamental state laws in all but Kazakhstan proclaim tha t Islam has a special status . However, none of these societies hav e fully worked out what this special status should be, or to wha t degree the new state's social legislation should overlap th e principles of Shar'ia law . This is an ongoing dilemma in all Muslim societies, and in a broader sense the relationship between religion and state rule i s a problem which all modern civil societies grapple wit h continuously . But the question takes on a special timeliness i n Central Asia, where inflation is rampant and economi c productivity is dropping rapidly, making the region's leader s feel that they are in a battle to forestall disaster in whic h every day counts . In such an environment leaders are particularly sensitive t o neutralize all potential threats . They not only want to stay in power but are concerned that even signs of instability will scar e off potential investors . The search for investors however i s itself a problem . On the one hand Western investors are strongl y partial to secular societies . On the other hand, Muslim societies are themselves good sources of potential investment , but they often link foreign aid programs to projects designed to further propagate the faith . Obviously, it should not be assumed that each of the region's leaders will make the same accommodations with Islam . Historically, Islam has not played an identical role in each o f these societies, and is unlikely to in the future as well . Eve n today, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and initially Tajikistan, have made closer alliance with religious leaders than have those of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan . One reason for this is that the first three countries ar e 3 more mono-religious . Equally important though is the fact tha t the sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks, and even the nomadic Turkmens , were always "better" Muslims than the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads . The whole region is experiencing a religious rival ; new mosque s and religious schools open weekly, and the general popula r observance of religious traditions is increasing . The effect o f this revival is most apparent in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, wher e religious parties have formed and can fairly make claim to mas s membership in selected parts of their respective countries . The pattern this revival is likely to take, and whether i t will "jump" republic boundaries to "infect" neighborin g Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan are both unclear . Numerous factor s will affect the relations that develop between Islam and th e state in each of Central Asia's new-nations . One factor is sure to be the speed or existence of a n economic recovery . The current secular elite may discredit a secular model of development as well as their own leadership i f current economic strategies fail . Another factor will be the law s enacted which regulate religious life . Currently, Islami c parties are banned in each republic . Foreign policy, and the influence of foreign actors wil l also affect developments, as will the developments within th e region itself . Central Asia does not yet have internationa l borders in place between the states of the region ; unarmed religious activists are free to move throughout the region an d even armed "insurgents" are generally able to dodge road-block s such as those now on the mountain passes between Tajikistan an d Kyrgyzstan . One thing is clear . Each of Central Asia's current leader s views a further "tilt" to Islam as antithetical to th e strengthening of their personal political fortunes . Each o f these leaders has advanced a secular model of leadership to hel p strengthen his authority and increase his popularity . Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev sees himself as the leader o f Asia's new economic "dragon", Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akaev style s 4 himself the head of an Asiatic Switzerland, Turkmenistan' s Sapurmurad Niazov has had himself proclaimed "Father" of th e Turkmen people, while Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov sees himself a s a just ruler turned dictator by the force of circumstance, an d Tajikistan's Imomali Rahmonov is the liberator of his people fro m the tyranny of Islamic democracy .