Routledge advances in South Asian studies Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism 1 Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia Edited by The compound crisis of 1990 Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez P.R Chan, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Philip Cohen 2 Coalition Politics and Hindu NationaJism Edited by Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez 'j <I '.;.; . , ~ ~ 1 ~ 8~.• m ~ ~ ~l ~ ~ ,I j .'I ~ ~ I~ ~~o~:!~~~~up ~ LONDON AND NEW YORK Contents ix List of illustratilms x List of contributors xiii Acknowledgements Glossary of acronyms and concepts xv PART I 1 Theoretical concerns Introduction. Coalition politics, religious nationalism and public policy: a theoretical examination 3 KATHARINE ADENEY AND LAWRENCE SAEZ 1 The BJP coalition: partisanship and power-sbaring in 13 'lj government 'I ,~ ALISTAIR Me MILLAN 36 ~~ 2 The shapes of Hindu nationaIism .. ~ ,j JOHN ZAvas 3 In part, a myth: the BJP's organisational strength 55 ~:1 /i JAMES MANOR "'1 ,j ;j PART II "! Domestic governance 75 4 The NDA and the politics of 'minorities' in India 77 SUBRATA K. MITRA 5 Hindu nationalists and federal structures in an era of 97 regionalism I KATHARINE ADENEY i il ~ ~~ viii Contents 6 Social justice and empowennent of the weaker sections and gender rights 116 lliustrations NITYA RAO 7 Managing the anti-corruption rhetoric: the N ationaI Democratic Alliance, transparency and corruption 136 GURHARPAL SINGH 8 Indian education policy under the NDA government 153 MARIE LALL PART III Figures 171 External factors 225 ILl Defence expenditure in $ (billions), 1988-2002 Defence expenditure as a percentage ofGDP, 1988--2001 227 9 The NDA and the politics of economic refonn 173 11.2 lL3 Defence expenditure as a percentage of government ROB JENKINS expenditure, 1988--2001 227 10 The NDA and Indian foreign policy 193 JAMES CHIRIYANKANDATH AND ANDREW WYATT Map 212 239 II The NDA and national security 12.1 Electoral results, 2004 APURBA KUNDU 12 The BJP and the 2004 general election: dimensions, causes Tables and implications of an unexpected defeat 237 25 Ll Allocation of government portfolios between parties, 1998 27 CHRISTOPHE JAFFRE LOT 1.2 Allocation of government portfolios between parties, 1999 ':~ •."'.' Response to statement: 'There is greater brotherhood ~.'~,-:,. 13 Hindutva's march halted? Choices for the BJP after the 4.1 among Hindus and Muslims' 89 2004 defeat 254 4.2 Response to statement: 'Injustice has been done to ;.~." MEGHNAD DESAI '::~ Christians' 90 ~. 4.3 Response to statement: 'Government is responsible for the , 91 Bibliography 264 protection of the interests of minority communities ! 289 5.1 Topics in the 1999 NDA manifesto relating to ~l'!.: Index 101 1;, constitutional and legal reforms 5.2 Constitutional amendments under the NDA 102-3 12.1 Performance of the BJP over 20 years of general elections I ;1 in India 238 1 12.2 The share of the Hindi belt MPs of the BJP in 1991-2004 241 ! 12.3 The BJP's performance in elections 1991-2004; state-wise 242 9 The NDA and the politics of economic reform Rob Jenkins Introduction The NDA Government continued the process of economic reform initi­ ated by the INC Government in 1991, and sustained by the United Front Government during 1996--98. Faced with the need to deepen second­ generation refanns, the NDA encountered a more complex set of chal­ lenges than its predecessors. The political implications of a broadened agenda - combined with shifts in the nature of party competition, federal relations and political mobilisation, not to mention the economy itself - have made managing the poli tics of economic reform particularly daunt­ ing during the )\TDA era. In common with the other contributions to this volume, this chapter assesses the role of coalition politics, ideological constraints and external forces in shaping the NDA's perrormance in power. The chapter argues that the content, pace and sequencing of economic reform was to a con­ siderable extent influenced by all three factors, though not necessarily in ways that might have been predicted at the time the NDA came into office. In the area of economic reform, the NDA faced the challenge of preventing the three constraints from merging together in ways that would make the task of liberalising the Indian economy even more daunt­ ing than it already was. Aspects of Hindutva, for instance, were constantly in danger of becoming wedded - through such RSS-linked front organisa­ tions as the SJM - to a form of economic nationalism that cast external forces (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multinational capital generally) as the nefarious drivers of the govern­ ment's liberalisation programme. To the extent that the BJP's junior coali­ tion partners were susceptible to the economic nationalism aspect of this logic, the three forces were often perilous~y dose to solidifying into a formidable composite constraint. This was prevented both by skilful poli­ tics on the part of the ,coalition's managers, and also by certain structural factors. For instance, while the idea of economic nationalism was appeal­ ing to certain NDA elements (for crass political reasons as much as any ideological commitment to economic autarky), the Hindutva thrust given j 74 Rob Jenkins The NDA and the politics of ecorwmic reform 175 to these ideas by the likes of the SJM was anathema to them, indeed dis­ well. When a group is affected by more than one type of 'reform', there crediting the otherwise sacrosanct idea of swadeshi in certain quarters. l are few universally reliable, and comparatively applicable, measures for The relative influence of each of these three factors on the process by determining whether, in the case of an individual household or medium­ which the NDA pursued economic liberalisation varied across time, across sized firm (to say nothing of a diversified conglomerate), the losses from policy domains and across reform tasks. Perhaps the most notable trend one species of refonn - such as changes to the tax code - are fully offset has been the continuity in the tactics used to manage the politics of by other aspects of liberalisation, such as increased foreign competition reform. The NDA Government continued with the tendency towards resulting from reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade. Machiavellian politics displayed by its predecessors, including continued In addition to the difficulty of deciding upon the most relevant agenda reliance on India's federal institutional structure to negotiate awkward items for political analysis there is a second obstacle to assessing the politic_alc\ilemmas, NDA's performance. This is the problem of determining the validity of Whether the momentum of reform slowed under the NDA, or whether basic economic indicators associated with second-generation refonns. (as the World Bank argued in 2003) 'the pace of reforms has slowed since Huang and Khanna (2003), for instance, argue that we must challenge the mid-j990s' (2003: i), depends very much on one's view of what consti­ our most basic assumptions about what phenomena require explaining. tutes 'reform', whether the earlier stages of reform are considered politic­ For instance, China's lead over India in tenns of FDI inflows, they argue, ally less demanding than later stages, and how much allowance is made is quite possibly grossly overstated. This is because Chinese tax laws create for the broader economic environment within which reform takes place. incentives for economic actors to conceal earnings and to bring them Indeed there are inherent analytical obstacles that confront any analyst back into circulation in the form of foreign investments, namely the phe­ seeking to characterise the NDA Government's performance on economic nomenon known as 'round-tripping'. While China's figures have been reform. The. first is the difficulty of determining the appropriate standard overstated - Huang and Khanna claim that estimates could be up to twice against which to assess performance. Should we adopt process standards - as high as actual inflows - India's numbers have been understated. It is indicating policy measures introduced - or outcome standards, indicating possible, they argue, that India's foreign investment levels are double what what the policies yielded? If we adopt process standards, as this chapter the official statistics indicate. If they are right, then the two countries' mainly does, should these be conceived of dichotomously - either a refonn respective foreign investment performances, in terms of inflows as a per­ was or was not effected - or 'continuously', on the basis of gradual progress centage of gross domestic product (CDP), are pretty close to converging, towards a policy shift? The case of labour policy illustrates this point. While with investment into China equalling 2 per cent of total domestic output legislative amendments to the much-criticised Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) compared to a figure of 1.7 per cent for India. of j 947 were not affected - to say nothing of its outright abolition, as some Regardless of whether a process or outcome standard is considered might like - steps in this direction were taken, such as clearance by the most appropriate, what constitutes an acceptable threshold for successful cabinet of certain IDA amendments. reform remains unclear. Should the NDA be judged against its manifesto Were we to adopt outcome measures, even more problems would arise. commitments? Or would the known preferences of key decision makers Certain policy changes take years