JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations E-ISSN: 1647-7251 [email protected] Observatório de Relações Exteriores Portugal de Sousa Carvalho, Alexandre POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, núm. 1, mayo-octubre, 2016, pp. 19-32 Observatório de Relações Exteriores Lisboa, Portugal Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=413546002003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative OBSERVARE Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 19-32 POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho [email protected] Doctoral student in Political Science at ISCTE-IUL (Portugal), Master's in African Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford, England and graduate of International Relations from the University of Coimbra. Associate researcher at the Centre of International Studies, ISCTE-IUL and consultant at OBSERVARE-UAL Abstract Academic literature tends to reflect the two main objectives of power-sharing: promoting the construction of sustainable peace and serving to structure the foundations for growth and development of democracy in divided societies. reflecting this, two dimensions and discourses of analysis and evaluation stand out: a classical dimension centred on power- sharing as theory and a normative proposal for democracy in divided societies, and another focused mainly on power-sharing as a meachanism of conflict management. This article aims to introduce the reader to discussions about power-sharing, reviewing and critically analysing power-sharing literature to show its gaps and tensions, as well as suggesting some points where one can continue the debate. Keywords Power-sharing; "Consociationalism"; Structuralism; Peace; Democracy; Conflicts How to cite this article Carvalho, Alexandre de Sousa (2016). "Power-sharing: concepts, debates and gaps". JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, May-October 2016. Date of last consultation [online], observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol7_n1_art2 (http://hdl.handle.net/11144/2620) Article received on 16 February 2016 and accepted for publication on 8 March 2016 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 19-32 Shares of power: concepts, debates and gaps Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS1 Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho Power-sharing: Introduction The scientific literature dedicated to power-sharing emerged in the late 1960s as a normative proposal that aimed to provide democratic stability in divided societies2 through the accommodation and inclusion of political elites along with incentives for the promotion of moderation and restraint. Driven mainly by the work of Arend Lijphart (1969; 1977a; 1977b) who defines power-sharing as a "government cartel of political elites"3 that, in essence, is "a set of principles which, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide each significant group in a society with representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to their group" (Lijphart 1977a: 25). The scientific literature on power-sharing corresponds, according to Horowitz (2005), with the study of the political conditions in which violence in multi-ethnic societies occurs and, therefore, the identification of requirements to manage and prevent such conflicts. Therefore, they are studies of political “engineering” with a view to design an inclusive and peaceful institutional framework in divided societies. Power-sharing studies focus on structuring options of political systems that can manage and combat the destructive potential of inter-communitarian divisions (or its manipulation for political purposes). Timothy Sisk (1996: 5) defined the theory of power-sharing as 1 The translation of this article was funded by national funds through FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia - as part of OBSERVARE project with the reference UID/CPO/04155/2013, with the aim of publishing Janus.net. Text translated by Thomas Rickard. 2 Divided society should be understood as a society that is multi-ethnic and, simultaneously, where ethnicity as well as identity questions configure a politically salient division. Reilly (2001:4) 3 Originally, Lijphart (1969:216) wrote "[...] consociational democracy means government by an elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” The term consociational was, as Liphart (2008:6) explains later, replaced by power-sharing. 20 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 19-32 Shares of power: concepts, debates and gaps Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho "a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group". In theoretical terms, power-sharing allows the pacification of clashing groups involved in historical antagonisms and discrimination, in order to enable the construction of just and stable societies through more inclusive political representation. However, the way power-sharing is achieved institutionally is variable and diverse (O'Flynn and Russell, 2005). Thus, power-sharing theories must understand the study of structural conditions in which violence in divided and multi-ethnic societies emerge, as well as the subsequent institutional requirements to prevent such conflicts in a way that is democratically sustainable and inclusive. Often named "constitutional engineering studies", power- sharing theories have the objective of developing an institutional framework that effectively combats the politics of ethnic exclusion of majoritarian models in plural and polarised societies. The dangers of tyranny of the majority The different approaches of power-sharing theories − both in its dimension of democratic theory as well as conflict management) − share a mutual recognition of the limitations and dangers of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided societies and advocate the benefits of political engineering in order to define more inclusive governance models that can mitigate latent conflicts. Both allude to the problems of exclusion in majoritarian systems, such as distortions in political representation and/or the potential of a "dictatorship of the majority", in which minority groups may be permanently unable to obtain political representation or access to political power: “[…] ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting was potentially permanent. ” Horowitz (1985: 629-630) In the international context of the Second World War, newly independent countries had a tendency to assume the same constitutional rules previously established by the old colonial orders (Lijphart 2004). Power-sharing theories originated in this way, in product and response to independence and the difficulties in implementing and consolidating democratic processes in plural societies during the regression of the second wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991). The main premise set out by proponents of power-sharing relates to the disadvantages of the applicability of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided and plural societies. This assumption is based on an empirical assertion that, in plural societies with 21 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 1 (May-October 2016), pp. 19-32 Shares of power: concepts, debates and gaps Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho majoritarian political systems, some segments of society face potentially permanent political exclusion from the electoral game. Larry Diamond (1999:104) summarises the disadvantage of majoritarian models in divided societies, affirming that: "If any generalisation about institutional design is sustainable (...) it is that majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, religious or other emotional and polarising divisions. Where cleavage groups are sharply defined and group identities (and inter-group insecurities and suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group.” In a majoritarian democracy, divided societies tend to perceive electoral competition as a contest for possession and domination of the State and its resources, exacerbating the adversarial dimension of politics as well as its conduct. This perception tends to escalate during electoral periods, since access to political power can represent the guarantee of protection of rights and political, economic and even physical survival. Robert Dahl (1973) refers to the concept of “mutual security” and emphasises its importance during electoral periods in ethnically divided societies, arguing that elections, being the primary forum for inter-group competition, need a minimum level of rights protection because a defeat in the electoral competition could pose a threat to survival. This notion