Political Fences & Bad Neighbors North Korea Policy Making in Japan & Implications for the United States June 2006 A Project Report by The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis James L. Schoff Political Fences and Bad Neighbors: North Korea Policy Making in Japan and Implications for the United States June 2006 A Project Report by: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 675 Massachusetts Avenue 1725 DeSales Street, NW 10th Floor Suite 402 Cambridge, MA 02139 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (617) 492-2116 Telephone: (202) 463-7942 Fax: (617) 492-8242 Fax: (202) 785-2785 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] http://www.ifpa.org/ James L. Schoff Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies For further information, please contact: Cambridge, Mass., IFPA Office Mr. James L. Schoff [email protected] 617-492-2116 Copyright©2006 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Contents Introduction and Acknowledgements v Executive Summary vii North Korea Policy Making in Japan, Then and Now 1 Top-down Policy Making and the 2002 Koizumi-Kim Summit 3 Japan-DPRK Relations since the 2002 Koizumi-Kim Summit: Dialogue vs. Pressure 5 Pressure Groups, Pundits, and the Public 5 Yamasaki’s Initiative and Fukuda’s Isolation 8 Changes in the Government’s North Korea Policy-Making Processes 10 Regional and National Trends Affecting the North Korean Issue for Japan 16 Trade and the Sanctions Card 17 Regional Security Trends 18 Six-Party Talks, Abduction Diplomacy, and the Nationalism Factor 21 The Role of Public Opinion 23 North Korea Policy Making in Post-Koizumi Japan 26 The Cabinet, Factions, and Post-Koizumi Politics 27 Lessons from Vietnam 28 Implications for the United States 29 Terms and Abbreviations 33 Appendix A: Text of the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration A:1 Appendix B: Outline of Japan’s Basic Policies to Deal with the Abduction Issue A:2 Appendix C: Bill on Response to Abduction and Other Human Rights Abuses Issues by North Korean Authorities A:3 References A:4 About the Author and IFPA A:7 Player Profiles Chosen Soren 2 Kazoku-kai 6 Sukuu-kai 7 Pressure Faction 9 Dialogue Faction 11 Cabinet Abduction Issue Task Force 12 iii Introduction and Acknowledgements In September 2005, the Institute for Foreign Policy Anal- nation with Japan is increasingly important for the United ysis (IFPA) began a study of recent trends concerning Ja- States, and the course of the Japan-DPRK relationship will pan-North Korea relations and the mechanics of Japanese influence near-term U.S. strategy and tactics. foreign-policy making toward the Democratic People’s Re- If the six-party process remains unproductive, the Unit- public of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The goal of the ed States will eventually have to make a strategic decision study was to enhance U.S. policy makers’ understanding about if and how it wants to try to break the stalemate, and, of the current and future political dynamics in Japan on the regardless of the choice it makes, strong support from Japan North Korean question, in part by closely examining the un- will be critical to success. Broadly speaking, U.S. policy derlying trends related to Japanese public opinion toward makers can either seek to apply greater economic and dip- North Korea, to the changing personalities and policy-mak- lomatic pressure on North Korea, or they can pursue a more ing habits and structures in the Japanese government, and conciliatory approach. The first option will be difficult with- to ways that the media and policy pressure groups influence out support from China and South Korea, but it could yield the North Korea debate in Japan. This report describes the some results if Japan enthusiastically backs a hard-line poli- findings of the project’s research and interviews, and it seeks cy. An aggressive U.S. strategy would fall apart, however, if to identify the determining factors behind Japan’s evolving support from Japan or the Japanese public wavered; Wash- North Korea policy and to assess their implications for U.S. ington has been surprised before by fluctuating or conflict- policy makers in the near and medium term. ing policy signals in Tokyo. Conversely, the second strategic The basic approach that Japan and the United States cur- option could create serious problems for the U.S.-Japan al- rently employ toward North Korea was articulated at a sum- liance if anti-DPRK sentiment runs much deeper in Tokyo mit meeting in Crawford, Texas, between President George than Washington perceives, or if key Japanese policy makers W. Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro on May 23, are making political calculations based on a continued ad- 2003. This was the first bilateral summit meeting since the versarial relationship with Pyongyang. Some in Japan worry outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October that a multilateral deal with North Korea covering only nu- 2002, and the agreed upon approach can be summarized as clear programs will diminish Tokyo’s leverage over Pyong- an application of “dialogue and pressure…to achieve a peace- yang regarding its own bilateral priorities. ful solution” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003). The Of course, a third option is to stay within the current, calibration of dialogue and pressure has fluctuated from time narrow range of dialogue and pressure policies, but this is to time, and it is not necessarily coordinated explicitly by the a passive approach that essentially accepts a nuclear North two countries, but the range in terms of how both countries Korea over at least the medium term (five to fifteen years) have implemented dialogue and pressure has been quite nar- and ultimately relies on hope that incremental measures row in the last three years. There have been periods when the over time will yield results, or that some other externality pendulum swings one way or the other, but the swings are will lead to positive developments (and that nothing terrible not wide or quick, and the allies have not moved perceptibly will happen in the meantime). Each of these three approach- in opposite directions since the Crawford summit. es (dramatically stepped-up pressure, a noticeable compro- The solidarity between the United States and the Re- mise in dialogue, or maintaining the status quo) carries with public of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), however, has been it various risks and possible advantages. In addition, the po- steadily weakening, and this has constrained Washington’s tential effectiveness of any policy will depend, at least in part policy options regarding North Korea’s nuclear programs. and perhaps significantly, on U.S.-Japan cooperation, and The administration of ROK President Roh Moo-hyun has how well that process of cooperation unfolds could have a been reluctant to consider any hard-line tactics, at times even strong impact on the overall health of the bilateral alliance, working to deflect U.S. pressure. As a result, policy coordi- depending on how each partner perceives the political and vi Introduction security-related stakes involved. Japan’s present, relatively tari Yumi, Ina Hisayoshi, Ishozaki Atsuhito, Ito Naoki, Izu- poor relationships with South Korea and China are anoth- mi Hajime, Frank Jannuzi, Kawakami Takashi, Kawakatsu er important factor to consider in all of this. Moreover, if a Ueki Chikako, Kondo Shigekatsu, Kono Taro, Kurata Hideya, nuclear North Korea remains a reality in the medium term, Michishita Narushige, Nagashima Akihisa, Oshima Takashi, then the United States and Japan, as the two countries with Ted Osius, Saiki Akitaka, Sato Katsumi, Shibata Gaku, Shi- the highest threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea, will noda Tomohito, David Straub, Sugiura Mika, Takashima Hat- likely employ a variety of enhanced defensive measures to suhisa, Takesada Hideshi, Tanaka Hitoshi, Tokuchi Hideshi, protect themselves during this time, which would open up Tosaki Hirofumi, Watanabe Akio, David Wolff, Yamamoto new issues with regard to policy coordination and political/ Ichita, and many others. We are also grateful to Major Gen- bureaucratic communication. eral Yamaguchi Noboru at the National Institute for Defense The IFPA research team began the study by carrying out Studies and to Professor Ito Kenichi at the Japan Forum on an intensive survey and review of Japanese policy literature International Relations for arranging special group meetings and government reports related to North Korea, the abduc- dedicated to this topic. The interviews with U.S. officials tion issue, the six-party talks, U.S.-Japan relations in this were particularly constructive in terms of understanding how context, and the future of Japan’s foreign policy regarding well the government-to-government process of communica- the Korean Peninsula. We looked first at what the relevant tion on these issues is working and whether or not any seri- ministries and affiliated think tanks’ white papers and re- ous gaps exist in priorities and perceptions. ports had to say on these topics since the first Koizumi visit In order to keep the report concise and useful to policy to Pyongyang in 2002, as well as at political party reports makers, background explanations and historical context are and manifestos. The team also surveyed newspaper articles kept to a minimum. There is a good deal of valuable liter- and editorials in the Yomiuri Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, ature available in both Japanese and English regarding Ja- Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, other policy periodi- pan-DPRK relations, past and present, so a chronological cals such as Sekai, Chuo Koron, and Gaiko Forum, and more explanation of how we arrived at the current situation, for popular weekly magazines such as Bungei Shunju, Shukan example, is limited.1 Instead, this report focuses on the most Kinyobi, and Shokun!, along with various books, all in an current trends and determining factors in North Korea pol- effort to shed light on the patterns of argument and then to icy making in Japan, the mechanics of how policy is made link those arguments back to individuals, groups of individ- and influenced, and what this might mean for U.S.