They’re Still There, He’s All Gone: American Fatalities in Foreign Wars and Right-Wing Radicalization at Home* Richard J. McAlexander† Michael A. Rubin‡ Rob Williams§ 09 August, 2021 Abstract What explains right-wing radicalization in the US? Research shows that demographic changes and economic decline both drive support for the far-right. We contribute to this research agenda by 1) studying the elusive early stages in the process of radicalization and 2) highlighting an additional factor that contributes to right-wing radicalization in the US: the impact of foreign wars on society at home. We argue that the communities that bear the greatest costs of foreign wars are most prone to high rates of right-wing radicalization. To support this claim, we present robust correlations between participation in the far-right social media website Parler and fatalities among residents who served in the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This correlation holds at both the county and census tract level, and persists after controlling for the level of military service in an area. The costs of the US’s foreign wars have important effects on domestic US politics. On January 6, 2021, supporters of President Donald Trump illegally breached the U.S. Capitol in an attempt to prevent Congress from certifying then President-elect Biden’s election victory. FBI director Christopher Wray, and later a number of Capitol police officers in Congressional testimony on July 27, described the events as domestic terrorism. Since January 6, nearly all Federal agencies responsible for U.S. national security have declared far-right extremism a grave threat to the country. Though extraordinary, the insurrection of January 6 can be understood as part of a broader trend in far-right radicalization in the U.S.1 Even before the insurrection, the 2020 Homeland Threat Assessment highlighted far-right extremism as an urgent, long-overlooked security concern. Far-right violence is most visibly associated with the “militia” movement (e.g. Oath Keepers, Three Percenters) and white supremacist and racist political organizations (e.g. KKK, Proud Boys, Attomwaffen Division). The most lethal incident of far-right terrorism in American history was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people and injured hundreds more. More recently, individuals steeped in far-right politics have perpetrated mass shootings in Charleston, SC in 2015, Pittsburgh, PA in 2018, El Paso, TX and Poway, CA in 2019, among too many other similar incidents. *We thank Gregoire Phillips for substantial comments on an earlier draft. We also thank Christopher Blair, Anna Meier, and James Fearon for helpful comments. †University of Pennsylvania, Perry World House. ‡University of Connecticut, Human Rights Institute. §Washington University in St. Louis. 1See, among others, Perliger (2020); Jardina (2019); Belew (2019) 1 An individual’s escalation to extremism and violence is rarely sudden or immediate, but rather the culmination of a gradual radicalization process that begins with nonviolent and less provocative activities such as disseminating radical ideas or participating in far-right organizations (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Bartlett and Miller 2012; Miller-Idriss 2020). Analogously, elite polarization, in the form of increasingly radical Republican Party leaders and the discourse dominating Fox News, drives macro-level trends in far-right violence and participation in far-right organizations (Kydd 2021). While only a fraction of radicalized individuals engage in extremism and violence, their nonviolent activities have a variety of other negative consequences; from distorting policy and its distributive benefits to eroding confidence in government and democratic institutions. This research note investigates the early stages of right-wing radicalization in the contemporary United States. Following McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) and Bartlett and Miller (2012), we define radicalization as the process of increasing extremity of beliefs and behaviors challenging the status quo political order and/or the bounds of mainstream political debate. Extremism refers to the beliefs on this continuum that deviate from the status quo to the greatest extent and behaviors that deploy or justify violence. Far-right radicalization and extremism, specifically, refer to objectives to “preserve or restore traditional politics,” or protect the power of those “who have traditionally enjoyed authority, privilege, or wealth” (Jackson 2020, 9–10.). Existing literature highlights two main causes of right-wing radicalization in the United States: economic anxiety and racial resentment toward minorities, potentially rooted in demographic shifts in the population. In the wake of major structural changes in the economy (e.g. globalization and deindustrialization) or financial crises, some who lose careers or financial security may adopt radical populist, nativist, and anti-globalist ideas.2 Following a similar logic, erosion of social capital or increased social isolation may be associated with political expression such as voting for right-wing parties (Bolet 2021). Demographic shifts in the racial or ethnic make-up, and cultural shifts away from conservative or traditional values, may trigger a “cultural backlash” against social and political changes (Norris and Inglehart 2019), especially when the majority or privileged group perceives these trends as threatening to erode their political power in the future (Kydd 2021). The politicization of these demographic and cultural changes leads some to develop out-group antipathies (Kinder, Sanders, and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1983) or deeper attachment to group identity (Jardina 2019), in extreme cases leading to privilege violence against groups perceived as enemies.3 We agree that both economic anxiety and racial resentment explanations are important for understanding right-wing radicalization, but highlight a third factor missing from this debate: the impact of U.S. foreign military engagements on politics and society at home. We argue that communities that bear the costs of these wars, specifically in terms of fatalities among community members, may be more prone to high rates of radicalization. Foreign military engagements swell the ranks of the armed services, and sending young adults to fight means that some will return with physical or 2See, among others, Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler (2019), Baccini and Weymouth (2021). 3See Kleinfeld (2019), McAlexander (2020), among others 2 mental health issues and others will not come back at all. Family and friends that survive those killed may acutely oppose the war effort, assess its achievements unfavorably relative to the costs borne, and distrust and vilify the institutions and politicians that support(ed) its continuation. They may seek out narratives and belief systems that channel their grievances, including from the radical right. In addition to connecting with one another and with veterans sharing their disillusionment with government, those directly affected also socialize other community members into radical belief systems and social/political organizations. Therefore, we expect communities that suffer greater fatalities will generate more individuals participating in the early-stage activities of far-right radicalization, such as sharing (mis)information or expressing support for radical ideas on social media. Experts have long noted a connection between military or law enforcement and far-right politics in the United States. Membership in far-right organizations in the U.S. expands following major war efforts rather than surges in poverty, nativism, populism, or other grievances in the population; and war veterans frequently “bring the war home,” joining and leading these organizations (Belew 2019, 20–21). Many American far-right organizations recruit individuals with military or law enforcement backgrounds for their training and capabilities (Ware 2019) and/or encourage their members to enlist in order to acquire relevant experience (Donnelly 2021). Some veterans may be particularly susceptible to recruitment and radicalization for a variety of reasons. In today’s volunteer force, individuals from the socio-economic, demographic, and cultural backgrounds that the economic anxiety and racial resentment arguments suggest are more prone radicalization are disproportionately represented in the military. Paralleling the Vietnam War story (Belew 2019), those who served in Iraq and Afghanistan may confront a sense of futility as their counterinsurgency and state-building efforts repeatedly failed to change the security situation due to political realities on the ground, while political backlash against the wars among the population at home may contribute to a sense that their service is unappreciated. Our argument complements this work by emphasizing the effects of military engagements on society more broadly, examining the individuals and communities disproportionately affected by military engagements beyond (exclusively) those who serve. We provide evidence for this claim by examining publicly available data from Parler, the online social media platform now infamous as a forum for right-wing radicalization, which includes geo-located information on users’ uploaded videos. Efforts to measure early stages of radicalization systematically typically face major barriers: extremist organizations remain clandestine, individuals may be wary of revealing their participation, and, unlike violent incidents, the