Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations Michael Krepon & Julia ompson, Editors SEPTEMBER 2013 Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations Michael Krepon Julia ompson Editors September 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS 7 Preface Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center 9 Introduction Amb. Lincoln P. Bloom"eld, Jr., Stimson Center 13 List of Acronyms and Key Terms 15 Space and Nuclear Deterrence Michael Krepon, Stimson Center 41 The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear Deterrence and Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar - Yet Profoundly Different Karl Mueller, RAND Corporation 61 Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies 81 Deterrence and Crisis Stability in Space and Cyberspace Bruce W. MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace 101 The United States and China in Space: Cooperation, Competition, or Both? Michael Nacht, University of California, Berkeley 113 U.S.-China Cooperation in Space: Constraints, Possibilities, and Options Brian Weeden, Secure World Foundation 131 Annex: A Comparison of Nuclear and Anti-satellite Testing, 1945-2013 Michael Krepon and Sonya Schoenberger, Stimson Center 6 Introduction US national security experts spend years studying, seeking to avoid and sometimes helping to mediate or prosecute con#icts. Over time, veteran policy hands in the exec- utive and legislative branches, as well as academia, thinks tanks and the media, come to believe that they understand all the important dimensions of security. And yet, for most, one dimension – space – presents a signi"cant gap in their understanding. Space’s importance is major, growing and underappreciated inside the Washington Beltway. Over a half century ago, the US-Soviet space race captured the imagination of the American people, and the manned space program from the 1960s onward bred na- tional competence in the design, manufacture and launch of rockets, satellites and payloads with ever-greater capabilities. Scienti"c study, helped by access to space, #ourished. Civil and military use of space-based communications grew fast as the internet, personal computing and cellular telephony gained widespread adoption be- ginning in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the Pentagon recognized that the US military had developed a dependence on spaced-based communications, such that a sudden denial of space-enabled information in wartime could impair the e$ectiveness of combat units. e military saw from wargaming simulations of future con#ict that space assets were like a crystal goblet: exquisite but easily shattered. An adversary would naturally con- template measures to disable US forces’ ability to command and control operations across an entire theater of operations, and to access real-time intelligence and target- ing data supplied from distant sources. e enormous war"ghting advantage a$orded to US forces by space systems was, because of its vulnerability, perceived as an Achilles heel. e conclusion was logical: space had to be defended. Space became a “domain,” talked about by defense analysts as one of several discrete arenas of potential confrontation, like air, land, sea or nuclear – or more recently, cyber. For security experts, these can be useful categories; yet here is where the un- derappreciation of space becomes acute. It is not just that traditional “terrestrial” war- fare, involving loss of life, destruction of property and territorial conquest imposes readily-visible costs that society has long recognized as vital interests, while the idea of attacking satellites in space seems a lesser level of aggression. e deeper problem is with the long-term consequences of destructive con#ict in space, for these may be 9 poorly anticipated by policymakers during a time of hostilities, and yet, in retrospect, these may prove to be more regrettable than all but the most destructive acts of war in the other “domains.” Presidents in the 21st century will expect to exercise close control over any major future crisis; many regard the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as the template for wise, clever, well-advised presidential decision-making in an escalating confrontation. And yet, as useful as experience from the nuclear playbook is, wargames have suggested important di$erences, one of which is that the space domain imposes a particularly forbidding time element on the management of a space crisis. Not only will time be lost in detecting that US space systems have been interfered with, but knowing with certainty that a space system anomaly was due to attack, and assigning unmistakable attribution, will consume precious time as well. Because entire constellations of valuable satellite systems rotating the Earth could be destroyed quickly if indeed an adversary is targeting them, military commanders with expertise and responsibilities in the space domain will press for an immediate presi- dential grant of authority to take action. Are security generalists comfortable that they could advise the president on decisions and actions that would best serve the US inter- est in such a scenario? What makes this domain, and the study of deterrence in space, at once di$erent and underappreciated, is the a%ermath. Conventional wars can produce fearsome destruc- tion; lost lives cannot be replaced, but societies recover. Even the nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima instruct us that relatively small nuclear exposure of civil- ian populations can be extremely hazardous and hard to manage; yet societies can pursue measures to cope with their e$ects, and recover. Imagine, however, a future con#ict in which space assets are targeted with destructive force. e US Air Force Space Command in recent years hosted wargaming exercises that simulated, in one instance, hostilities that required US and allied forces to operate for “a day without space.” While loss of space-based communications was mitigated by terrestrial systems, the consequences for operating in space were certainly not rem- edied in a day. Indeed, participants were le% to speculate if the United States might be contemplating a century or even much longer “without space.” Consider what this could mean for the reputation of the United States, and for the tra- jectory of human discovery. Unchecked, hostile action in space could produce debris, orbiting the earth at nine times the speed of a bullet, so prevalent as to put at risk all 10 sophisticated spacecra% including satellites. is could place manned and unmanned space #ight at unacceptable risk of mission failure due to catastrophic collision with debris. Not only would investment in, and insurance for, advanced spacecra% and launch engineering be extinguished. Of much greater importance, mankind’s access to space for exploration and pursuit of knowledge would be closed o$ – for young and old alike, for schoolchildren, scientists and aspiring astronauts, in America and around the world, possibly for a very long time. A more toxic legacy for US security policy would be hard to conceive. at is why the study of space deterrence should matter to all policymakers, and why the Stimson Center’s Space Security project, led by Stimson co-founder Michael Kre- pon, is pleased to present this collection of six essays studying deterrence of destruc- tive acts in space, drawing from lessons from the nuclear era. I hope you "nd them of interest. Lincoln P. Bloom"eld Jr. Chairman, Stimson Center 11 Acronyms and Key Terms A2/AD – anti-access/area denial ASAT – anti-satellite BMD – ballistic missile defense GEO – geosynchronous orbit GGE – Group of Government Experts GPS – global positioning system ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile ICOC – International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ITAR – International Tra(c in Arms Regulations LEO – low Earth orbit LTBT – limited test ban treaty MEO – middle Earth orbit MIRV – multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration NRO – National Reconnaissance O(ce OST – Outer Space Treaty PNE – peaceful nuclear explosions PLNS – pre- and post-launch noti"cation system PNT – precision navigation and timing PPWT – Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the reat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects SALT – Strategic Arms Limitations Talks SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative SEIS – space-enabled information services START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty TCBMs – Transparency and Con"dence Building Measures UNCOPUOS – United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space WMD – weapons of mass destruction 13 Space and Nuclear Deterrence By Michael Krepon “Space deterrence” is de"ned here as deterring harmful actions by whatever means against national assets in space and assets that support space operations. Analogously, nuclear deterrence is de"ned as deterring harmful actions by means of nuclear weap- ons. Concepts of nuclear deterrence have been well developed. In contrast, attention to space deterrence has been sporadic during and a%er the Cold War, sparked mostly when anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities have been tested. ese concerns faded a%er the demise of the Soviet Union, and have now revived with the advent of China’s am- bitious space program. DEMONSTRABLE VS. INFERRED DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence and space deterrence have common elements as well as distinct di$erences. No di$erence is more striking than with respect to the visibility of nuclear deterrence capabilities